





DEMOCRACY IN SPITE OF THE DEMOS: ARENDT, THE DEMOCRATIC TURN, 
































Presented to the Department of Philosophy 
and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 







DISSERTATION APPROVAL PAGE 
 
Student: Larry Alan Busk 
 
Title: Democracy in Spite of the Demos: Arendt, the Democratic Turn, and Critical 
Theory 
 
This dissertation has been accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in the Philosophy Department by: 
 
Dr. Rocío Zambrana Chair 
Dr. Colin Koopman Core Member 
Dr. Bonnie Mann Core Member 
Dr. Gabriel Rockhill Core Member 




Janet Woodruff-Borden Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School  
 
Original approval signatures are on file with the University of Oregon Graduate School. 
 



























Larry Alan Busk 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 








 This dissertation examines the limits of the figure of democracy as a critical 
category in contemporary political philosophy. I frame the analysis around a structural 
tension in the work of several authors who rely on democracy as a theoretical foundation, 
which I call “the elitist-populist ambivalence.” This theoretical tendency regards 
democracy as a categorical imperative—a foundational normative principle and an end in 
itself—but simultaneously delimits the composition of the demos by disqualifying certain 
political actors from the status of the political, thereby violating the parameters of a 
categorical imperative by specifying conditions. In other words, the democratic turn 
appeals to formal concepts but decides the political content in advance. It advocates 
democracy on its own terms, democracy in spite of the demos. But if democracy has 
normative purchase only under certain conditions, then our critical political theory must 
be based on these conditions rather than the figure of democracy. 
 The project focuses on three main bodies of literature: the work of Hannah 
Arendt, the tradition of radical democracy (exemplified by Jacques Rancière, Chantal 
Mouffe, and Ernesto Laclau), and early Frankfurt School critical theory (Theodor Adorno 





“democracy,” her work is of interest to this project because it represents a stark 
expression of the elitist-populist ambivalence: a political ontology based on democratic 
iconography and a simultaneous delimitation of who should count as the demos. The 
discussion of Rancière, Mouffe, and Laclau explores the ways in which these figures 
reproduce not only Arendt’s democratic motifs but also her constitutive exclusion. Albeit 
with divergent political commitments, they both appeal to democracy in spite of the 
demos. Finally, Adorno and Marcuse provide an alternative to the categorical imperative 
of democracy. By critically confronting the social mediations of pervasive popular 
ignorance and irrationality, the early Frankfurt School displaces the normative force of 
the figure of democracy by a critique of the actually existing demos. This critique, I 
argue, allows us to steer a theoretical course between the perils of elitism and the 








NAME OF AUTHOR:  Larry Alan Busk 
 
 
GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED: 
 
 University of Oregon, Eugene 





 Doctor of Philosophy, 2018, University of Oregon 
 Master of Arts, Philosophy, 2015, University of Oregon 
 Bachelor of Arts, Philosophy, 2013, Webster University 
  
 
AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST: 
 
 Social and Political Philosophy 





 Graduate Employee, University of Oregon, 2013-2018 
  
 
GRANTS, AWARDS, AND HONORS: 
 
Joe Frank Jones III Graduate Student Essay Award, “Right-wing Populism and 
Democratic Values: A Challenge from the Frankfurt School,” Award for best 
graduate student paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society for 
Philosophy in the Contemporary World, 2018  
 
 Intensive Language Course Grant, DAAD, 2016 (declined)  
 
 Philosophy Matters Prize, “Sleepwalker: Arendt, Thoughtlessness, and the 
Question of Little Eichmanns,” Award for best graduate student paper in the 












 Busk, Larry Alan. “Radical Democracy with What Demos? Mouffe and Laclau 
after the Rise of the Right.” Radical Philosophy Review 21, no. 2 (forthcoming 
October 2018).  
 
 Busk, Larry Alan. “Looking Like Number Twelve: The Twilight Zone and the 
Culture Industry.” In The Twilight Zone and Philosophy, edited by Alexander 
E. Hooke and Heather Rivera. Chicago: Open Court, 2018. 
 
 Busk, Larry Alan. “History as Chiasm, Chiasm as History.” Philosophy Today 62, 
no. 1 (2018): 285–98. 
 
 Busk, Larry Alan, and Billy Dean Goehring. “Narcissus and the Transcendental: 
Merleau-Ponty, Deleuze, and the Challenge of Meillassoux.” Chiasmi 
International 19 (2017): 401–16. 
 
 Busk, Larry Alan, and Elizabeth Portella. “Who Are the True Machiavellians? 
Althusser and Merleau-Ponty Reading The Prince.” Rethinking Marxism 29, 
no. 3 (2017): 405–15. 
 
 Busk, Larry Alan. “Two Women in Flight in Beauvoir’s Fiction.” Southwest 
Philosophy Review 33, no. 1 (2017): 105–14. 
 
 Busk, Larry Alan. “It’s a Good Life? Adorno and the Happiness Machine.” 
Constellations 23, no. 4 (2016): 523–35. 
 
 Busk, Larry Alan. “Westworld: Ideology, Simulation, Spectacle.” Mediations 30, 
no. 1 (2016): 25–38. 
 
 Busk, Larry. “Anti-Intellectualism’s Not Dead: Romano, Lysaker, and American 
Philosophy.” The Pluralist 11, no. 2 (2016): 49–63. 
 
 Busk, Larry. “Sleepwalker: Arendt, Thoughtlessness, and the Question of Little 
Eichmanns.” Social Philosophy Today 31 (2015): 53–69. 
 
 Busk, Larry. “The Violence of the Political and the Politics of Violence: ‘Dirty 
Hands’ Reconsidered.” Sartre Studies International 21, no. 1 (2015): 53–74. 
 
 Busk, Larry, and Billy Dean Goehring “What Is a Working-Class Intellectual?” 










This project benefited immensely from conversations with various friends and 
colleagues, especially Eli Portella and Billy Dean Goehring. I am also grateful for group 
discussions following presentations at several academic conferences, in particular the 
Critical Theory Workshop/Atelier de théorie critique in Paris, the Critical Social 
Ontology Workshop in St. Louis, and the Society for Phenomenology and Existential 
Philosophy in Memphis. Finally, I owe a debt of gratitude to my incomparably supportive 
and generous dissertation committee, above all Dr. Zambrana; without her tireless 






































I. INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................................  1 
 The Democratic Turn and the Categorical Imperative ...............................................  4 
 Democracy or Delusion? ............................................................................................  17 
 
II. ARENDT’S ISLAND OF FREEDOM ........................................................................  25 
 A Political Ontology ...................................................................................................  25 
 Islands of Freedom and Seas of Necessity .................................................................  36 
 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................  47 
III. DEMOCRACY AT ITS LIMITS—RANCIÈRE, MOUFFE, AND LACLAU .........  52 
 Rancière: Democracy against Philosophy ..................................................................  53 
 Mouffe: Agonism without Agony ..............................................................................  65 
 Laclau, Laclau and Mouffe, and the Undemocratic Demos .......................................  74
 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................  87 
IV. FROM “FALSE DEMOCRACY” TO FALSE DEMOS ...........................................  89 
 Socially Necessary Delusion and the Logic of Opinion .............................................  91 
 Climate Skepticism and the False Demos ..................................................................  99 
 Back to Ideology? .......................................................................................................  107 
V. WHAT IS ELITISM? ..................................................................................................  113 
 The Incompetence Principle .......................................................................................  115 
 The Problem with the People .....................................................................................  120 
 Elitists and Populists...................................................................................................  128 
 Concluding Remarks ..................................................................................................  133 




CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 This project examines the limitations of the figure of “democracy” as a critical 
category in contemporary political philosophy. I frame the analysis around a structural 
tension that pervades the work of several theorists who make use of democratic 
iconography in an axiomatic way, a tension I term “the elitist-populist ambivalence.” 
This theoretical tendency regards democracy as a categorical imperative—i.e., as a 
foundational normative principle and an end in itself—but simultaneously delimits the 
composition of the demos, thereby violating the parameters of a categorical imperative by 
specifying conditions. In other words, it appeals to formal categories but decides the 
political content in advance. It advocates democracy on its own terms, democracy in spite 
of the demos. But if democracy has critical purchase only under certain conditions, then 
our theoretical intervention must be based on these conditions rather than the figure of 
democracy. There are situations, to take the point a bit further, when what constitutes a 
problem is not a “democratic deficit” but, in fact, the opposite. In a time of pervasive 
popular ignorance and delusion, a reliance on democratic iconography obfuscates the 
potentially questionable character of the demos, rendering us incapable of comprehending 
or confronting dangerous and pathological political tendencies (e.g., climate skepticism, 
xenophobia). What is called for in this case is not a theory of “false democracy” but a 
theory of “false demos.” The question then would not be “how do we give the people a 
voice?” but “why do the people speak so wrongly?” If our theoretical commitments are 
rooted in an analysis of the present with an emancipatory aim, then the figure of 
democracy is limited and even problematic in its critical value. 
 The project focuses on three main bodies of literature: the work of Hannah 
Arendt, the tradition of radical democracy (exemplified by Jacques Rancière, Chantal 
Mouffe, and Ernesto Laclau), and early Frankfurt School critical theory (Theodor Adorno 
and Herbert Marcuse). Though Arendt betrays no particular commitment to the term 
“democracy,” she has been decisively influential for the democratic turn in Continental 
political theory. Her work is of interest to this project because, in my estimation, it 





and its concomitant elitist-populist ambivalence. The discussion of Rancière, Mouffe, and 
Laclau highlights the extent to which these figures reproduce not only Arendt’s 
democratic motifs but also her constitutive exclusion (even if it is not the same 
exclusion). Albeit with divergent political commitments and disparate theoretical 
concerns, both Arendt and radical democratic theory appeal to democracy in spite of the 
demos. Finally, Adorno and Marcuse provide an alternative to the categorical imperative 
of democracy. By critically confronting popular ignorance, irrationality, and delusion, 
and by understanding these phenomena as inextricably linked to the contradictions of a 
given social totality, the early Frankfurt School perspective displaces the normative force 
of the figure of democracy by a critique of the actually existing demos. This critique, I 
argue, allows us to steer a theoretical course between the perils of elitism and the 
equivocations of populism.  
 
 Contemporary political theory abounds with competing claims to offer the most 
‘robust’ account of democracy at both normative and descriptive registers.1 The only 
thing taken for granted across the spectrum is that democracy as such is a political-
theoretical baseline—“we’re all democrats now,” as Wendy Brown remarks ironically.2 
Typically, and not without some justification, theorists with a critical orientation focus 
their attention on the distance between the realities of prevailing nominal ‘democracies’ 
and something (a structural change, a better procedure, an impossible ideal) that would 
constitute a ‘real’ or ‘true’ democratic politics.3 My concern in this project is not with 
                                                 
1 For catalogs of different approaches, see Held, as well as Terchek and Conte. As Held notes, the figure of 
democracy has not always commanded the overwhelmingly positive connotation that it does today—in 
fact, for most of the history of political theory, exactly the opposite attitude prevailed: “From ancient 
Greece to the present day the majority of political thinkers have been highly critical of the theory and 
practice of democracy. A general commitment to democracy is a very recent phenomenon” (1). Cf. Roberts 
and McClelland. 
 
2 See Brown (2012). Recently, some dissident voices in critical theory have challenged the deification of 
democracy (see Rockhill, 51-102, and Dean (2009), 77-94). Though my argument follows a different 
trajectory, I regard my intervention as consonant with theirs. In the analytic tradition, Brennan has directly 
argued against democracy and in favor of “epistocracy.” I will discuss Brennan’s argument in chapter four 
and differentiate it from my own conclusions. 
 
3 With the possible exception of Diamond, all of the contemporary democratic theorists cited in the 
introduction fit this basic pattern, as do the radical democrats discussed in chapter two. See also Wolin 
(2010), Rahman, Mair, MacLean, Urbinati, and Milligan. At the extremity of this tendency is Derrida’s 





determining the right theory or model of democracy, nor with envisioning its as-yet-
unrealized true form. Rather, I am interested in whether democracy (however understood) 
functions coherently as a critical category in our present political moment. The central 
question is: if we are interested in thinking the conditions for the possibility of a less 
antagonistic, oppressive, and self-destructive world, can the figure of democracy and its 
accompanying iconography function as a critical tool of analysis? By answering in the 
negative, I do not mean to suggest that critical theory become ‘anti-democratic,’ which 
would simply trade one formalism for another. Still less do I mean to proscribe the use of 
the term in situations where it might be strategically effective. The figure of democracy 
has historically served an important function in various emancipatory movements that 
have produced positive results. The same could be said for the figure of nationalism, but 
this does not establish the critical-theoretical force of nationalist iconography for the 
present conjuncture.  
 Defining at the outset what I mean by “democracy” would be counterproductive, 
as the analysis will be guided in each case by how the philosopher under discussion 
understands it. The word, as Robert Dahl notes, “is like an ancient kitchen midden 
packed with assorted leftovers from twenty-five hundred years of nearly continuous 
usage.”4 I refer to “the figure of democracy” because “figure” captures the rhetorical 
function and kaleidoscopic connotations of the term while allowing variation in its 
theoretical content in a way that “idea” or “concept” does not; a figure is less than a 
concept but more than an empty signifier. My use of “iconography” is likewise meant as 
a placeholder to track all of the evocative markers or indicators of democracy—popular 
power, plurality, debate, doxa, public space, etc.—without reducing it to a set of 
necessary and sufficient conditions in advance. The suggestive homage to religious 
reverence is intentional and will, I hope, be justified by the end of the discussion.  
This project focuses on a particular domain of democratic theory. Different 
theoretical models—deliberative, participatory, liberal—make use of somewhat different 
iconography. In the examples below, we will see the elitist-populist ambivalence present 
                                                                                                                                                 
suggests that democracy will never exist, in the sense of a present existence: not because it will be deferred 
but because it will always remain aporetic in its structure…” (86).  
 





in Marxists, liberal humanists, pluralists, and others. But I focus on radical democratic 
theory because it represents the most explicit and sustained attempt to suture the figure of 
democracy to the projects of critique and resistance. It is my hope that, mutatis mutandis, 
the terms of the analysis will apply to other variations on the democratic theme as well, 
inasmuch as they posit a relationship between democracy and the aims of critique.5 
 
The Democratic Turn and the Categorical Imperative 
 “It is the task of the left,” writes Todd May, “to think and act upon democracy. In 
many ways, it has always been the task of the left to do so […] Conservatism by its 
nature seeks to resist change, or at best to allow change to happen slowly.” If this is true, 
then the problematic of this project becomes a kind of non-sequitur: there is no need to 
explain why the formal terms of democratic iconography are inevitably instantiated with 
a particular content, because this content is synonymous with the democratic form. 
“Democracy is about everyone,” May continues, “not simply those in power. Democracy 
almost always is a challenge to tradition. That is why its creation is a task belonging to 
the left.”6 Democracy, then, is a critical, emancipatory category by definition.  
There are a few peculiarities in May’s line of reasoning, however. Notice that 
“change” is taken to mean ‘change for the better’ or ‘change in a Left-progressive 
direction’; the changes demanded or accomplished by the Right—e.g., the dismantling of 
social welfare programs, restrictions on immigration—apparently do not count. If one 
takes these changes to be good or necessary, then one could easily reverse May’s 
formulation and say that “the Left by its nature seeks to resist change.” The notion of 
“challenging tradition” is equated with Leftism, without further specification about which 
traditions and what kind of challenge, as if being oppositional or heterodox as such were 
enough to determine the content of one’s politics. There is a similar problem with his 
claim that “democracy is about everyone.” Is the Right not included in this “everyone”? 
If it is, then how is democracy both about everyone and about the Left? The category 
May opposes to “everyone” is “those in power.” Are we to believe that the Right covers 
                                                 
5 One conspicuous omission is the model of democracy developed by Habermas. This is mainly because I 
cannot add anything to the critiques of the dangers and limits of Habermas’s formalism that have already 
been developed, for example, by Thompson (esp. 51-59), Abromeit (2017), and Chari (esp. 73-77).  
 





the category of “those in power” while everyone without power is, by default, a member 
of the Left? 
 This passage and its peculiarities represent, in microcosmic form, the current of 
thought that I want to challenge in this project. The idea that there is some immediate 
relationship between democracy and a particular kind of politics, that more democracy 
necessarily translates into a less oppressive or regressive social world, has become a 
largely unquestioned presupposition in numerous quarters of critically-oriented political 
theory. With this democratic turn, the figure of democracy has taken on a self-evidently 
emancipatory aura. At the same time, this emancipatory currency depends on the careful 
delimitation of the demos, a qualification of which ‘people’ are to be given ‘power.’ 
Implicitly or (in May’s case) explicitly, democracy is understood at once as a formal 
armature and as containing within it particular content. 
This ambivalent moment is ubiquitous enough to show up in figures as otherwise 
distant from one another as Cornel West and Larry Diamond. In Democracy Matters, 
West states that “the basis of democratic leadership is ordinary citizens’ desire to take 
their country back from the hands of corrupted plutocratic and imperial elites.”7 He also, 
however, explicitly connects “the deterioration of democratic powers” to the rise of “the 
Christian Right.”8 Members of the latter apparently do not qualify as “ordinary citizens,” 
and their “desire to take their country back” is not democratic enough. Diamond’s In 
Search of Democracy doubles down on this collapsing of form and content: 
Imagine a world in which all states were democracies […] A world of universal 
democracy would not be a perfect world. Many democracies would no doubt still 
be illiberal, but the framework of democracy and an open society would generate 
public pressure to gradually move them in a more liberal direction. […] It would 
be a world of dramatically fewer human rights abuses, greater personal and press 
freedom, less corruption, less violent conflict, and quite conceivably a world that 
had put an end to interstate war. It would be a world that no longer sponsored or 
tolerated mass killings like the Rwandan genocide […] It would be a world 
without famine […] It would be a more just world.9  
 
                                                 
7 West, 23. 
 
8 Ibid, 2. 
 





If only Rwanda had more of the “qualities of democracy”—according to Diamond: 
universal suffrage, elections, multiple parties, access to information, public 
accountability, and “citizen satisfaction”10—the mass slaughter of the Tutsis by the Hutus 
might have been avoided. Setting aside the gross oversimplification involved in this 
claim, notice that it assumes a direct correlation between democratic “qualities” and 
particular results; this denies from the outset the possibility that elements of the demos, 
and even decisive elements, might still condone or participate in genocide, interstate war, 
and human rights abuses in spite of fair elections, government transparency, and “public 
pressure”—they might be the public, after all.   
  Theorists with avowedly Marxist commitments have also made the democratic 
turn, as exemplified by the opening question of Jerry Harris’s Global Capitalism and the 
Crisis of Democracy: “Can the power of democracy overcome the power of global 
capitalism?”11 Along these lines, Ellen Meiksins Wood’s Democracy against Capitalism 
traces the historical lineage of the concept of democracy back to its etymological roots as 
‘rule by the laboring class,’ while Richard Wolff’s Democracy at Work: A Cure for 
Capitalism argues for employee ownership and management of business enterprises. Also 
worth mentioning in this context (although she is less of a straightforward Marxist) is 
Brown’s Undoing the Demos, which presents neoliberalism as a system bent on the 
destruction of democratic values and traditions. Underpinning all of these analyses is the 
premise—illustrated by the cover of Harris’s book—that people are everywhere 
clamoring for less capitalism, neoliberalism, etc., and that certain institutions or certain 
powerful individuals are thwarting this demand.12 It then becomes a question of ‘the 
people’ versus a small handful of elites, as if the people are already opposed to these 
systems and it is just a matter of giving them a power they lack. This prevents us from 
                                                 
10 See ibid, 33-44. 
 
11 Harris, 11. Cf. Howard’s The Specter of Democracy, which argues that Marx’s own work, if creatively 
reconstructed, points not to classless society but to something like radical democracy. He claims that Marx 
was unable to see the truly radical (i.e., democratic) implications of his own theory because he was too 
“philosophical” (xiii). Abensour (2011) argues along similar lines. Even Lukács, near the end of his life, 
published a book called The Process of Democratization, which critiques the Soviet model on the grounds 
that “Stalin [did not create] the political base for socialist democracy” (133). At the same time, however, he 
writes that “the masses must be reeducated, reactivated, and once again feel their potency” (151).  
 






considering the possibility that the demos is in some way complicit with the systems 
under critique and is thus part of the problem. Harris attacks the “market 
fundamentalism” of politicians such as Jeb Bush,13 but does not dwell on the fact that 
millions of people have voted for Bush (and many others like him). Wolff asserts that 
“worker self-directed enterprises” would be more environmentally friendly,14 but does 
not entertain the prospect that the workers directing a given energy firm may not believe 
in climate change. In diametrically opposing neoliberalism and democracy, Brown 
obscures the fact that substantial parts of the demos (the Tea Party in the U.S., for 
example) are in favor of and have even struggled for the neoliberal “stealth revolution.” 
And if, to take up Wood’s argument, the actually existing laboring class does not 
understand its oppression as a product of capitalism, then democracy vs. capitalism is a 
false dichotomy insofar as increased power for this class would not, automatically, 
translate into a post-capitalist system. This is no mere logical point, as it indicates the 
terms by which capitalism is to be critiqued and the place of democracy in such an 
undertaking. 
All of the figures mentioned so far take for granted that certain Left-progressive 
content is inscribed within the formal terrain of democratic iconography, be it liberal 
humanist (Diamond) or anti-capitalist (the Marxists). This project will focus on a 
particular justification for the democratic turn, one that not everyone mentioned so far 
would assent to but one that offers an argument for the critical value of the figure of 
democracy. 
It is difficult to give a singular name to this argument, because its advocates 
employ widely varying vocabularies. It operates according to two basic, closely related 
hypotheses. First, it states that ‘the political’ is ‘autonomous’ and irreducible with regard 
to other categories like ‘the economic’; the former possesses its own structure, its own 
problems, and its own rewards.15 Second, it understands the political as the realm of 
opinion and debate, of doxai in confrontation with one another, and not as a matter of 
                                                 
13 Harris, 13. 
 
14 Wolff, 133-134. 
 
15 While still maintaining democracy as a critical foundation, Brown (1996) has forcefully criticized the 
Left’s turn to “the autonomy of the political,” arguing that it amounts to a tacit acceptance of global 





truth, guided by reason, struggling to overcome illusions and establish the definitively 
right kind of society—a characterization that would lend the political the qualities of a 
science or a metaphysics and thus deprive it of its specificity.  
A succinct and oft-cited expression of the first thesis can be found in Paul 
Ricœur’s 1957 essay “The Political Paradox,” where he posits “the relative autonomy of 
the political [le politique] compared to the socio-economic history of societies.”16 If ‘the 
political’ has a specific and autonomous logic, then there are specifically political goods 
and harms, and it is this specificity that endows the figure of democracy with its 
normative force. The second thesis is encapsulated in Claude Lefort’s frequently quoted 
phrase from a 1983 essay: “[D]emocracy is instituted and sustained by the dissolution of 
the markers of certainty.”17 The basis of legitimate political power, his argument goes, 
has been unmasked as an “empty place,”18 historically contingent and lacking any 
ultimate foundation that might be uncovered through rational inquiry or analysis. A 
democratic society is one that organizes itself around this indeterminacy, while 
totalitarianism attempts to deny the absence of an ultimate ground by appealing to some 
substantial foundational myth. Both of these moments entail a renunciation of the 
philosophical ambition to prescribe definitive or authoritative political content (both 
Ricœur and Lefort articulate this explicitly).19 Because the political is autonomous and 
because its markers of certainty have dissolved, Plato’s philosopher kings and Rousseau’s 
“lawgiver” appear at best as hopeless intellectual endeavors and at worst as oppressive 
totalitarian fantasies. Politics is about doxa, not about truth. The only political system—
or normative criterion—adequate to this understanding of ‘the political’ is democracy. 
  Through various iterations and formulations, these two theses inform a current of 
the democratic turn in political theory concerned with suturing the critical project of 
                                                 
16 Ricœur, 261. This essay initiated the distinction between le politique (usually translated as ‘the political’) 
and la politique (usually translated as ‘politics’), which has had a long life in French political theory. I 
quote here the original French in my own translation, as Kebley misleadingly renders “la politique” as 
“polity.” 
 
17 Lefort, 19. 
 
18 Ibid, 12. Cf. Barber: “Where there is truth or certain knowledge there need be no politics…But 
democratic politics begins where certainty ends” (349).  
 





emancipation to the figure of democracy.20 Insofar as its appeal to democratic 
iconography as a critical foundation draws on these two ontological postulates, I will 
refer to this tendency as the categorical imperative of democracy. The reference is of 
course to the Kantian moral system, and specifically to the way Kant characterizes the 
relationship between the categorical imperative and autonomy: 
If the will seeks the law that is to determine it anywhere but in the fitness of its 
maxims for its own legislation of universal laws, and if it thus goes outside of 
itself and seeks this law in the character of any of its objects, then heteronomy 
always results. The will in that case does not give itself the law, the object does so 
because of its relation to the will. This relation…admits only of hypothetical 
imperatives: I ought to do something because I will something else. On the other 
hand, the moral, and hence categorical imperative says that I ought to act in this 
way or that way, even though I did not will something else.21 
 
The categorical imperative is capable of prescribing a moral law because it is not 
determined by any external demand or circumstance but only by the internal structure of 
the will itself. The democratic categorical imperative likewise establishes its normative 
currency on the formal structure of ‘the political’ over against any specific political 
content. Acknowledging the ontological priority of autonomy and the dissolution of 
certainty means granting democracy the status of an end in itself, not consigning it to 
merely instrumental or conditional value (i.e., rendering it a hypothetical imperative); 
determining the ‘right’ course of politics by means of something other than its own 
nature—reducing it to economic interests or deciding it by appeal to facts—is to 
introduce something heteronomous into the political and thus distort its status as such.  
At the same time, however, this formalism is supposed to coincide with an 
emancipatory, progressive political orientation, just as Kant’s rarefied and abstract moral 
law, ostensibly cleansed of anything empirical, ends up conforming to the Christian 
                                                 
20 These two theses are not mutually inclusive. The primary figures under discussion here take them to be 
reciprocally implicating, but contemporary philosophers from other domains of democratic theory have 
advanced arguments that maintain “political cognitivism” while insisting on the specificity of the political 
and on the value of democracy. See Estlund and Copp. Historically, these two theses have a long lineage, 
though they have traditionally been understood as mutually exclusive rather than mutually inclusive, 
corresponding roughly to the two kinds of “freedom” discussed in Berlin’s classic essay. Lefort’s 
formulation corresponds to the stark rejection of paternalism characteristic of Berlin’s “negative liberty” 
(what might be called a broadly “liberal” impulse), while Ricœur’s insistence on autonomy points to the 
performative dimension of “positive liberty” (what we could call a “republican” value). See the insightful 
history by Bobbio.   
 





mores of his time.22 More or less surreptitiously, the heteronomy that was banished 
reasserts itself. The formal categories are infused with a content that does not essentially 
belong to them, and this unsanctioned admixture is meant to lend the figure of democracy 
its critical purchase. This is accomplished by delimiting the demos, i.e., by selectively 
focusing the attention on instantiations of formal democratic iconography that coincide 
with a particular content and relegating other, undesirable content  to a status beneath or 
opposed to the formal categories, or by simply ignoring it. This is what I mean by 
“democracy in spite of the demos.” As we have already seen, this logic is present in the 
democratic turn at a broad level, but since my project focuses on a particular 
manifestation of this turn (the categorical imperative), I will concern myself with how it 
shows up in the context of this manifestation.  
Let me cite a few examples of the tendency I have in mind. Over the course of 
several books, William Connolly has developed an account of “deep pluralism,” which he 
sums up succinctly as a “bicameral orientation to political life.” This orientation involves 
maintaining two sometimes conflicting perspectives: first, a commitment to one’s own 
“faith, doctrine, creed, ideology, or philosophy,” be it “Marxism…a branch of 
Christianity…orthodox Judaism, Kantianism, Rawlsianism, neoconservatism, or 
pragmatism,” and second, an appreciation of “how [this creed] appears opaque and 
profoundly contestable to many who do not participate in it,” together with a “struggle 
against the tendency to resent this very state of affairs.”23 Connolly’s approach goes 
beyond advocating for formal legal protection of private beliefs, insisting that deep 
pluralism requires a “public ethos” and that its understanding of politics must be 
“multidimensional” (i.e., not limited to representative government).24 Although he does 
not articulate it in exactly these terms, his account of bicameral pluralism draws on a 
conception of the political as autonomous and indeterminate in the ways described above. 
He also understands this form of pluralism as essential to democracy and vice-versa.25   
                                                 
22 See, for example, the discussion of marriage and sexuality in the Lectures on Ethics (Kant 1997), 155-
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Against this backdrop, Connolly occasionally remarks that the contemporary 
political situation has dimmed the prospects for a realization of this democratic 
aspiration. “The agenda of deep pluralism,” he writes, “is not in the cards ‘today’ because 
the right wing holds so many of those cards.”26 Side by side with a leveling of content—
Christianity, Marxism, and neo-conservatism are all so many “creeds”—there is the 
suggestion that certain (“right wing”) political commitments are fundamentally 
inappropriate; content is exiled as irrelevant and then returns as decisively important. 
Ostensibly, the explanation for this is that Right-wing politics is inherently anti-pluralist, 
and therefore violates the categorical imperative demanded by “bicameralism.” But with 
pluralism defined in such formal terms, there is no a priori reason why the Right should 
be denied admittance on the basis of its content. Connolly gives no account of how or 
why certain “creeds” would lend themselves more easily to bicameral political life than 
others; both liberal humanism and Christian conservatism could be pluralist (cognizant of 
and comfortable with the contestability of its creed) or anti-pluralist (dogmatic and closed 
to discussion). There is consequently no explanation of why one is necessarily more 
democratic than another. By equating Left-progressive politics with pluralism and 
excluding the Right, Connolly collapses form and content at the same time as he defends 
a strictly formal normative political theory.  
Connolly might argue that the Right, once in power, tends to be anti-pluralist by 
universalizing its particular creed (free market fundamentalism, traditional Christian 
mores, etc.) in the form of legislation that marginalizes or oppresses other viewpoints.  
But from the perspective of those who subscribe to this creed, the secular liberal 
humanism of the other side does the same thing once in power; they could (and do) 
understand legalized abortion, for example, as an attack on their religious belief system, a 
coercive universalizing of particular values at the expense of others. If the Left held more 
cards, the Right would have equal cause to denounce the monochromatic political climate 
and accuse its opponents of stifling pluralism. By eliding this possibility, not recognizing 
that the Left seems as anti-pluralist to the Right as vice-versa, Connolly performs the 
very failure of bicameralism that his theoretical intervention was meant to address. 
                                                 





We find a more detailed example of this ambivalence in Nancy Fraser’s Scales of 
Justice. The central thesis is that a political theory concerned with justice must combine 
the economic and cultural dimensions of “redistribution and recognition” with an 
attention to specifically political inequities and misrepresentations. Appealing to “the 
irreducible specificity of the political,”27 she argues that a unique form of injustice occurs 
when certain actors are denied access to the process of “frame setting,” i.e., determining 
who can be counted as a political subject and what can be counted as a political issue—
“the meta-discourses that determine the authoritative division of political space.”28 
Disparities in access and representation occur not just at the level of particular policy 
decisions, but also at the level of the “grammar” through which politics is made 
intelligible, at the level of social ontology. The persistence of the “Westphalian model,” 
in which politics concerns only ‘citizens’ and takes place strictly within and between 
‘states,’ has led to a “democratic deficit” that is not appropriate to an increasingly 
globalized and complex world. It thus becomes necessary for a theory of justice to 
include “struggles for meta-political democracy,”29 establishing avenues through which 
politically marginalized actors can express grievances of “misframing” and enact change 
at this level. The point is not to arrive at the final or ‘right’ frame, but to provide 
mechanisms by which frames can be contested and multiplied.   
 Both moments of the categorical imperative are present in Fraser’s approach: the 
political has a specific logic, but its content is indeterminate and open to contestation. A 
normative political theory must therefore root itself in democracy. But notice that Fraser 
appeals simultaneously to the necessity of democratizing the process of frame-setting and 
to a notion of “misframing.” Will those who endorse the outmoded “Westphalian” model 
of politics be included in the democratic frame-setting process, even though we have 
decided in advance that their frame is inadequate? The response might be that this model 
is the dominant one, while democracy at the level of frame-setting is meant to give voice 
to forms of oppression unintelligible within the prevailing system. The consequence of 
this, however, would be an indiscriminate legitimization of any novel “grammar” insofar 
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as it is understood as novel by its advocates. I have already alluded to the Tea Party; one 
might well conceive this movement as the struggle for a previously unrecognized hyper-
libertarian “frame” in which taxation and social welfare programs are forms of 
oppression against ‘entrepreneurs.’ The objection that such a social ontology is not truly 
novel does not go very far: for devotees, this ‘oppression’ is sufficient to warrant a new 
movement and new vocabulary.  
 Of course, Fraser is not interested in endorsing all novel political grammars as 
such. “Social movements disclose new dimensions of justice,” she writes, “when they 
succeed in establishing as plausible claims that transgress the established grammar of 
normal justice, which will appear retrospectively to have obscured the disadvantage their 
members suffer.”30 A new question forms: what counts as success and plausibility? By 
any quantifiable metric, the Tea Party movement has had success in shifting public 
discourse and policy in the U.S. (and by extension the world).31 Fraser does not want to 
say that all political contestations are automatically legitimate, and so she combines the 
“multi-dimensional social ontology” informing the project with a “normative monism”: 
“As soon as we accept that injustices of misframing can exist in principle, we require 
some means of deciding when and where they exist in reality. Thus, a theory of justice 
for abnormal times requires a determinative normative principle for evaluating frames.”32 
She finds this monism in “the all-subjected principle,” which states that “all those who 
are subject to a given governance structure have moral standing as subjects of justice in 
relation to it.”33 With this criterion, we could determine that the feminist movement’s 
appeal to ‘misframing’ is legitimate and that the claims of the ‘men’s rights activists’ are 
not.34 This is because women are subjected to the governance structure of patriarchy, 
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while men are not actually oppressed in any way by feminism, “political correctness,” 
etc.  
At this moment the argument becomes circular, as an account of who is subject to 
what “governance structure” will depend upon a particular “frame”—a given social 
ontology or “grammar”—and so the criterion for adjudicating between legitimate and 
illegitimate frames already assumes what it is meant to appraise. In other words: we can 
only apply the normative principle from within a given frame, and so it cannot function 
as a means of evaluating when a social movement has “established a plausible claim.” If 
one’s political grammar includes “the war on Christmas,”35 to take another example, then 
this frame passes the test of “the all-subjected principle” insofar as, in this imaginary, 
devout Christians are subjected to a form of governance by secularism, academic elites, 
or whatever. Normative monism cannot determine if this contestation represents a 
genuine injustice of misframing without reinstating the same “democratic deficit” that it 
sought to remedy. While the entire project hinges on a democratic multiplication of 
frames that rejects “appeals to authority,”36 a particular frame is taken as a fait accompli. 
Again, the gulf between form and content cannot be bridged without sacrificing one or 
the other. 
A final example. Oliver Marchart’s Post-Foundational Political Thought offers a 
self-conscious reflection on the problem I have been articulating, drawing explicitly on 
Ricœur and Lefort. He insists on the ontological (as opposed to merely ontic) 
consequences of the autonomy and indeterminacy of the political; the “post-foundational 
turn” does not only mean that the “ground” for any particular politics is undermined, but 
also and more significantly that the notion of a “final ground” itself becomes untenable.37 
Political movements can and should still attempt to provide grounds for themselves, but 
always against the backdrop of this constitutive limit (what he calls a “quasi-
transcendental”38), the impossibility of arriving at an uncontestable and exhaustive 
foundation. Drawing on Mouffe and Bonnie Honig, Marchart argues that traditional 
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political philosophy is an attempt to “displace” politics itself by appealing to a fixed and 
final foundation.39 The interesting moment for our purposes comes when he considers the 
implications of this ontological thesis for our ontic concerns:   
If we take seriously the notion of a politico-ontological difference, then we should 
recognize that we will never be able to secure an ontological ground that would 
found or determine a particular ontic politics (emancipatory or not)—such a move 
would clearly be self-contradictory. And…we can easily imagine a conservative 
post-foundational skepticism which is not necessarily democratic or 
emancipatory. [notice the distancing of conservatism and democracy] So, if to 
derive a particular politics from a post-foundational stance would be a clear non-
sequitur, then it seems that the only political argument which can be made starting 
from the political difference is a non sequitur argument.40 
 
To a certain extent, his line of thought here seems to mirror my own: a recognition of the 
autonomy and uncertainty of the political does not entail or correspond to any political 
content. He goes so far as to say—pace Ricœur and Lefort, Connolly and Fraser—that it 
does not even entail democracy. He explicitly criticizes the equation of “post-
foundationalism” and Leftist/progressive political aims, referring to this false equivalence 
as “emancipatory apriorism.”41 
Marchart then retreats from this conclusion, first by reattaching the post-
foundational turn to the figure of democracy and then by bringing emancipation back into 
the fold: 
[D]emocracy is to be defined as a regime that seeks, precisely, to come to terms 
with the ultimate failure of grounding rather than simply repressing or foreclosing 
it […] Claude Lefort’s argument as to the dissolution of the markers of certainty 
and as to the emptying of the place of power in democracy implies that 
democracy is the regime which comes closest to accepting the absence of an 
ultimate ground. 
 
…the displacement of politics is an act that tries to conceal its own political 
nature, and thus its own contingency, historicity, conflictuality and ungroundable 
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status. If, on the other hand, democracy and emancipation must be conceived of in 
a post-foundational way…then it is of vital importance for an emancipatory 
project to defend a post-foundational approach. 42 
 
Through this gesture, he sutures the categorical imperative of democracy and 
emancipatory politics from the other direction—claiming that emancipation necessarily 
entails “the specificity of the political” and “the dissolution of the markers of certainty,” 
rather than vice-versa. Though the categorical imperative of democracy is no longer a 
sufficient condition for Left politics, it is still a necessary condition. In this case, content 
is not surreptitiously introduced into form, but form into content. Our critical question 
can likewise be reversed: would it not be of equally vital importance for a conservative 
Right-wing project that regarded itself as democratic to defend a post-foundational 
approach? If, as he argues above, there is no necessary connection between a post-
foundational understanding of the political and emancipatory politics, then there is also 
no necessary connection between the latter and democracy—which is defined by the 
extent to which it “comes to terms” with its indeterminate situation. To say that an 
emancipatory project demands a post-foundational approach is another non-sequitur, as 
this approach is demanded by any project that does not “conceal its own political nature,” 
regardless of its content. In foregrounding the relationship between post-foundationalism 
and Left-progressive political content, minimizing the potential relationship between the 
former and any other project, Marchart rehearses the categorical imperative of democracy 
in spite of his critique of “emancipatory apriorism.”  
 These examples are only sketches. The next two chapters of this project attempt to 
trace in detail the ambivalent structure of the democratic categorical imperative, first in 
Arendt and then in the “radical democracy” of Rancière, Mouffe, and Laclau. Beginning 
with Arendt may seem counterintuitive, as she does not advocate a Left-progressive 
political project in any unambiguous way. Her work is of central importance for this 
discussion not only because of its strong influence on the Left democratic turn, but also 
because it reveals in the most emphatic way the elitist-populist ambivalence at work in 
the categorical imperative. She develops a political ontology anchored in democratic 
iconography—conforming to the two theses articulated by Ricœur and Lefort above—but 
                                                 





at the same time excludes much of the demos from the status of ‘the political.’ My 
argument in the third chapter is that Rancière, Mouffe, and Laclau repeat this basic 
Arendtian maneuver, albeit with a different object of exclusion. In their hands, this 
democratically oriented political ontology is meant to coincide with a critical, 
emancipatory political project—but this coincidence is accomplished by, as it were, 
staying faithful to Arendt and disqualifying parts of the demos from consideration. 
 In pointing to an elitist-populist ambivalence, I do not have in mind the “paradox 
in the theory of democracy” as described by Richard Wollheim and others.43 In this 
account, there is a potential contradiction between one’s desire for a certain outcome and 
the desire that this outcome be decided democratically. If I support democracy and also 
support policy x, and if policy x is decided against by the democratic process, then I both 
support and do not support policy x. Theorists in the critical milieu, however, do not 
typically understand democracy as ‘whatever policy the majority supports should be 
enacted,’ nor are they content to combine this principle with liberal-constitutional 
safeguards to protect against ‘the tyranny of the majority’ or with ‘proceduralist’ caveats 
that insist on a fair and open deliberation process. If democracy is to be critical, the 
argument goes, it must have a more fundamental, deeper, or (as we will explore in 
chapter three) more ‘radical’ meaning than just ‘majority rule.’ The ambivalence comes 
when this democratic depth is taken, without justification, to coincide with a particular 
political project and to exclude others a priori. The problem does resemble Wollheim’s 
inasmuch as it relates to the tension between form and content. Here, however, it is not a 
matter of two potentially conflicting commitments (a commitment to democracy and a 
commitment to certain outcomes), but the supposition that these commitments are 
actually identical.   
 
Democracy or Delusion? 
The categorical imperative of democracy and its elitist/populist ambivalence 
would be an innocuous theoretical oversight if the object of its exclusion were only a 
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negligible extremity. If the examples we consider (France’s Front national, men’s rights 
activism, climate denial) were only liminal or speculative cases, my critique would 
likewise remain at an abstract, ahistorical level, content to point out the surreptitious and 
ambivalent introduction of content into the nominally formal iconography of democracy. 
The Left democratic turn carries a more serious danger, however, when its ‘other’—the 
part of the demos that it refuses to esteem as democratic—attains a dominant or decisive 
position in actually existing politics. When ignorance, Right-wing extremism, and 
delusion solidify into active and successful political movements, the theory that maintains 
the figure of democracy as a critical foundation is forced to make one of two choices: 
either grant these phenomena an emancipatory or progressive status, or ignore them 
altogether. Except in occasional and cautionary moments, typically accompanied by an 
unjustified disqualification (as we have already seen and will see again throughout 
chapter three), the democratic turn has opted for the second option. At best, it 
characterizes pernicious political tendencies as the responsibility of a small handful of 
elite powers exerting their will over and against the will of the people (e.g., Harris as 
discussed above). The possibility that ‘the people’ also will these pernicious tendencies is 
thus denied from the outset. By its very structure, the categorical imperative of 
democracy prevents us from acknowledging the popularity of regressive or pathological 
political positions, thereby also preventing us from critically analyzing or confronting 
them. West, for example, writes: 
As I’ve traveled across this country giving speeches and attending gatherings for 
the past thirty years, I’ve always been impressed by the intelligence, imagination, 
creativity, and humor of the American people, then found myself wondering how 
we end up with such mediocre and milquetoast leaders in public office. It’s as if 
the best and brightest citizens boycott elected public office…44 
 
This becomes less mysterious if we admit the unpleasant reality that drastically more 
people in this country attend sermons by evangelical preachers than lectures by public 
intellectuals. The real danger of the democratic turn does not lie in any logical 
incoherence, but in its failure to come to terms with this disturbing fact about the present 
political conjuncture. 
                                                 





The ‘other’ of the democratic turn, in other words, is not a thought experiment. 
Around fifty percent of the U.S. population doubts the scientific consensus on 
anthropogenic climate change, and many do not believe that the climate is changing at 
all.45 Elected officials like Senator James Inhofe—who brought a snowball to the floor of 
the Senate to discredit climate science, authored a book on the subject called The 
Greatest Hoax, and served as chair of the Committee on Environment and Public 
Works—continue to command decisive constituent support.46 Around a third of this 
population also disbelieves that human beings have evolved to their present state, and 
twenty-nine percent think that former president Obama is a Muslim.47 In several states, 
school textbooks are rewritten to expunge the history of American racism—one actually 
referring to slaves as “workers.”48 On the public stage of political discourse, we can hear 
major politicians claim that the U.S. has never supported dictatorships.49 During one of 
the 2016 primary debates, former Senator Rick Santorum opined that "Islam is not just a 
religion. Islam is Sharia Law. It is also a civil government. It is also a form of 
government. The idea that that is protected under the first amendment is wrong. There 
will have to be a line drawn.” The large audience then applauded.50 These widespread 
and egregious misrepresentations—by no means limited to the U.S. and by no means 
exhausted by this list—are not mere harmless mistaken beliefs; at our present historical 
moment, they are assuming a position of momentous political significance. Shortly after 
the U.S. presidential election, Oxford English Dictionaries named “post-Truth” the word 
of 2016,51 and a top advisor in the new administration made headlines when she referred 
to “alternative facts.”52 Facing all of this, one is tempted to invoke Tocqueville’s 
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Democracy in America and declare that “a new political science is needed for a totally 
new world.”53 At the same time, the increasing visibility of this phenomenon should not 
lead us to think that it is new. What we are experiencing now is only a particularly stark 
expression of a politics of delusion which long predates the 2016 election and which 
made this historic moment possible. 
When the democratic turn appeals to ‘the people’ (which it does in various 
sophisticated ways), it does not mean the people who applauded Senator Santorum’s 
“Islam is Sharia Law” comment. When it valorizes “new social movements,” it does not 
mean the Tea Party or ‘men’s rights activism.’54 When it ontologizes doxa as the essence 
of the political, it does not have in mind the doxa that anthropogenic climate change is a 
massive Left-wing conspiracy. But are these people not also people, these movements not 
also movements, these doxai not also doxai?  
This line of thought may invite an objection from democratic theorists of a 
deliberative persuasion. They might argue that democracy can only fully function, and 
thus maintain its normative force, if the democratic citizenry is “informed.” What 
democracy holds in esteem is not “raw public opinion,” to use James Fishkin’s 
terminology, but the voice of the people “after it has been tested by the consideration of 
competing arguments and information conscientiously offered by others who hold 
contrasting views.”55 Or, following Joshua Cohen’s formulation, we might say that a 
commitment to democracy requires a recognition of “reasonable pluralism” rather than an 
indiscriminate legitimation of all values that any element of the demos might hold. A 
value is “reasonable,” according to Cohen, “just in case its adherents are stably disposed 
to affirm it as they acquire new information and subject it to critical reflection.”56 
Ostensibly, then, climate skeptics and xenophobic nationalists would be excluded from 
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the normative winners’ circle because their positions, according to the intellectually 
demanding conceptions of democracy established here, are not “informed” or 
“reasonable” and thus not yet fully democratic.57 
If we take this objection at its word, we arrive at the bizarre conclusion that the 
demos may be thoroughly undemocratic, and that democratic values may bear absolutely 
no relation to ‘the people’ as they are presently constituted—an oxymoronic result 
expressed by the title of Yascha Mounk’s The People vs. Democracy. We should ask, in 
this case, why the term democracy is maintained even if its form is entirely divorced from 
the prevailing content of the demos. This question is especially pertinent insofar as the 
“informed opinion”/“reasonable value” stipulations posit a divide between the current 
“voice of the people” and something that would constitute its true voice, raising the 
further question of how this divide could be bridged democratically.58 Unless the 
criterion for establishing what counts as an ‘informed opinion’ or a ‘reasonable value’ is 
also arrived at through the democratic process, in which case the proviso becomes 
meaningless, the stipulation that the demos be of a certain rational caliber shifts the 
normative force away from democracy and toward rationality or reasonableness.  The 
peculiarly of this Rousseauian conclusion—that the people must be shown how to 
properly exercise their will—is expressed most clearly by Carl Schmitt in his Crisis of 
Parliamentary Democracy: “The consequence of this educational theory is a dictatorship 
that suspends democracy in the name of a true democracy that is still to be created […] 
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only political power, which should come from the people’s will, can form the people’s 
will in the first place.”59  
The ominous implications of Schmitt’s argument aside, the reasonable/informed 
caveat has devastating consequences for a theory that regards democracy as an end in 
itself. If we are confident that deliberation will yield results that point away from 
positions like climate skepticism and xenophobia, then we have decided the correct 
political result in advance of the democratic process. We are, in effect, identifying 
democracy with the right politics and then dismissing the wrong politics on the grounds 
that it is undemocratic, no matter how much popular support it commands. If a 
commitment to democracy means that we want the people to have power provided that 
the people hold certain values and believe certain things—which may not coincide with 
what they actually believe and value—then everyone is a democrat, and our differences 
come down to differences of content. Christian absolutists could profess a faith in 
democracy provided that everyone is a Christian. Commitments to democracy with 
provisos about “informed” or “reasonable” views—where “informed” is taken to mean 
“believes in climate change” and “reasonable” to mean “has a critical perspective on the 
history of racial oppression”—accomplish the same thing. Even a monarchist could 
support democracy, provided that the demos always defers to the monarch, and this is 
why Schmitt claims that “dictatorship is not antithetical to democracy.”60 These are so 
many forms of democracy in spite of the demos. As soon as we assume that certain 
results will follow from democratization, and justify democracy on that basis, the critical 
weight is placed on the results rather than the democratization. If, on the other hand, we 
are not confident that deliberation will point away from climate skepticism and 
xenophobia, and regard the success or failure of democracy strictly on the basis of its 
procedure,61 then we must ask ourselves if a commitment to democracy is worth these 
potentially troubling outcomes.   
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The categorical imperative of democracy rejects the notion that there is some 
definitively correct political result external to its democratic iconography, rightly seeing 
that this would void the normative specificity of democracy; its theorists likewise 
distance themselves from the idea that democracy is synonymous with ‘majority rule.’ 
Yet the impulse to disqualify certain political movements as undemocratic on the basis of 
their content remains intact, as we have already seen and will see again in chapter three. 
But the Right-wing demos, unfortunately for the democratic turn, is still the demos. 
Climate skepticism and xenophobia are still parts of its voice, its kratia. I am not 
suggesting that critical political theory should begin taking these positions seriously in 
that sense that one takes well-given advice seriously; rather, my claim is that we should 
take these phenomena seriously in the sense that one takes an eminent danger seriously. 
The categorical imperative of democracy prevents us from doing the latter, and if it were 
consistently maintained—which it rarely if ever is—would demand that we do the 
former. It wants it both ways: to avoid conferring legitimacy on these pathological and 
far-Right views, and to avoid a critical analysis of them that might drift into ‘anti-
democratic’ territory. Given the increasingly evident dangers harbored by the politics of 
delusion, we can no longer remain in abeyance here; we are forced to make a choice.  
The last two chapters of this project explore what form this choice might take. 
Chapter four engages with Adorno and Marcuse, focusing on the former’s “Opinion 
Delusion Society” and the latter’s “Repressive Tolerance.” In these pieces and elsewhere, 
they develop an account of pathological political “opinion” as an expression of 
antagonistic, contradictory social relations. This culminates in what I will call a theory of 
“socially necessarily delusion,” otherwise called “ideology.” I argue that our present 
political conjuncture is better theoretically understood and critically confronted by a 
theory of social delusion than by the logic of democracy as a categorical imperative. The 
democratic ethos of the Left, as I hope to have indicated already and to explore more 
deeply in chapter three, is fraught with a tension between its political content (whereby it 
excludes certain perspectives as inadmissible in some way) and its formal normative 
categories (which preclude the possibility of such exclusion). The theory of ideology 
developed by Adorno and Marcuse allows us to go beyond this elitist/populist 





appraisal of the demos. Rather than providing and defending a formal concept of “the 
political” while surreptitiously or unjustifiably determining its content, they orient their 
analysis at the level of the latter.  
The final chapter will respond to one of the criticisms of ideology critique that has 
led to its perceived obsolescence in recent years: the charge of “elitism.” Ideology 
critique, its opponents suggest, presupposes a fundamentally anti-democratic division 
between intellectual knowledge and mass culture, a division that preserves the power of 
an elite intelligentsia by making it the guardian of a truth inaccessible to the multitude. 
To address this concern, I will provide a brief history of the argument for elitism that has 
been part of Western political philosophy since Plato, which I call “the incompetence 
principle.” I will then distinguish this argument from the approach of the early Frankfurt 
School. For the incompetence principle, the prevailing ignorance and irrationality of the 
demos reveals an essential characteristic of its nature; for Adorno and Marcuse, however, 
the phenomenon of “socially necessary delusion” reflects a contingent, historically 
specific situation that can and must be transformed through critical education and 
practice. 
This distinction will allow me to respond to the charge of elitism. The democratic 
turn criticizes ideology critique as elitist, but this judgment depends on an equivocation 
between an essentialist claim about the abilities or prerogatives of a given class or group 
of people (the incompetence principle) and a diagnosis of the momentous political 
problem of mass delusion, which is not necessary and eternal but reflects a historically 
specific reality (Adorno and Marcuse). The latter, I argue, should not properly be called 
elitism. In fact, insofar as it insists on withholding altogether the title of “the political” 
from certain (Right-wing) political movements, the elitist label belongs more 
appropriately to the categorical imperative of democracy than to ideology critique. 
Returning to the early Frankfurt School, we are in a position to avoid both the classist 
implications of the incompetence principle and the equivocations of the democratic turn, 









ARENDT’S ISLAND OF FREEDOM 
 
There is a tension in Arendt’s thought between her valorization of democratic 
iconography and her restrictive demarcation of political space. Her identification of 
politics with the public sphere—a space where a plurality of persons can appear, speak to 
one another, give their opinions, and undertake collective or individual action—is 
undermined by her categorical relegation of necessity (the reproduction of material life) 
to the private, non-political realm. This bifurcation has the effect of excluding a priori 
from politics all those who have not secured the “liberty” (independence from material 
necessity) to exercise “freedom” (the ability to act on the public stage). For her, the 
collapse of this strict dichotomy—i.e., increasing democratization, the rise of “the 
masses”—has engendered the most disastrous political events of our time, including the 
rise of totalitarianism. Arendt’s political ontology is thus torn between a consecration of 
plurality and a restless insistence on exclusivity. In other words, she has faith in 
democracy but no faith in the demos.  Her work is therefore a stark expression of the 
elitist/populist ambivalence that concerns this project, and will indicate the terms by 
which it can be understood and analyzed. The aim of this chapter is to elaborate the 
origins, consequences, and meaning of this ambivalence in Arendt’s work. 
 
A Political Ontology 
Arendt makes a fundamental distinction between “the public sphere”—the place 
of appearance, plurality, and speech, and therefore the political, and “the private 
sphere”—the place of the maintenance of material necessities. She frequently associates 
the public sphere with the polis and the private sphere with the household. This 
distinction, which runs like a fault-line throughout her work, lays the foundation for her 
ambivalent political ontology.  
 Taking cues from (her reading of) Aristotle, Arendt argues that human beings are 
political by condition owing to two closely related phenomena: the fact of plurality 





gives meaning to the notion of “world”—the shared space between the plurality of 
individuals in which they all have a stake and in which they “appear” to one other:  
While all aspects of the human condition are somehow related to politics, this 
plurality is specifically the condition—not only the condition sine qua non, but 
the condition per quam—of all political life (HC 7).  
 
Wherever the relevance of speech is at stake, matters become political by 
definition, for speech is what makes man a political being […] Men in the plural, 
that is, men in so far as they live and move and act in this world, can experience 
meaningfulness only because they can talk with and make sense to each other and 
to themselves (HC 3-4). 
 
To live together in the world means essentially that a world of things is between 
those who have it in common, as a table is located between those who sit around 
it; the world, like every in-between, relates and separates men at the same time 
(HC 52). 
 
The polis represents the space in which human beings (I will replace Arendt’s sexist 
language for now—more on this later) come together in their equality and distinction, to 
appear to one another and to speak. It is the public sphere in its purest form, the political 
itself (cf. BPF 51). Her choice of the term polis is not accidental, as she understands the 
ancient Athenian model as the clearest possible expression of the public/political. The 
public sphere is also the place of “freedom,” which will become clearer when we discuss 
“action” below, but which we can begin to flesh out by discussing the opposite of the 
public.  
The private sphere is where human beings are when they are not exposed to the 
plurality of their fellows seated around the common table of the “world,” when they are 
not “appearing” in public. The private is what belongs to the individual as opposed to 
what is shared in common, and it therefore includes private property. Importantly, the 
private is also the realm of “necessity,” “in the original sense of being necessitated by 
having a body” (HC 73). For Arendt, it is not only that private concerns like property and 
the reproduction of life are properly outside of the public sphere, but that a prerequisite 
for participation in the public sphere is a mastery of these “necessities” such that one is 
no longer beholden to them. Furthermore, since appearance in public represents what is 





the overtones of Aristotelian teleology), to be fully beholden to necessity is to be not fully 
human. She again takes her cue from ancient Athens:   
What all Greek philosophers…took for granted is that freedom is exclusively 
located in the political realm, that necessity is primarily a prepolitical 
phenomenon, characteristic of the private household organization, and that force 
and violence are justified in this sphere because they are the only means to master 
necessity—for instance, by ruling over slaves—and to become free (HC 31). 
 
It is…not really accurate to say that private property, prior to the modern age, was 
thought to be a self-evident condition for admission to the public realm; it is much 
more than that. Privacy was like the other, the dark and hidden side of the public 
realm, and while to be political meant to attain the highest possibility of human 
existence, to have no private place of one’s own (like a slave) meant to be no 
longer human (HC 64). 
 
Private wealth, therefore, became a condition for admission to public life not 
because its owner was engaged in accumulating it but, on the contrary, because it 
assured with reasonable certainty that its owner would not have to engage in 
providing for himself the means of use and consumption and was free for public 
activity […] To own property meant here to be master over one’s own necessities 
of life and therefore potentially to be a free person, free to transcend his own life 
and enter the world all have in common […] If the property-owner chose to 
enlarge his property instead of using it up in leading a political life, it was as 
though he willingly sacrificed his freedom and became voluntarily what the slave 
was against his own will, a servant of necessity (HC 64-65). 
 
When the aristocratic master enters the public realm, he must leave behind his concern 
for his private property and his economic privilege; this concern is dealt with in private 
by domination over others (cf. PP 116-119). While we still need to discuss “action” to get 
a full account of Arendt’s notion of “freedom,” we can say that, for her, freedom at least 
includes freedom from—freedom from the necessity of having to maintain one’s own 
necessities. Since freedom from necessity is the condition for access to the public sphere, 
and mutatis mutandis the condition for political life, it follows that those who are 
“servants of necessity” are unable to participate in politics. With this argument, Arendt 
establishes a negative relationship between economic precarity and the political. Those 
whose lives are defined by the maintenance of bare necessities are not properly political 
beings, and properly political beings have their necessities provided for such that, when 





The categories of the public and the private are correlated to the concepts of labor, 
work, and action. Labor is the reproduction of the basic necessities of life; the human 
being conceived in terms of labor is referred to as the animal laborans. Work is the 
construction of lasting and stable structures (e.g., buildings, monuments, works of art). 
Unlike labor, the objects of work have a sense of permanence and therefore immortality; 
they are not constructed merely for the sake of “bare life.” The human being defined by 
work is called homo faber. Action is the unique, ephemeral capacity of human beings “to 
begin something new” (HC 8-9, 177-78, cf. OV 30-31), which Arendt here and elsewhere 
describes as a kind of “miracle” (HC 246-247, BPF 168-169).1 Action depends upon the 
existence of a public realm, and is associated with great deeds or “glory” (HC 180). It is 
also characterized by its unpredictability, in contradistinction to labor and work (HC 191-
192). Furthermore, action depends upon plurality and relates to speech in ways that labor 
and work do not. Accordingly, it is the only one of these three domains that is uniquely 
political, the only one that relates to positive freedom (the freedom to begin something 
new), and therefore the category most expressive of the human condition: “[H]uman 
plurality is the paradoxical plurality of unique beings. Speech and action reveal this 
unique distinctness. Through them, men distinguish themselves instead of being merely 
distinct; they are the modes in which human beings appear to each other, not indeed as 
physical objects, but qua men” (HC 176).2 In later works, Arendt will go so far as to 
identify action and freedom (BPF 151). Finally, action is also, even more than work, the 
promise of “earthly immortality”: “Without this transcendence into a potential earthly 
immortality, no politics, strictly speaking, no common world and no public realm, is 
possible” (HC 55).3  
We can see already the ambivalent structure of Arendt’s thought: an exaltation of 
human plurality as the meaning of politics, and a simultaneous acknowledgment that 
                                                 
1 Arendt’s philosophical obsession with “natality,” evident as early as her doctoral thesis on St. Augustine, 
has been explored by numerous scholars especially Bowen-Moore. 
 
2 Cf. “Human action, like all strictly political phenomena, is bound up with human plurality, which is one 
of the fundamental conditions of human life insofar as it rests on the fact of natality, through which the 
human world is constantly invaded by strangers, newcomers whose actions and reactions cannot be 
foreseen by those are already there and are going to leave in a short while” (BPF 61). 
 
3 Canovan (1992) notes that, in several unpublished manuscripts, Arendt claims that “action” began before 





significant portions of the population are excluded from the political realm and are 
therefore not part of this human plurality. Politics is what takes place between free human 
beings, but the condition for the possibility of this freedom is not itself a political issue. I 
turn now to discuss her motivations for developing this curious structure.  
Arendt puts the public/private/labor/work/action schemata to work in diagnosing 
what she takes to be an affliction of “the modern era”: the rise of “the social.” She argues 
that, owing to a complex constellation of causes, the necessities formerly consigned to 
the private sphere have been made objects of public concern. “The social” or “society” is 
the name she gives to this “curiously hybrid realm where private interests assume public 
significance” (HC 35). In other words: 
The distinction between a private and a public sphere of life corresponds to the 
household and the political realms, which have existed as distinct, separate 
entities at least since the rise of the ancient city-state; but the emergence of the 
social realm, which is neither private nor public, strictly speaking, is a relatively 
new phenomenon whose origin coincided with the emergence of the modern age 
and which found its political form in the nation-state (HC 28). 
 
[T]he dividing line is blurred, because we see the body of peoples and political 
communities in the image of a family whose everyday affairs have to be taken 
care of by a gigantic, nation-wide administration of housekeeping…“collective 
housekeeping”; the collective of families economically organized into the 
facsimile of one super-human family is what we call “society,” and its political 
form of organization is called “nation” (HC 28-29). 
 
Society is the form in which the fact of mutual dependence for the sake of life and 
nothing else assumes public significance and where the activities connected with 
sheer survival are permitted to appear in public (HC 46).  
 
This development amounts to the destruction of what is proper to both the public and the 
private (HC 59, 69). In society, the accumulation of wealth, the maintenance of 
necessities, and the reproduction of life as such—in a word, economic concerns—
displace the properly political activities of action and speech that characterized the polis. 
The animal laborans, previously defined precisely by its non-political (economic) mode 
of being, has now attained dominance in public sphere at the expense of human “action,” 
i.e., at the expense of the truly political. 
 Arendt finds theoretical expression of this development in the work of Marx (and 





according to which labor was inferior to work and action (HC 17).4 Arendt develops an 
understanding of Marx’s work as the apex of “socialization,” where the formerly 
despised status of the reproduction of the life process is glorified and transfigured into the 
content of politics. To make this clearer, see how Arendt characterizes the status of labor 
in the Athenian context:  
To labor meant to be enslaved by necessity, and this enslavement was inherent in 
the condition of human life. Because men were dominated by the necessities of 
life, they could win their freedom only through the domination of those whom 
they subjected to necessity by force. The slave’s degradation was a blow of fate 
and a fate worse than death, because it carried with it a metamorphosis of man 
into something akin to a tame animal. A change in a slave’s status, therefore, such 
as manumission by his master or a change in general political circumstance that 
elevated certain occupations to public relevance, automatically entailed a change 
in the slave’s “nature”… It is in this sense that Euripides calls all slaves “bad”: 
they see everything from the viewpoint of the stomach (HC 83-84, 84n, cf. 316).  
 
In Marx, as in the rise of the social, this “viewpoint of the stomach” becomes “good,” the 
“tame animal” who labors because she is enslaved by necessity becomes politically 
meaningful (something unthinkable to the Athenians). According to Arendt, this amounts 
to the dissolution of political experience as such. In society as in Marx, “the animal 
laborans was permitted to occupy the public realm; and yet, as long as the animal 
laborans remains in possession of it, there can be no true public realm, but only private 
activities displayed in the open” (HC 134). Marx’s political utopia, then, is actually more 
of an antipolitical dystopia, the final instantiation of what, since Plato, had been the 
philosophers’ dream: to be finished with politics altogether (HC 222, cf. this point with 
Rancière). As she puts it: 
Within a completely “socialized mankind,” whose sole purpose would be the 
entertaining of life process—and this is the unfortunately quite unutopian ideal 
that guides Marx’s theories—the distinction between labor and work would have 
completely disappeared; all work would have become labor because all things 
would be understood, not in their worldly, objective quality, but as results of 
living labor power and functions of the life process (HC 89). 
                                                 
4 In her book-length study Hannah Arendt and Karl Marx, Tama Weisman argues that “the implications of 
conceiving of humans as animal laborans sets the tone for all of Arendt’s explicit writings on Marx” (9, cf. 
Pitkin 131-134). Interestingly enough, Marx agrees with Arendt on the relationship between necessity and 
freedom: “The realm of freedom really begins only where labour determined by necessity and external 
expediency ends; it lies by its very nature beyond the sphere of material production proper […] The true 
realm of freedom, the development of human powers as an end in itself, begins beyond it, though it can 






Arendt, once very sympathetic to Marx,5 developed this damning criticism while laboring 
over a book that was never completed, tentatively titled “Totalitarian Elements in 
Marxism” (designed as a kind of sequel to The Origins of Totalitarianism, it was 
eventually abandoned and elements of it found their way into The Human Condition and 
various other later writings). This will become significant later, when we consider the 
extent to which the categorical schema of The Human Condition was motivated by a 
reaction to the calamity of totalitarianism.6  
  The rise of the social, Arendt argues, effects an inversion of the political 
means/ends relationship that prevailed in ancient Athens. In classical antiquity, the 
mastery of necessity was a means to the end of political life, of distinguishing oneself in 
the realm of appearances. In the modern era, the reproduction of life is an end in itself, 
and politics is understood as a means to that end. This phenomenon, along with the 
epistemological crisis initiated by the rise of modern science, is the meaning of modern 
“world alienation” as Arendt understands it: 
[W]e have almost succeeded in leveling all human activities to the common 
demoninator of securing the necessities of life and providing for their abundance. 
Whatever we do, we are supposed to do for the sake of ‘making a living’; such is 
the verdict of society, and the number of people, especially in the professions who 
might challenge it, has decreased rapidly. The only exception society is willing to 
grant is the artist, who strictly speaking, is the only “worker” left in a laboring 
society (HC 126-127, cf. 322) 
 
Whatever the future may bring, the process of world alienation, started by 
expropriation and characterized by an ever-increasing progress in wealth, can 
only assume even more radical proportions if it is permitted to follow its own 
inherent law (HC 257). 
 
This development is so problematic because it diminishes the capacity and motivation for 
action, and thus results in the hypostatization and mechanization of a given way of life. 
At precisely the time when a reflection on means and ends is most warranted—the era of 
totalitarianism and the atomic bomb—we are predisposed against this task by the nature 
                                                 
5 See AJC, 160.  
 
6 As for the accuracy of Arendt’s reading of Marx, Weisman is correct to note that “Arendt never opens her 
thinking to the possibility that the now mostly discredited orthodoxy of the Second International that 
conflates the works of Marx and Engels is mistaken” (2, cf. Pitkin, 133). As we have seen, however, this 





of “society.” This is why Arendt, from this work through the Eichmann book and her last 
unfinished text, The Life of the Mind, is concerned with the faculty of thinking. Thinking 
is by no means the same as action, but at the moment of action’s fall from grace it is 
incumbent upon us “to think what we are doing” (HC 5).  
 This means/end inversion is closely related to another modern phenomenon that 
Arendt finds dangerous: the emergence of a relatively liberated animal laborans as a 
being with (quasi-)political power. Technological advances have lessened the burden of 
the reproduction of life, leaving the animal laborans with relatively more free time to 
pursue other ends, including ‘political’ activity. The problem is that a laborer understands 
only labor and consumption (i.e., the reproduction of life); she “sees everything from the 
viewpoint of the stomach,” as Arendt put it above. Even when the burden of necessity is 
lifted, then, the animal laborans cannot make productive use of the newly won freedom, 
but can only approach the political in terms of the social. This terminates in a “society of 
laborers without labor” (HC 5), making, in effect, the entire society into a non-political 
laboring/consuming society: 
The modern age has carried with it a theoretical glorification of labor and has 
resulted in a factual transformation of the whole of society into a labouring 
society. The fulfillment of the wish, therefore…comes at a moment when it can 
only be self-defeating. It is a society of laborers which is about to liberated from 
the fetters of labor, and this society does no longer know of those other higher and 
more meaningful activities for the sake of which this freedom would deserve to be 
won (HC 4-5). 
 
[T]he spare time of the animal laborans is never spent in anything but 
consumption, and the more time left to him, the greedier and more craving his 
appetites. That these appetites become more sophisticated, so that consumption is 
no longer restricted to the necessities but, on the contrary, mainly concentrates on 
the superfluities of life, does not change the character of this society, but harbors 
the grave danger that eventually no object of the world will be safe from 
consumption and annihilation through consumption (HC 133). 
 
This suggests, though only obliquely, that Arendt’s concern about “the rise of the social” 
is not only about the development of a certain mentality or disposition, as some scholars 
intent on rationalizing her apparent elitism have argued,7 but also the ascendency of 
                                                 





certain (quasi-)political actors with a penchant for this disposition, i.e., the materially 
dispossessed. This will become clearer when we discuss On Revolution below. 
Arendt carries this argument further by suggesting that the expansion of this 
“society of laborers without labor,” this “mass culture” (HC 134), has at least an elective 
affinity with the rise of totalitarianism. In such a society, “action as such is entirely 
eliminated and has become the mere ‘execution of orders’” (HC 223)—notice that she is 
already looking ahead to the encounter with Eichmann. It is at this point that the figure of 
the “masses” takes on a momentous and frightening significance for Arendt. See her 
characterization of the potential “ochlocracy” of this laboring society: 
If tyranny can be described as the always abortive attempt to substitute violence 
for power, ochlocracy, or mob rule, which is its exact counterpart, can be 
characterized by the much more promising attempt to substitute power for 
strength…there is always the danger that, through a perverted form of “acting 
together”—by pull and pressure and the tricks of cliques—those are brought to 
the fore who know nothing and can do nothing (HC 203-204, my italics). 
 
There is, indeed, much evidence to suggest that Arendt’s study of totalitarianism 
motivates the disjunctive categorical schemata of The Human Condition.8 Looking back 
to The Origins of Totalitarianism, we see an explicit connection between imperialism 
(the principle progenitor of totalitarianism, according to Arendt) and the displacement of 
the political by the social (OT 123-147), as well as an explanation of the category of “the 
mob” as a symptom of the modern capitalist (i.e., “social”) world (OT 147-157). There is 
even an explicit association between the dislocation of homo faber by animal laborans 
(using these terms) and totalitarian ideology (OT 475). While she insists that the 
existence of masses is not a sufficient condition for totalitarianism (OT 313), she does 
                                                 
8 Canovan (1992) interprets Arendt’s ontology as a reaction to the rise of totalitarianism, claiming that 
“responses to the most dramatic events of her time lie at the very centre of Arendt’s thought” (7). 
Totalitarian ideology, as the final chapter of Origins argues, is the marriage of two contradictory principles: 
that everything is determined, and that anything is possible. This is why Arendt privileges “action” but also 
insists upon the limits of the public sphere; she wants to maintain spontaneity and freedom while preserving 
a space upon which politics cannot encroach. Wolin (1994) also reads the categorical schemata of The 
Human Condition as an outgrowth of Arendt’s analysis of totalitarianism, but draws the connection quite 
differently. Whereas Canovan mines Arendt’s critique of totalitarian ideology for its democratic fruits 
(plural spaces, action, speech), Wolin traces the antidemocratic strain of this same critique (what the earlier 
Canovan called the “elitist” element). Wolin argues that the public/private dichotomy is fundamentally 
antidemocratic, and that “the rise of the social” is so troubling for Arendt precisely because it is 
democratizing. He cites passages from Origins that I interpreted above as ochlophobia, and suggests that 
this aversion to popular power develops into the elitist categories of The Human Condition, especially the 





claim that it is a necessary one—“without the masses the leader is a nonentity” (OT 325). 
Consider also this rhetoric, from the essay “Truth and Politics”: “[Deliberate falsehood in 
politics] is clearly an attempt to change the record, and as such, it is a form of action […] 
This is frequently done by subversive groups, and in a politically immature public the 
resulting confusion can be considerable” (BPF 245, my italics). Compare this with the 
passages cited above about the masses’ propensity for totalitarian manipulation. A theme 
emerges: a lack of faith in the animal laborans to be politically responsible, the 
suggestion that the “impotence” of “mass democracies” (PP 98) gives rise to a 
“politically immature public” prone to calamitous political mistakes. A certain 
ochlophobia, or fear of “the masses,” pervades Arendt’s work.9 For all her glorification 
of human plurality, she is nervous about extending this plurality too far. If totalitarianism 
is the destruction of plurality, it is also, paradoxically enough, the result of too much 
plurality of the wrong kind.10 
 Peppered in between these passages reflecting a pronounced fear of the demos are 
moments of apparently genuine democratic thinking. In an interview titled “Thoughts on 
Politics and Revolution,” Arendt says this: “Not everyone wants to or has to concern 
himself with public affairs. In this fashion a self-selective process is possible that would 
draw together a true political elite in a country. Anyone who is not interested in public 
affairs will simply have to be satisfied with their being decided without him. But each 
person must be given the opportunity” (CR 233). From what has been said above, it 
would seem as though the expansion of opportunity to the animal laborans constitutes a 
catastrophe in Arendt’s eyes. But here, she extends access to public affairs to “each 
                                                 
9 King (2015) details a friendly exchange of letters and ideas between Arendt and the famous theorist of 
“mass society,” David Reisman (109-124), and argues that the figure of “the masses” informs Arendt’s idea 
of “the social” (123). Still, Arendt is not entirely clear on what she means by the terms “masses” or “mob.” 
Sometimes, as we have seen, she is content to explicitly associate this phenomenon with the relative 
liberation of the animal laborans. At other times, she gives what seems to be a slightly different definition 
(OT 311). In his review of Between Past and Future, Raymond Williams criticizes Arendt for being 
unclear on this term. She replied to him in a letter, admitting that her thinking on this point was equivocal 
and uncertain (see King (2015), 122). 
 
10 If Arendt’s thought has a close philosophical relative, it is probably José Ortega y Gasset’s The Revolt of 
the Masses, which bemoans the loss of an exceptional insular elite under mass democracies: “‘Everybody’ 
was normally the complex unity of the mass and the divergent, specialised minorities. Nowadays, 
‘everybody’ is the mass alone. Here we have the formidable fact of our times, describes without any 
concealment of the brutality of its features” (18). Cf. Heller: “Arendt in fact shared Ortega y Gasset’s 





person.”  This rhetoric leads some critics to conclude that there really is no elitist/populist 
tension in Arendt’s thought.11 But we must tread carefully here: if we accept the claim 
that Arendt’s “public sphere” is available to anyone regardless of economic status—
which she suggests in the quote just given, but which seems to be in conflict with her 
descriptions elsewhere—this still would not mean that “private” economic concerns are 
subject to public debate. So political space may be accessible to the poor, but only on the 
condition that they not speak about their poverty. In the passage above (HC 133), 
however, we are led to believe that the dispossessed cannot approach politics except in 
terms of possession (and therefore not at all).  
The categorical schemata of The Human Condition have been subject to 
numerous criticisms on various grounds. Several scholars have taken note of the 
antinomy that I am describing as an elitist/populist ambivalence.12 At the same time, as I 
have just mentioned, many readers deny that Arendt is as contradictory as she seems and 
take up the task of exonerating what appears as elitism in her work.13 A consistent and 
initially compelling way of salvaging Arendt’s thought from some of its troubling 
implications is to read her conception of the political together with her populist impulses 
as articulating the necessity for a radical (though non-violent) reorganization of society or 
redistribution of resources. The train of thought runs like this: Arendt insists that 
liberation from necessity is a prerequisite for political participation, and sometimes says 
that “each person” should be allowed political participation. So, her conception of politics 
impresses on us the task of making sure that everyone is liberated from necessity enough 
to engage in public affairs.14 Perhaps in spite of herself, Arendt offers a radical, 
                                                 
11 Isaac writes that “[Arendt’s] ‘aristocracy’ is an aristocracy of civic-mindedness, not a hereditary elite 
based on access to wealth” (158). Bokiniec writes that “Arendt’s elites are not from aristocratic leisure 
class, it is aristocracy of human spirit, of engagement, of action, elite that can be joined by anyone who is 
willing to participate in the public sphere” (79).  
 
12 See Emden, Canovan (1978), Gines, and Breen. Benhabib (1993) gives a concise account of this general 
problem with Arendt’s “public space” (especially 74-85). Multiple feminist critics have taken Arendt to 
task on this point (See Dietz, especially 23-26), and even some of her stalwart defenders lament her 
careless erasure of the oppression of women in Athens (Pitkin 165-176).  
 
13 In addition to those already cited, see Canovan (1992), McClure, Pitkin.  
 
14 Bernstein, while acknowledging that “the rise of the social” for Arendt is basically the rise of the poor 
(116-117), writes: “to claim…that every person must be given the opportunity to participate in politics, 





emancipatory politics with her claim that political freedom requires freedom from toil; it 
expresses the task of working toward the increasing democratization of freedom from toil 
so as to make political space more available for all.  
 There are some passages that give credence to this interpretation. In the same 
interview I quoted a few paragraphs above, Arendt says: “Our problem today is not how 
to expropriate the expropriators, but, rather, how to arrange matters so that the masses, 
dispossessed by industrial society in capitalist and socialist systems, can regain property” 
(CR 214). Or consider Arendt’s reply to Michael Gerstein’s question about the status of 
class and property in her thinking: “To make a decent amount of property available to 
every human being—not to expropriate, but to spread property—then you will have some 
possibilities for freedom even under the rather inhuman conditions of modern 
production” (RPW 320). Better still, see the following from the essay “Public Rights and 
Private Interests”: 
[I]ndeed, freedom, political life, the life of the citizen—this ‘public happiness’ 
I’ve been speaking of—is a luxury; it is an additional happiness that one is made 
capable of only after the requirements of the life process have been fulfilled […]  
So if we talk about equality, the question always is: how much have we to change 
the private lives of the poor? […] Before we ask the poor for idealism, we must 
first make them citizens: and this involves so changing the circumstances of their 
private lives that they become capable of enjoying the ‘public’ (PRPI 107). 
 
As attractive a possible appropriation of Arendt’s political ontology this reading may be, 
and as much as these (relatively obscure) passages lend it support, it is difficult to 
reconcile with her work as a whole, especially On Revolution. 
 
Islands of Freedom and Seas of Necessity 
Arendt’s primary objective in contrasting the French and American Revolutions is 
to form a hypothesis as to why the former “ended in disaster” while the latter was “so 
triumphantly successful” (OR 46). Her conclusion is that the American experiment was 
based on “freedom” and was therefore a truly political revolution able to found an 
enduring republic, while the French attempt was based on “the social question” and was 
                                                                                                                                                 
or strive to realize a society where every person has the opportunity to engage in politics. This becomes (in 
Arendt’s account) a primary political question” (120). This reading is also articulated by Knauer (especially 
192-193), who writes that “in order to integrate Arendt’s concept of praxis, animal laborans must become 





as a result a spectacular failure.  By “the social question” Arendt means “the existence of 
poverty” (OR 50), and she refers to this struggle as “liberation” in contradistinction to 
“freedom” (OR 20-24). This is consonant with the way she characterizes “the rise of the 
social” in The Human Condition, i.e., when economic concerns (like the miserable 
poverty that defined the lives of the lower classes in the ancien régime) take on political 
significance (she once again describes “society” as “that curious and somewhat hybrid 
realm which the modern age interjected between the older and more genuine realms of 
the public or political on one side and the private on the other”—OR 113). In other 
words, the French Revolution’s critical error was that it tried to abolish poverty 
politically, to achieve a private end with public means: 
The social question began to play a revolutionary role only when, in the modern 
age and not before, men began to doubt that poverty is inherent in the human 
condition, to doubt that the distinction between the few, who through 
circumstances or strength or fraud had succeeded in liberating themselves from 
the shackles of poverty and the labouring poverty-stricken multitude was 
inevitable and eternal (OR 12-13). 
 
All rulership has its original and its most legitimate source in man’s wish to 
emancipate himself from life’s necessity, and men achieved such liberation by 
means of violence, by forcing others to bear the burden of life for them. This was 
the core of slavery, and it is only the rise of technology, and not the rise of 
modern political ideas as such, which has refuted the old and terrible truth that 
only violence and rule over others could make some men free. Nothing, we might 
say today, could be more obsolete than to attempt to liberate mankind from 
poverty by political means; nothing could be more futile and more dangerous (OR 
104).  
 
The notion that only “the rise of technology” could relieve the necessity of “private” 
economic domination (cf. OR 131) troubles the potentially emancipatory interpretation 
alluded to above, and renders all the more confusing Arendt’s talk of “changing the 
circumstances of [the poor’s] private lives that they become capable of enjoying the 
‘public’.” Was this not the fatal mistake of the French Revolution, according to her 
description? Perhaps the attempt to abolish poverty with politics is permissible only now, 
since technology has made this possible. But at the same time she insists that 
“today…nothing could be more futile and more dangerous” than the attempt to alleviate 





 The argumentative structure of The Human Condition shows up in On Revolution 
in other ways as well. Just as the former did, the latter explicitly associates the disastrous 
“rise of the social” with Marx and Marxism, suggesting that prioritizing economic 
restructuring and redistribution amounts to a perversion of the political means/ends 
relationship and to the dissolution of “freedom” in the name of “the life process”:  
If Marx helped in liberating the poor, then it was not by telling them that they 
were the living embodiments of some historical or other necessity, but by 
persuading them that poverty itself is a political, not a natural phenomenon, the 
result of violence and violation rather than scarcity. [Marx] finally strengthened 
more than anybody else the politically most pernicious doctrine of the modern 
age, namely that life is the highest good, and that the life process of society is the 
very centre of human endeavour. […] Not freedom but abundance became now 
the aim of revolution (OR 52-54).15 
 
On Revolution drives home this point again and again: the French Revolution was a 
disaster because it was not a truly political revolution, and it was not a truly political 
revolution because it was concerned with “the life process of society,” with poverty and 
hunger, “the invasion of the public realm by society” (OR 213). It was a revolution “from 
the point of view of the stomach,” doomed as an uprising “whose end is impotence, 
whose principle is rage, and whose conscious aim is not freedom but life and happiness” 
(OR 103).  
This brings me to another theme from The Human Condition that carries over to 
On Revolution: Arendt’s low estimation of the political maturity of the dispossessed and 
her fear of the dangerous power of the masses, which she brings up in both the French 
and American contexts: 
[T]his multitude, appearing for the first time in broad daylight, was actually the 
multitude of the poor and the downtrodden, who every century before had hidden 
in darkness and shame. What from then on has been irrevocable, and what the 
agents and spectators of revolution immediately recognized as such, was that the 
public realm—reserved, as far as memory could reach, to those who were free, 
namely carefree of all the worries that are connected with life’s necessity, with 
bodily needs—should offer its space and its light to this immense majority who 
are not free because they are driven by daily needs (OR 38).  
 
                                                 
15 Cf. Gündoğdu: “Arendt applauds Marx as a theorist who shows that poverty is not a necessary and 
natural outcome due to a law of scarcity but a political phenomenon that results from ‘exploitation’ or 





[T]he trouble was that the struggle to abolish poverty, under the impact of a 
continual mass immigration from Europe, fell more and more under the sway of 
the poor themselves, and hence came under the guidance of the ideals born out of 
poverty, as distinguished from those principles which had inspired the foundation 
of freedom. For abundance and endless consumption are the ideals of the poor: 
they are the mirage in the desert of misery […] And while it is true that freedom 
can only come to those whose needs have been fulfilled, it is equally true that it 
will escape those who are bent upon living for their desires (OR 130). 
 
These passages should be read against interpretations that construe Arendt’s 
apprehension about the animal laborans and the ‘rise of the social’ as a strictly analytical 
concern, as a question of mentality and disposition. It is a certain mentality that Arendt 
finds troubling—the conception of politics as instrumental, as a means of the end of 
material life—but she is also convinced that the poor, when they are given power, act out 
of this mentality (“the ideals born of poverty”) and will continue to do so even when they 
cease to be poor. This unmistakably anti-populist rhetoric—which should be familiar 
from The Human Condition—contravenes her democratizing gestures elsewhere, the 
sentiment that “each person…must be given the opportunity” to participate in public 
affairs. If this democratizing gesture means that political space must be accessible to the 
poor (who are not free), then Arendt seems to be recommending her own worst nightmare 
(“the rise of the social,” etc.). If the gesture means instead that collective life should be 
reorganized and resources redistributed such that the poor are “liberated” (as she 
sometimes hints), then she is recommending what she diagnoses as the crucial misstep of 
an ill-fated revolution.  
Before continuing the discussion of On Revolution, we should to pause to note the 
curious ambivalence that emerges from this argument. Arendt knows that political 
freedom is impossible without “freedom from toil” (liberation), and yet insists that 
“everyone must be given the opportunity” to participate in politics. But here, she says that 
increasing economic liberation has only been made possible with “modern technology” 
and cannot be attempted by “political means.” Her thought on this point articulates a 
necessity and then systematically blocks the realization of this necessity. Freedom (from 
toil) is the condition for the possibility of access to political life in the public realm, and 
yet the political is categorically not allowed to act on the conditions of this freedom from 





should happen (if everyone is to be given the opportunity to participate), but it is not clear 
how this could happen without political action. What Arendt grants with one hand she 
takes away with the other.16 The only possibility for including “each person,” then, is the 
liberation brought by technology. But there is a problem here as well: in The Human 
Condition, Arendt warns against the “society of laborers without labor” that results when 
the animal laborans is granted more spare time by technological advances. So the 
“labouring poverty-stricken multitude” is dangerous if it tries to liberate itself actively, 
and also dangerous if it is liberated passively by “the rise of technology.”   
  The primary difference in the situations preceding the respective revolutions, 
according to Arendt, was that “poverty was absent from the American scene.” She 
immediately amends this claim to read “what were absent from the American scene were 
misery and want rather than poverty” (OR 58). This enabled the American founders to 
orient their revolutionary project around the “rights of the citizen” as opposed to “the 
rights of Man,” as the French would (OR 140). Arendt once again looks to antiquity to 
augment her distinction, this time to Rome: 
The distinction between a private individual in Rome and a Roman citizen was 
that the latter had a persona, a legal personality, as we would say; it was as 
though the law had affixed to him the part he was expected to play on the public 
scene, with the provision, however, that his own voice would be able to sound 
through […] Without his persona, there would be an individual without rights and 
duties, perhaps a ‘natural man’—that is, a human being or homo in the original 
meaning of the word, indicating someone outside the range of the law and the 
body politic of the citizens, as for instance a slave—but certainly a politically 
                                                 
16 Several scholars have noted this curious element, including Gines (52-55) and Disch (1996, 59, 62), and 
Bernasconi (19). Canovan, while praising Arendt’s “classical Republican” political values (1992, 212-227), 
acknowledges that her participatory vision is impossible for most given the economic status quo, noting 
that Arendt “had grave doubts” about “taking what had been the rights of a few and extending them to all 
humanity” (239-240); Canovan seems to buy the “technological development” argument (230-231). In 
“The ‘Autonomy of the Political’ Reconsidered,” Villa attempts a direct response to this ambivalent 
structure. He begins by rehearsing the reading of Arendt according to which her work visualizes a “polis 
without slaves,” but also acknowledges the difficulties of this reading: “Rather than seeking ways to realize 
a ‘polis without slaves,’ Arendt spends a suspiciously large amount of time (and theoretical energy) 
warning us about the dangers that the liberation of ‘slaves’ poses to her cherished ‘public realm’” (35). He 
then makes an abrupt turn, arguing that Arendt’s conception of the public realm is not as exclusionary as it 
seems: “From an Arendtian point of view, a politics whose central concern is to either build up or knock 
down the welfare state fails to engage the most important political consideration of all: the institutional 
housing of political freedom. Such housing makes the participation of ordinary citizens possible by 
providing accessible public spaces for debate and deliberation” (37). So Arendtian politics, in this 
understanding, is the institutional maintenance of public space. But this does not address the problem of 
how “ordinary citizens” are to be included, insofar as 1) economic liberation is still the condition for the 





irrelevant being […] the men of the French Revolution had no conception of the 
persona, and no respect for the legal personality which is given and guaranteed by 
the body politic (OR 96-98). 
 
This gives more detail to her claim that the American Revolution succeeded where the 
French failed because it was a truly political revolution. It was concerned with the 
foundation of a body politic where “legal personalities” capable of speech could appear, 
their “natural” necessities a non-sequitur.  
 There are two other, closely related factors that make the American Revolution so 
successful in Arendt’s estimation. One is its status—sometimes in spite of its founders’ 
self-understanding—as a foundation and a beginning. The other was its predilection for 
public debate, discussion, and deliberation in town halls, councils, and wards: 
[The Revolution was characterized by] constituent assemblies and special 
conventions whose sole task it was to draft a constitution; hence also the need to 
bring the draft home and back to the people and have the Articles of Confederacy 
debated, clause by clause, in the town-hall meetings and, later, the articles of the 
Constitution in the state congresses (OR 136). 
 
The principle which came to light during those fateful years when the foundations 
were laid—not by the strength of the one architect but by the combined power of 
the many—was the interconnected principle of mutual promise and common 
deliberation; and the event itself decided indeed, as Hamilton had insisted, that 
men “are really capable…of establishing good government from reflection and 
choice,” that they are not “forever destined to depend for their political 
constitutions on accident and force” (OR 206). 
 
The local town halls, like the Athenian polis, were places where personae could appear to 
one another and speak, i.e., the properly “public sphere” described in The Human 
Condition. Arendt is clear that these councils, in which the “public happiness” (OR 110) 
she cherishes is embodied and secured, have an explicitly political (not social/economic) 
function (OR 266). As we have seen, “the social question” played no role in (Arendt’s 
account of) the American Revolution. “Political freedom,” she says in this context, 
“means the right ‘to be a participator in government’, or it means nothing” (OR 210). But 
the high recommendation of the council system returns us to our familiar question: who is 
granted access to this public sphere? Who can, should, or must attend the town hall 
meeting? Who has this right of political freedom? Her brief comment on this score is 





The phenomenon I am concerned with here is usually called the “elite”, and my 
quarrel with this term is not that I doubt that the political way of life has never 
been and will never be the way of life of the many, even though political business, 
by definition, concerns more than the many, namely strictly speaking, the sum 
total of all citizens. […] My quarrel with the “elite” is that the term implies an 
oligarchic form of government, the domination of the many by the rule of a few. 
From this, one can only conclude…that the essence of politics is rulership and 
that the dominant political passion is the passion to rule or to govern. This…is 
profoundly untrue. The fact that political “elites” have always determined the 
political destinies of the many and have, in most instances, exerted a domination 
over them, indicates…the bitter need of the few to protect themselves against the 
many, or rather to protect the island of freedom they have come to inhabit against 
the surrounding sea of necessity…(OR 267-268). 
 
Although she is skeptical of the term “elite” insofar as it associates politics with ruling, 
the disjunctive political ontology of The Human Condition shines through clearly: islands 
of “freedom” and seas of “necessity.” The exclusionary nature of the polis remains in full 
force, as those whose lives are characterized by the maintenance of bodily needs are not, 
and cannot be, properly political subjects. Refraining from the attempt to expand this 
island by political means, to democratize the public sphere—i.e., to secure everyone’s 
necessities such that they can participate in public life—is precisely the virtue of the 
American Revolution over and against the French.  
 Arendt’s admiration for America is qualified, however. She claims that the 
authentically political aspect of the founding of the United States has been lost in its 
subsequent history—in fact, the glorious moment was lost almost immediately. The 
heritage of “freedom” represented by the Revolutionary movement was mitigated by the 
emergence of the representative form of government as opposed to Jefferson’s “ward” 
system (OR 209ff). While the early stages of the Revolution had been characterized by 
active popular participation, “action,” and the singular experience of foundation, the 
developing nation stabilized and relaxed into a complacent “social” state, its popular 
power transferred to elected officials entrusted solely with the task of protecting “private” 
interests. Paradoxically, then, the very achievement of the American Revolution 
(founding a stable state) led to the decline of the ethos of its achievement (OR 224-247).  
“Representative government,” she writes, “has in fact become oligarchic government” 
(OR 261). To recover the lost treasure of true politics, she suggests, as we have already 





this—in scare quotes—as “an ‘aristocratic’ form of government” (OR 271). Interestingly, 
Arendt also describes the development of the representational system in the following 
way: “The ‘élite sprung from the people’ has replaced the pre-modern élites of birth and 
wealth” (OR 269). Now, one could read this comment with a positive connotation 
according to the democratic impulses in Arendt’s work (political power has shifted from 
the wealthy to the larger populous). One could also read it with a negative connotation 
according to the elitist aspects of her work (the politically immature “people” have been 
given political power they are not worthy of). Given her judgment about representative 
government, coupled with her remarks about what kind of “elite” would characterize her 
ideal council system, the latter reading seems more plausible.  
The historical accuracy of On Revolution has been called into question numerous 
times, especially Arendt’s “Disneyland version”17 of the American Revolution. Scholars 
have also debated the consequences of these inaccuracies for her theoretical argument.18 
While we should not pretend that Arendt is only offering an instructive fable in her 
account of the Revolutions, we should also not suppose that its factual inaccuracies 
determine the value of her work or constitute its most serious problems. More will be 
gained by looking at what the factual inaccuracies reveal about her political ontology. 
Her valorization of the Athenian polis and her lionizing of the American Revolution 
should be considered together, not only because they perform the same function in the 
structure of her argument, but because they reveal the same antinomy of her thought, i.e., 
that the “space of freedom” is constituted by domination. It is no secret that the American 
“founding fathers,” whom Arendt admires for their commitment to “freedom,” conceived 
their “Republic” as belonging to land-owning white men only.19 The American 
Revolution was, in fact, so characterized by “freedom” that it emerged and sustained 
itself on the shoulders of a massive slave trade and the genocide of an indigenous 
population. But what is decisive here is that is the fact that Arendt is perfectly aware of 
these historical realities: “the absence of the social question from the American scene 
was, after all, quite deceptive…that abject and degrading misery was present everywhere 
                                                 
17 Bernasconi, 4.  
 
18 See Nisbet, King (2011), Dossa, Feher, Barnouw, and Disch (2011). 
 





in the form of slavery and Negro labour […] [Slavery is] the primordial crime upon 
which the fabric of American society rested” (OR 60-61).20 Whatever the status of the 
hideous violence concomitant with the “foundation” Arendt admires, it was apparently 
not enough to provoke her to rethink her account of the virtues of the American 
Revolution. And yet there is little here that explicitly contradicts the political ontology 
laid out in The Human Condition. Slavery, the subjugation of women, and the condition 
of the laboring landless are, after all, “private” matters.21 The Americans succeeded 
where the French failed, according to Arendt, because they accorded a privileged status 
to the political persona. This is true, and all of our qualms about On Revolution 
disappear, if we assume that only landowning white men count as personae. The 
American Revolution was a “success” and the French a “failure” only from the 
perspective of the safety and prosperity of this elite group.  
 The preceding enables us to articulate the relationship between Arendt’s elitism 
and her democratic iconography in another way, in terms of its isonomic character. The 
term “isonomy” is usually understood as something like “abstract equality in law,” i.e., as 
the formal legal equality of all citizens regardless of social or economic position. Arendt, 
in her customary fashion, resignifies the term according to her understanding of its Greek 
roots: “Isonomia does not mean that all men are equal before the law, or that the law is 
the same for all, but merely that all have the same claim to political activity, and in the 
polis this activity primarily took the form of speaking with one another. Isonomia is 
therefore essentially the equal right to speak” (PP 118). But this “equality” of “all” takes 
on a peculiar form in Arendt’s hands, as she says on the same page: “Freedom does not 
require an egalitarian democracy in the modern sense, but rather a quite narrowly limited 
oligarchy or aristocracy, an arena in which at least a few or the best can interact with one 
another as equals among other equals. This equality has, of course, nothing to do with 
justice.” So the public sphere is isonomic, but exclusionary. The isonomic equality of 
speaking beings is predicated on and inseparable from the material and social inequality 
                                                 
20 See also: “Through centuries the extermination of native people went hand in hand with the colonization 
of the Americas, Australia and Africa” (OT 440). 
 
21 Bernasconi puts it well: “She gave the distinction between the social and the political a normative status 
which led her to applaud the American Revolution, among other things, for ignoring the social and 





that renders such isonomy possible. Social, material differences are at once politically 
irrelevant and determinant of the extent to which one is a political being.22 Arendt’s 
elitism does not merely run alongside her democratic iconography but is inscribed within 
it.23 
 Both sides of this ambivalence—that social differences both do and do not have 
political significance—are expressed by Arendt in different ad hoc pieces. One side of 
this tension is notoriously expressed in the “Reflections on Little Rock” essay, in which 
Arendt protests against the enforced desegregation of Southern public schools in the 
1950’s. I will refrain from summarizing or critiquing her argument as a whole, but will 
cite one passage that expresses the curious status of isonomy in her work:  
Segregation is discrimination enforced by law, and desegregation can do no more 
than abolish the laws enforcing discrimination; it cannot abolish discrimination 
and force equality upon society, but it can, and indeed must, enforce equality 
within the body politic. For equality not only has its origin in the body politic; its 
validity is clearly restricted to the political realm. Only there are we all equals. 
Under modern conditions, this equality has its most important embodiment in the 
right to vote, according to which the judgment and opinion of the most exalted 
citizen are on a par with the judgment and opinion of the hardly literate […] What 
equality is to the body politic—its innermost principle—discrimination is so 
society. Society is that curious, somewhat hybrid realm between the political and 
the private in which, since the beginning of the modern age, most men have spent 
the greater part of their lives. For each time we leave the protective four walls of 
our private homes and cross over the threshold into the public world, we enter 
first, not the political realm of equality, but the social sphere (RJ 204-205). 
 
                                                 
22 Compare this to the central thesis of Arendt’s On Violence, i.e., that violence is the opposite of power. 
Violence, she argues, becomes necessary when political power breaks down or becomes vulnerable, when 
the conditions for the possibility of political action—speech, public space, plurality—are compromised or 
constricted. Violence, then, is the end or the destruction of the political. But as we have seen, the political is 
predicated on the violent subordination of some to others. So violence is the condition for the possibility of 
politics, but must be kept carefully distinct from it.  
 
23 This antinomy shows up in interesting ways in the literature. In her discussion of On Revolution (2003, 
157-166), Benhabib (2003) characterizes Arendt’s distinction between the political and the economic as a 
“hapless ontological divide” that obscures the fact that “there is no neutral and nonpolitical organization of 
the economic; all economy is political economy” (158). But she then immediately congratulates Arendt for 
an “insight into the interdependence of liberation and freedom, or rather the interdependence of 
socioeconomic conditions and of political freedom” (159). Holman also (inadvertently) articulates this 
tension: “The polis was thus not a rule of some over others, but an isonomy, which assumes not a natural 
equality of condition or capacity between all, but an equality between those who are understood as existing 
with one another in a specific relation as peers” (Holman 109). Of course, the ancient Athenians did not 
take their slaves to be their peers, no more than the American “founding fathers” granted isonomy to the 





Notice that here we “are all equals” in the political realm, and that she is content in this 
instance to associate this with voting, which includes “the hardly literate.” This is not the 
idea of “the political” we have been given to understand from her other work. But in any 
case, what is developed in this passage is a dissociation of relevance between political 
equality and social inequality. The latter is not the concern of the former, and attempts by 
the former to act upon the latter are a transgression of its inherent limits (note the same 
theme from On Revolution). If we take her seriously in her more elitist moments—as 
opposed to this passage in which illiterates get to participate in politics by voting—then it 
would seem that, as we have suggested before, the economically underprivileged  have 
no political recourse to address their situation.24 
 At the same time, we must point out the disconcerting character of her racism 
when considered alongside her sophisticated reflections on the “social” conditions” of 
European-American Jewish experience.25 “When one is attacked as a Jew, one must 
defend oneself as a Jew” (EU 12), but African Americans have to defend themselves as 
“citizens.” Drawing on Arendt’s reflections on the figure of the “pariah”—in the first 
third of Origins, her book on Rahel Varnhagen, and various other “Jewish writings”—is a 
common strategy of rescuing her from the more problematic implications we have 
                                                 
24 The isonomic theme of this disturbing essay acts as a point of departure for several critics intent on 
drawing out the limits and flaws of Arendt’s political ontology. The most expansive attempt on this front is 
Gines’s Hannah Arendt and the Negro Question. The central focus of the book is Arendt’s recurring but 
not unambiguous anti-Black racism, which Gines reads as a cipher for the constitutive limits of Arendt’s 
work as a whole. In a similar vein, Bernasconi’s estimation of the Little Rock essay is also poignant: 
“Arendt told African Americans that the instrument which had been used to oppress them should govern 
the form of their protests” (21). Muhlmann makes a similar point about that piece (133-136). Benhabib 
(2003), by contrast, defends Arendt’s social/political divide but says that the schema “fails” in her stance 
on Little Rock, as she was “looking at the experience of black-white race relations in the United States 
through glasses whose lenses were crafted in another context” (149). The point being made by Gines, 
Bernasconi, and Muhlmann seems to be that, if one’s glasses distort things to such an extent, there is a need 
for new glasses. Other accounts of Arendt’s racism include Johnson, who claims that she is even more 
racist than Gines gives her credit for, and Norton, who offers a thoroughgoing account of her troubled 
relation to Africa and African Americans in general.   
 
25 As Gines notes, Arendt develops a cogent argument against “abstract humanism” (close to the kind of 
isonomy she defends in the Little Rock essay) whenever it is a question of Jewish identity or social status, 
but this argument does not seem to extend to other “social” categories like “African American” (Gines 6-
11). This points to “glaring disjunctions” and “incongruities” (Gines, 10) in Arendt’s ontology. Cf. 






mentioned, and of mending the damage done by “Reflections on Little Rock.”26 Also 
worth mentioning in this context is “On the Emancipation of Women,” a review of a 
book by Alice Rühle-Gerstel that Arendt wrote while still in Germany. Here, she is 
sharply critical of the movement for formal, legal equality for women that neglects what 
she will later call “social” equality (EU 66-68).  
 
Conclusion  
Though she has no particular attachment to the term, Arendt’s political ontology 
is defined by the iconography we have come to associate with democracy—public space, 
plurality, speech, debate, and the freedom to begin something new. It is also clear, 
however, that she has a devastatingly low opinion of the demos in the original sense of 
this term: the poor, the laboring, and the dispossessed.27 Not only does she categorically 
disqualify “the maintenance of bodily needs” from political concern, but she goes so far 
as to suggest that the rising status and centrality of the animal laborans constitutes the 
abolition of politics and therefore the catastrophe of modern life. For her, the political 
itself is effaced when “the multitude of the poor and the downtrodden”—those 
“politically immature” masses “who know nothing and can do nothing” and who “see 
everything from the viewpoint of the stomach”—try to alter their conditions of life by 
political action, for they can only act with “the ideals born out of poverty.” This is 
therefore not an elitism which merely ignores the dispossessed, but an elitism which 
keeps them in their place—a place they must be kept if politics is to be possible for 
others. It is a denial of the capacity of the economically underprivileged to act politically, 
an ontological dispossession of the already materially dispossessed. Scholars consistently 
refer to Arendt’s idea of “plurality” to allay the problem of her elitism,28 but a plurality of 
elites is still a plurality. The other features of the political ontology cannot help those not 
                                                 
26 A good example of this tack is Disch (1996, 172-203), who uses this analysis as “a way to break with 
Arendt’s humanism on her own terms” (171). Even Gines hints at this approach, suggesting that Arendt 
could have “utilize[d] some of the tools at her disposal” (her reflections on Jewish life) to come to a more 
progressive account of the relation between the “social” and the “political” (Gines, 12). 
 
27 See Wood (2016), 181-237. 
 
28 Disch (1996, 31-40), Hirsch (55), Benhabib (2003, 104-107, 146), Canovan (1992, 205 ff), Curthoys 





included: democratic iconography is cold comfort to a disqualified demos, an island of 
freedom means nothing to one adrift in the sea of necessity. Despite her endless 
admonition of the philosophers’ retreat into the worldless realm of “Man” (as opposed to 
the world of “men”), Arendt returns there with a vengeance. In her disdainful exclusion 
of material necessity, she betrays her own cardinal rule, forgetting that the majority of 
“men” who inhabit the world are hungry, needy, and precarious. 
Criticizing Arendt for her elitism is not my primary concern here. I am interested, 
rather, in the relationship between this elitism and her conception of the political, 
particularly the notion—celebrated by many of her admirers—that politics is an end in 
itself. As we have seen, the “rise of the social” transfigures politics into a means to the 
end of the reproduction of life, consumption, and private happiness, destroying the 
uniquely political “public happiness” once known by the ancient Athenians and the 
American founding fathers. This happiness consists in making oneself seen and heard in 
the public sphere, expressing one’s opinion, engaging in debates and deliberations with 
others, persuading them and being persuaded, being one of a “plurality,” acting to bring 
forth something new, and determining the conditions of one’s own life. The figure of the 
political as an end in itself, sometimes referred to as “the autonomy of the political,” is 
taken up by many as Arendt’s most compelling contribution to political theory.29  
As I have struggled to show throughout this chapter, however, the “autonomy” 
that Arendt grants to the political is purchased at the price of ontologically disqualifying 
the maintenance of material necessity from the status of politics (even if it is the 
condition for the possibility of politics) and by extension those whose lives are defined by 
(or were defined by) this maintenance. Democratic iconography has foundational status 
only insofar as economic concerns are not subject to discussion and only insofar as the 
economically underprivileged are excluded. The essence of politics is discussion, but 
only a discussion of certain things. It is defined by appearance, but only the appearance 
of certain people. This is a formalism which decides its content in advance. Arendt 
                                                 
29 In a book synthesizing Arendt and Marcuse, for instance, Holman argues that while Marcuse’s work 
should act as a corrective to Arendt’s exclusion of “social” issues from public debate, Marcuse’s Marxism 
likewise needs an Arendtian corrective insofar as it (according to Holman) conceives of politics as 
“instrumentally aimed at the achievement of a certain extrinsic goal” rather than as “a performative good in 
itself” (Holman 4). See also Wenman (2015), Kalyvas, Honig (1996), Disch (1996), Hirsch, Isaac, Heather 





disqualifies the dispossessed because she abhors the political content that results from 
their inclusion—so much so that she refuses to call it politics. Political action is an end in 
itself only once we have narrowly delimited what counts as a political subject. Its 
autonomy is heteronomous.  
This raises the question of what we might call the ‘content lacuna’ of Arendt’s 
conception of political action.30 It is never entirely clear what is to be done in the public 
sphere, what “action” is supposed to accomplish if it is not allowed to infringe upon the 
“private.” At a symposium devoted to the latter’s work, Mary McCarthy posed this 
question to Arendt directly: “if all questions of economics, human welfare, busing, 
anything that touches the social sphere, are to be excluded from the political scene, then I 
am mystified. I am left with war and speeches. But speeches can’t be just speeches. They 
have to be speeches about something” (RPW 316). Arendt’s response—which, as 
attendee Richard Bernstein notes,31 satisfied no one present—is revealing. She first says 
that the content of political action will be determined by the political problems of a 
particular time and place. When pressed on what makes a problem political, she 
responds: “There are things where the right measures can be figured out. These things 
can really be administered and are not then subject to public debate. Public debate can 
only deal with things which—it we want to put it negatively—we cannot figure out with 
certainty.” Politics is concerned with things that are “somehow really debatable” as 
opposed to “everything which can really be figured out, in the sphere Engels called the 
administration of things—these are social things in general. That they should then be 
subject to debate seems to me phony and a plague” (RPW 316-317). As an example of 
these “things where the right measures can be figured out,” Arendt offers the issue of 
public housing: “There shouldn’t be any debate about the question that everybody should 
have decent housing” (318).  
So politics, in this conception, is the space of debate and opinion—but only about 
those issues which are “somehow really debatable,” those that “we cannot figure out with 
certainty.” Ostensibly, the material/economic concerns that Arendt excludes (like the 
existence of poverty) fall outside of this category; the mistake of the sans-culottes was to 
                                                 
30 Cf. Canovan (1978), 19. 
 





put “the administration of things” (like the distribution of resources) into question. One 
problem with this answer—as I will explore in later chapters—is the usefulness of such a 
conception of the political at a time in which the most momentous subjects of debate are 
often issues “which can really be figured out” in an even more obvious way (e.g., the 
reality of climate change). The association of “politics” with “uncertainty” disqualifies 
from political significance those who are ignorant of or incredulous toward those things 
which are certain. Again, we confront this curious ambivalence: Arendt’s identification 
of politics with doxa directly contravenes the Platonic motif of the philosopher king—but 
her work is also seized by an aversion to the demos that would not be out of place in 
Plato.32 
 Central to Arendt’s thought, as we said, is the thesis that the political—understood 
as the activity or performance of speech, plurality, debate, and dissensus—is an end in 
itself. We must now add a caveat: the political is an end in itself inasmuch as it concerns 
doxa rather than certainty or truth. This addendum is not incidental, for if the answers to 
political questions “could really be figured out,” then politics would not be an end in 
itself and there would be no need to posit democratic iconography as its essence.  
In this thesis and its crucial caveat, Arendt’s work has a broad affinity with the 
democratic ethos prevailing in Left political theory (and often directly informs it). Her 
conception of “public happiness” and her association of politics with doxa resonate with 
the turn (discussed in the introduction and the next chapter) toward democracy as a 
normative foundation for the Left, what I have called the categorical imperative of 
democracy. This chapter has argued, however, that in Arendt’s hands this categorical 
imperative comes with certain conditions: not everyone can be counted as a political 
subject, the demos must be carefully circumscribed. The Left democratic turn, I claim, 
reproduces this exclusionary moment as well (even if the object of exclusion is different).  
 It is important to note that the categorical imperative of democracy, like its 
namesake in the Kantian moral system, has both normative and ontological moments 
(never neatly separable). A set of formal characteristics is posited as belonging 
                                                 
32 D’Entrèves: “Against Plato and Hobbes, who denigrated the role of opinion in political matters, Arendt 
reasserts the value and importance of political discourse, of deliberation and persuasion, and thus of a 
politics that acknowledges difference and the plurality of opinions” (257-258). Kalyvas: “[Arendt 





essentially to ‘the political,’ and then these characteristics are exalted as ‘good’ in 
themselves. Because the political is autonomous, one ought to treat it as such. Because 
‘true’ politics admits of no ‘certain answers,’ to pretend otherwise is both an intellectual 
and an ethical failure (“phony and a plague,” as Arendt says). The most grievous error—
in both senses, again—would be to understand the iconography of the political as being 
for something else (such as ‘the reproduction of life’ or ‘a good society’), or as a good 
only if certain other conditions are met first (i.e., if the content of speech and debate is 
determined in advance). This would reduce political action to a means to some external 
end, i.e., to a hypothetical imperative, thereby annulling the ‘good in itself’ that politics 
truly is and mistaking the ‘management of the social’ for the properly political. So when 
Arendt introduces conditions into her framework, she not only betrays her own normative 
injunction but her ontological commitments as well. As we have seen and will see again 
in chapter three, the Left democratic ethos follows suit. 
Despite the intrusion of content into her formal categories, it is difficult to count 
Arendt as a partisan for any particular political position or project. She has been 
described as a liberal humanist, a “classical Republican” opposed to “liberal democracy,” 
a “radical conservative,” a Whig, a theorist of political virtù, an agonist, and a “reluctant 
modernist.”33 She considered herself neither a liberal nor a conservative nor a socialist 
(RPW 333-334)—“So you ask me where I am. I am nowhere” (ibid 336). When pressed 
for her stance on capitalism, she replied “I do not share Marx’s great enthusiasm about 
capitalism” (ibid 334). The democratic theorists of the next chapter, however, are in 
various ways and to varying degrees committed to a progressive and/or leftist project of 
social transformation, i.e., a structural change in the social, political, economic order that 
will address the inequalities, antagonisms, and oppressions wrought by racism, sexism, 
heterosexism, and the capitalist world system. Chapter three will consider how the 




                                                 
33 See, respectively, Disch (1996, 170-171), Canovan (1992, 201-202), Horowitz, Muhlmann, Honig (1996, 




CHAPTER III  
DEMOCRACY AT ITS LIMITS—RANCIÈRE, MOUFFE, AND LACLAU  
 
“Radical democratic theory,” while not a consistently applied term, refers to a 
current of critical political thought that emerged at the end of the twentieth century, 
situated geographically in and around the French intellectual context and historically near 
the decline of the Soviet Union. It is usually framed as a reaction against 1) the 
‘consensus’ model proffered by the tradition of deliberative democracy and 2) the 
‘reductionist’ tendency of Marxism to subsume ‘the political’ to ‘the economic.’ While 
getting more specific would require a treatment of individual figures, we can comfortably 
say with Breaugh et al. that “what distinguishes this tradition is a particular preoccupation 
with indeterminacy, difference, or division.”1 They are also right to point out that this 
milieu is heavily indebted to Arendt’s political ontology.2 Who counts as a “radical 
democrat” will depend on how one carves up the philosophical subdivisions,3 but Laclau, 
Mouffe, and Rancière are perhaps the three figures most frequently cited as exemplars of 
this theoretical current (the former two having originated or at least popularized the 
term), and so it is with their work that I engage here. The aim of this chapter is to show 
that as radical democracy reproduces Arendt’s democratic iconography (the populist 
element of her work, democracy as a categorical imperative), it also reproduces her 
exclusionary political “island” (the elitist tendency, democracy in spite of the demos). 
The point is not to criticize this exclusionary moment as such, to argue that Rancière, 
Mouffe, and Laclau should include those whom they exclude, or to expose a 
contradiction in service of a ‘refutation.’ Rather, my purpose is to reveal the limits of 
democracy as a critical category by narrating the tension produced when the radical 
democratic approach selectively imports particular content into its formal theoretical 
landscape.   
 
                                                 
1 Breaugh et al., 4.  
 
2 “It would be impossible to speak of a radically democratic return of the political in France without 
[Arendt’s] intervention” (21).  
 
3 Wenman (2015), for example, counts Badiou and Žižek along with Rancière and Laclau as “radical 





Rancière: Democracy against Philosophy 
 Rancière begins On the Shores of Politics with a striking metaphor: for fear of the 
unstable, unpredictable “democratic assembly” (the sea), philosophy attempts to ground 
politics on a firm theoretical foundation (the shore). Beginning with Plato, philosophy has 
sought to subsume politics under its own domain, to have rid of the messy political world 
that upsets its secure and durable categories: “The sea smells of sailors, it smells of 
democracy. The task of philosophy is to found a different politics, a politics of 
conversion which turns its back on the sea” (SP 1-2).  Our first radical democratic 
theorist understands himself to be challenging this tradition, attempting to think the sea 
on its own murky terms.4 
 Like Arendt, Rancière takes ancient Athenian political philosophy as his point of 
departure. In his reading, the tradition’s foundational texts present a vision of the political 
as “geometrical equality” (as opposed to “arithmetical equality”), i.e., the appropriate 
distribution of “parts” in a community. “Wealth” is the part owed to “the smallest 
number,” while “excellence” belongs to “the best”; the “part” owed to “the people” 
(demos) is “freedom,” and this part, paradoxically, also belongs to the whole, and so it is 
in a sense no part (D 6-9). This distribution and its justifications are, however, contingent 
rather than necessary. The “counting” of the parts is therefore always “a false count, a 
double count, or a miscount” (D 6). So while Plato (and the subsequent tradition of 
political philosophy) conceives politics as the correct distribution of parts, Rancière 
claims that it is the contestation of this precarious counting—by those who are 
miscounted—that gives politics [la politique] its meaning: “There is politics—and not 
just domination—because there is a wrong count of the parts of the whole […] Politics 
exists when the natural order of domination is interrupted by the institution of a part of 
those who have no part” (D 10-11). This intervention consists in the juxtaposition of the 
basic fact of “equality”—“the absence of arkhe, the sheer contingency of any social 
order” (D 15)—and an inegalitarian order of domination.  
                                                 





The uncounted can interrupt this order because they are capable of speech, which 
is the condition for the possibility of political action (D 48-52, SP 16, 51).5 Equality is 
always already presupposed in domination, Rancière argues, because “in order to obey an 
order at least two things are required: you must understand the order and you must 
understand that you must obey it. And to do that, you must already be the equal of the 
person who is ordering you. It is this equality that gnaws away at any natural order” (D 
16). Politics, then, is the ephemeral appearance of the contradiction between equality and 
inequality, identity and non-identity (D 18), “the introduction of an incommensurable at 
the heart of the distribution of speaking bodies” (D 19, cf. SP 81). What we usually call 
“politics”—the maintenance of a given order, “the simple management of the social” (SP 
11)—Rancière non-pejoratively terms “the police” (D 28-30).6 A given police order 
breaks down when its schema of distribution, its count of who counts as a speaking 
being, is disrupted by a new, incompatible “partition of the perceptible” (D 24 – le 
partage du sensible, also translated as “the distribution of the sensible”). This disruption 
is tantamount to “the production of a new field of experience” (D 35). Rancière gives 
several examples of this phenomenon, including Jeanne Deroin presenting herself as a 
candidate in an 1849 election even though women were barred from holding office (D 
41), and Auguste Blanqui responding “proletarian” when asked to state his profession at 
trial (D 37).  
 In Rancière’s understanding of ancient Athenian political ontology, the demos 
referred to those who had no part, “the great beast of the populace” (SP 2) counted as not 
counting by the police order. Rancière likewise equates his account of politics with 
democracy: “Wherever the part of those who have no part is inscribed, however fragile 
and fleeting these inscriptions may be, a sphere of appearance of the demos is created, an 
                                                 
5 Cf. Samuel Chambers: “[For Rancière] we cannot derive politics from any essential features of the human 
subject […] Rancière rejects all ontology” (17). 
 
6 Rancière almost always uses “la politique” to refer to politics/the political (as opposed to la police). He 
almost never makes use of the distinction between la politique (usually translated as ‘politics’) and le 
politique (usually translated as ‘the political’). This distinction has become a staple in French political 
theory. Among the few exceptions in Rancière’s case is RD 125, where he writes that “the political” (le 
politique) “consists in the tension between the police order….and the enactment of the egalitarian principle 
regarding the capacity of anybody.” This supports Marchart’s (2011) claim that, for Rancière, “le politique” 
represents the point of collision between la politique and la police. Thus, while it is not a major part of his 






element of the kratos, the power of the people, exists. The problem is to extend the 
sphere of this materialization, to maximize this power” (D 88). He defines the term 
similarly in Shores as “first and foremost the space of all those locations the facticity of 
which tallies with the contingency and resolve of the egalitarian inscription in the 
making” (SP 90). In fact, he distinguishes “democracy” from “politics” only to say that 
the former is the latter’s “mode of subjectification” (D 99); a few pages later, he writes 
that “democracy…is the institution of politics itself […] Every politics is democratic in 
this precise sense…in the sense of forms of expression that confront the logic of equality 
with the logic of the police order” (D 101). The meaning of “democracy,” then, is the 
articulation of division and dissensus as opposed to the “unified mass” that troubled 
Plato’s imagination, which is better termed “ochlocracy” (SP 32). Against various forms 
of anti-democratic rhetoric (which he catalogs in Hatred of Democracy and associates 
with Arendt on 23) and against an “epistemocracy” (HD 45) of experts who would decide 
on the right form of politics (a task that belongs to the police order and to the history of 
political philosophy), Rancière advocates a faith in “the intelligence of the people” (D 23-
25), the “wisdom of the many” (SP 35, cf. HD 97), or the “equality of intelligences” (SP 
51-52) and understands this faith as a precondition of the political. “The denunciation of 
‘democratic individualism’,” he writes, “is simply the hatred of equality by which a 
dominant intelligentsia lets it be known that it is the elite entitled to rule over the blind 
herd” (HD 68). 
 While his use of the term “democracy” is idiosyncratic, Rancière’s theory 
resonates with much of Arendt’s democratic iconography (he refers to her work 
frequently, almost always neutrally or positively—the passage I pointed to in the 
preceding paragraph is an exception).7 They share a certain privileging of speech, 
appearance,8 and debate,9 as well as a mistrust of philosophy’s ambition to prescribe the 
right content of politics. Rancière’s approach, however, could be utilized to critique 
Arendt’s elitist dimension. Instead of a public space free from the needs of the animal 
                                                 
7 See SP 45, 50, 89, D 133, HD 16, 23, 38, 52-3, 58, 61. 
 
8 “Politics is first of all a sphere of appearance” (DDA 296). 
 
9  “The only kind of dialogue compatible with democracy is one where the parties hear one another but do 





laborans, the political would be instantiated precisely when the animal laborans contests 
this exclusion and demands a place at the table as a speaking being. In spite of her anti-
Platonic protestations, Rancière could count Arendt as part of the philosophical project of 
abolishing politics, because, as the last chapter argued, she still turns her back on the 
“sea” of the demos (using, remarkably, the same metaphor).   
Rancière does not identify democracy/politics with economics or with class 
struggle, however. Hesitant to specify or determine in advance what content it will or 
should take, he speaks instead of “emerging” subjects “who take…wrong [tort] in hand, 
who expose the substance of the irreconcilable grievance while simultaneously beginning 
the process of addressing it by means of disputation. Politics exists by virtue of the 
democratic mobilization of this apparatus of appearance, imparity and grievance” (SP 
97).10 Politics is therefore “autonomous” in the sense discussed at the end of the last 
chapter, and democracy a process that makes sporadic historical appearances but never 
terminates in a final “end” which is external to itself. The figure of democracy also shows 
up in a normative register when Rancière criticizes contemporary state governments for 
working against the resurgence of democracy in a vain attempt to achieve “the end of 
politics” (see his contribution to the Democracy in what State? collection, “Democracies 
against Democracy,” cf. SP 60-61). He thus falls into the camp of theorists who criticize 
the prevailing nominal “democracies” in the name of an unrealized real (or radical) 
democracy; in his case, however, this real democracy is never “realizable” as such (cf. SP 
39-40).11 
 For all this, Rancière is not without an “anti-democratic” tendency of his own. He 
advances a formal theory of democratic contestation but selectively determines the 
content of this contestation in advance, proscribing certain “partitions of the sensible” in 
                                                 
10 “By subjectification I mean the production through a series of actions of a body and a capacity for 
enunciation not previously identifiable within a given field of experience, whose identification is thus part 
of the reconfiguration of the field of experience” (D 35). “Parties do not exist prior to the declaration of a 
wrong” (D 39).  
 
11 Samuel Chambers: “Politics can do nothing else than this: renegotiate and reconfigure the police order” 
(65). This is why Rancière sometimes criticizes the true/false democracy dichotomy, as in SP 39-40. Cf. 
Tanke: “For Rancière, the police is a distribution of the sensible that denies the ability of the part to 
supplement the polis with a claim of equality” (45). Tanke’s interpretation renders the term “police” 





spite of his own interdiction against this.12 In both Disagreement and Shores he 
characterizes the rising tide of racism and xenophobia in Europe as a negative example of 
his democratic model of dissensus: “The trouble is that racism is not the symptom [of 
“consensus” thinking] but the disease—the disease, in fact, of consensus itself…” (SP 
104). His use of the term “disease” here is not strictly metaphorical, as he goes on to 
pathologize these racially-charged nationalist views: 
The subject of the [racist] opinion says what he thinks of Blacks and Arabs in the 
same real/simulated mode in which he is elsewhere invited to tell about his 
fantasies [fantasmes] and to completely satisfy these just by dialing four figures 
and as many letters. The subject who opines accordingly is the subject of this new 
mode of the visible where everything is on display, up for grabs, a subject called 
on to live out all his fantasies in a world of total exhibition… (D 119-120, cf. the 
whole discussion from 117-121).   
 
But it is not clear, at a formal level, why the “Europe for Europeans” movements 
represent “consensus” against the backdrop of a liberal cosmopolitan European Union, or 
why this “contestation” would not count (!) as “the introduction of an incommensurable 
at the heart of the distribution of speaking bodies.”13 Ostensibly, those participating 
understand themselves to be doing something like this, rather than enacting a confused 
pathology—living out their “fantasies,” etc. So why is this interruption, this 
“subjectification” not an example of democracy but of its polar opposite? What about the 
“equality of intelligence” of these people? Rancière selectively chooses his positive 
examples from historical cases of leftist or progressive politics.14 But given his 
formalistic categories, the rise of neoliberalism could just as well be a disruption of the 
Keynesian police order that produces “emerging subjects” appearing in public to demand 
                                                 
12 For a critique of Rancière’s formalism along different lines than mine, see Chari, 54-60.  
 
13 Labelle offers an interpretation of this claim by Rancière: “The cleavage we find between a perfectly 
integrated society and its monstrous and unsayable otherness allows for the proliferation of neo-liberal and 
populist rhetoric which states that if the immigrant, the homeless or the unemployed remain unassimilated 
into society, it is simply by choice, in other words it is due to their refusal to be included” (94). But this 
presupposes that racist/xenophobic populist movements represent established homogeneity against 
multiplicity or plurality, bypassing the possibility that, according to their own speech, these movements 
represent “contestations” of the false homogeneity of liberal progressivism/multiculturalism.   
 
14 Theorists who “apply” Rancière’s ideas to concrete cases tend to do the same, for instance every example 





that corporations be “counted” as speaking beings.15  For better or worse, Right-wing 
extremism also represents “a tear in the common fabric, a new possibility that makes 
itself visible and that challenges the obviousness of a given world” (MP viii-ix).16 
Rancière, however, takes for granted that all such “tears” will be progressive or leftist.  
 It might be objected here that, contrary to what I have just suggested, Right-wing 
extremism represents the police rather than politics. In what sense could xenophobic and 
racist nationalism be said to operate on the presupposition of “equality”?  This points to a 
certain ambiguity in Rancière’s thought. As we have seen, he sometime speaks of the 
political as the juxtaposition of “the basic fact of equality” with the contingent inequality 
of a given police order. At other times, as we have also seen, he characterizes politics as 
the creation of specific political identities that juxtapose one partition of the sensible with 
another, or “an operator performing an opening” (RD 93).17 In one case, a given 
distribution of parts is challenged by the impossibility of a “right” distribution of parts; in 
the other, a given count is disrupted by the articulation of a different count.18 Rancière’s 
examples confirm both interpretations. When Jeanne Deroin presents herself as a 
candidate for office, this exemplifies the former conception: the police order that decrees 
that men can hold office while women cannot is disrupted by the assertion of the equal 
capacity of women. But when Auguste Blanqui states his profession as “proletarian,” he 
seems to be doing something else: giving voice to a new partition of the sensible which 
includes “proletarian” as a part, contesting a police order that does not count it. Here we 
have the emergence of a new “operator” and therefore an example of the latter conception 
of politics—a declaration of inequality against the presupposition of equality, rather than 
                                                 
15 Though with a markedly different theoretical agenda (as we saw in the introduction), Marchart (2011) 
has also criticized Rancière for what he deems the “emancipatory apriorism” of his work: “the idea of 
politics being egalitarian eo ipso. Politics, for Rancière…is either egalitarian, or it is not politics” (135).  
 
16 Marchart: “Neither on a theoretical nor on a practical plane is [Rancière’s emancipatory apriorism] 
convincing…One may simply imagine the less than hypothetical case of a bunch of disenfranchised Neo-
Nazis, a party of no part claiming to be the whole” (2011, 136).  
 
17 Samuel Chambers: “Politics produces the subject that would seem to precede politics…A radical 
democratic subject of politics does not just appear on the stage; it brings the stage into being” (9). 
 
18 In the sixth Thesis on Politics, however, Rancière contrasts “two ways of counting the parts of the 






the opposite.19 This ambiguity comes down to what Rancière means by “a false count, a 
double count, or a miscount” of parts. On one hand, any count of parts is always false 
insofar as there is no “right” count; on the other, a count can be false to the extent that it 
renders invisible a given part by identifying this position with the whole of society (“no 
part”). The second understanding, however, requires a condition made impossible by the 
first: that there are better and worse counts of parts.20 
 This difficulty could be resolved if we make use of a distinction between 
necessity and contingency, as Rancière frequently does. There is no “right” distribution 
of parts in the sense that one is valid necessarily and eternally, but in the present 
inegalitarian order there are true and false articulations of how this order distributes its 
parts. Right-wing xenophobia, then, would be a false “contestation” insofar as it based on 
a false partition of the sensible (‘white nationals are being oppressed by a dangerous 
foreign force and need to defend themselves’) and insofar as it is based on the false 
presupposition of necessary inequality (white supremacy, nationalism). In this case, we 
could make a distinction between those contestations which are legitimate (LGBTQ 
activists demanding to be “counted” without violence) and those which are not (men’s 
rights activists claiming that feminism is oppressive to men).   
 Rancière, however, denies us the theoretical tools to make either of these 
distinctions. Adjudicating between partitions of the sensible, deciding which 
“contestations” are right and which wrong, would place us back in the position of an anti-
democratic philosophy that eliminates politics. If political theory determines the correct 
count of what is owed to whom (LGBTQ activists are owed recognition and solidarity in 
                                                 
19 Compare these two passages, on the same page, from May (2008): “Democratic politics manifests a 
people. In a sense…it creates a political subject. It is not a conversation among subjects who have already 
been established in their character […] The project of a democratic politics, a politics of equality, is to 
reject the marginalized position to which one has been assigned, not for the sake of another or different 
position, but for the sake of nothing at all other than one’s own equality” (49). Is politics the creation of 
new subjects, or the contestation of any possible division between subjects on the basis of a fundamental, 
pre-existing equality? Elsewhere May seems to suggest both: “To engage in a democratic politics is not to 
discover a subject of politics; it is to create one. Equality is not received. It is made” (71). How does this 
reconcile with Rancière’s insistence that equality (“the absence of arkhe, the sheer contingency of any 
social order”) is the condition for the possibility of politics? Does politics produce its own condition of 
possibility?  
 
20 Tanke: “The key question with respect to any distribution fo the sensibile is to know whether it is 
founded upon equality or inequality” (2). If Rancière says that equality is the disruption of any distribution, 





struggle, men’s rights activists are not), then we return to the “epistemocracy” of those 
who claim expertise over and against those who are ignorant of how things really are.21 
As we have seen, this is a position that Rancière associates with the police and (what 
amounts to the same thing) the Platonic project, the end of politics and likewise of 
democracy. Rancière does say that there are better and worse police orders (D 30-31); for 
him, however, they are not better or worse on the basis of their particular distributions of 
parts (their content), but only by the extent to which they allow for the interruption of 
politics/democracy. So a police order which counts LGBTQ activism but not MRA is not 
better as such, and one which systematically blocks the emergence of MRA would be 
worse as such. One might object, again: LGBTQ activism is based on the presupposition 
of equality, while MRA is based on the conceit of natural hierarchy. In this case, we are 
back where we started: certain movements are based on truth (the contingency of any 
social hierarchy) and others are based on illusion (the necessity of a certain distribution of 
parts). But Rancière’s criticism of elitism, pivotal to his argument, dissolves the 
possibility of even this distinction, which is also pivotal to his argument.22 To make this 
clearer, we should look at the former in more detail, tracing its lineage back from 
Disagreement and Shores to his earliest work. 
Rancière’s conception of “the equality of intelligences,”23 inextricable from his 
theory of democracy,24 is rooted in the critique of philosophical elitism initiated by his 
first book, Althusser’s Lesson. There, he criticizes his former teacher’s categorical 
division between “the science of intellectuals” (AL 61) and the illusions of “the agents of 
production” (workers), which reproduces a “partition of the sensible” according to which 
common people cannot speak for themselves: “[Althusser] gives to philosophers the 
power to be the word-keepers” (AL 96). If the realities of workers’ lives do not match up 
                                                 
21 Cf.: “A common thread throughout my work is…attention to the ways in which arguments circulate 
between reasons of order and the reasons of those claim to attack it” (AET 240). 
  
22 Bosteels perceptively argues that Rancière inadvertently reproduces the “speculative Leftism” that he 
criticizes in others with his opposition between “police fictions” and “true politics.”  
 
23 The extent to which Rancière’s notion of “the equality of intelligences” should be taken literally is the 
subject of scholarly debate. May (2008) argues that, for Rancière, “the equality of anyone and everyone” is 
a necessary presupposition for progressive politics and does not reflect an actual universal capacity to learn 
any subject matter. Magnusson, however, insists against May that the term should be taken literally. 
 





to the intellectuals’ theory, then so much the worse for those realities.25 Such a theoretical 
maneuver, Rancière argues, functions to guarantee the legitimacy of the intellectual’s 
place in a given police order and consequently poses no meaningful challenge to that 
order. He continues this line of thought in The Philosopher and his Poor, where he draws 
an analogy between Plato’s “philosopher kings” and Marx’s distinction between 
“materialist science” and the false consciousness engendered by the capitalist production 
process. Marxism is only “Platonism sociologized,” as it presumes “the permanence of 
optical illusions, the necessary non-concordance between what the scientist knows and 
what the peasant sees” (PP 131).26 The innovation of unorthodox teacher Joseph Jacotot, 
the subject of Rancière’s The Ignorant Schoolmaster, was to abandon this presupposition 
of the inequality of intelligences, to replace the pedagogical logic of “explication” (which 
assumes and therefore solidifies an intellectual division in the social fabric) with that of 
“emancipation” (which assumes the equality of intelligences and can therefore unsettle 
that fabric).27 The figure of the intellectual/educator as one who fosters correct 
consciousness by way of expertise, Rancière claims, hopelessly resembles the old 
Platonic project: “the intelligent caste’s management of the stupid multitude” (IS 131).28 
He even equates the notion of “progress” with this elitist, paternalist perspective: 
“Progress is the new way of saying inequality […] The century of Progress is that of the 
triumphant explicators, of humanity pedagogicized” (IS 119-120).29  
                                                 
25 “Althusser tips his hat in tribute to the workers’ movement, only the better to wash his hands of empirical 
workers” (AL 80).  
 
26 Of course, the claim that there is a necessary disparity between the knowledge of intellectuals and the 
ignorance of “the masses” is substantially different from the claim that the categories of truth, illusion, 
knowledge, and ignorance are essential for an emancipatory politics. Rancière, however, collapses this 
distinction—I will return to this point at length in chapter six.   
 
27 Biesta (2010): “Whereas according to [explicative logic] the explanation of how the world really is leads 
to emancipation, Rancière has argued that instead of bringing about emancipation it introduces a 
fundamental dependency into the logic of emancipation, since the one to be emancipated remains 
dependent upon the truth or knowledge revealed to him by the emancipator” (40). 
 
28 Rancière explores these issues at more length in Staging the People: The Proletarian and his Double and 
The Intellectual and his People: Staging the People Volume 2. For more on his critique of “explication,” 
see Biesta (2010), Tanke (7-42), Davis (15-25), and Mecchia.  
 
29 He also rejects the label “intellectual” insofar as it distinguishes certain political actors over and against 





 This line of criticism continues to play a role in Rancière’s current work. In one of 
the contributions to his debate with Honneth, he returns to this theme: “[In explicative 
logic], the role of the schoolmaster is posited in the act of suppressing the distance 
between his knowledge and the ignorance of the ignorant. Unfortunately, in order to 
reduce the gap, he has to reinstate it ceaselessly” (RD 138). He goes on to claim that 
since democracy consists in the contestation of a certain partition of the sensible, the 
conceit of a right form of politics which the learned might illuminate to the ignorant is 
fundamentally anti-democratic. “The distribution of the sensible is not a matter of illusion 
or knowledge,” he writes. “It is a matter of consensus or dissensus” (RD 136).30 From 
Althusser’s Lesson to this recently published piece, we see the repetition of a basic 
opposition: on one hand the contestation of those who claim they are miscounted, the 
voice of the people capable of speech, democracy, and on the other hand the pedagogical 
disposition, “Platonism sociologized,” the distance between “the intelligent caste” and 
“the stupid multitude.” The latter side of this opposition reduces politics to “explication,” 
a matter of knowledge as opposed to ignorance, and therefore abolishes democracy. If we 
are to leave the all-too-comfortable “shores of politics” and think the sea, we must 
abandon the elitist logic which posits some truth which might be explained to those 
outside the know.31 He expresses this opposition in many places: 
I always try to think in terms of horizontal distributions, combinations between 
systems of possibilities, not in terms of surface and substratum. Where one 
searches for the hidden beneath the apparent, a position of mastery is established. 
I have tried to conceive of a topography that does not presuppose this position of 
mastery […] I constructed, little by little, an egalitarianism or anarchist theoretical 
position that does not presuppose this vertical relationship of top to bottom (PA 
49-50).  
 
Rancière always constructs his argumentation as a re-staging of a limited number 
of…scenes or events of discourse. It is also important to remark that he introduces 
no hierarchy in the selection of its scenes. The Marxist tradition and all the 
tradition of social science distinguishes two kinds of words: there are the words in 
which people express a situation as they feel it, and there are the words by which 
science accounts for a situation and for the ways in which those who are part of it 
                                                 
30 Immediately after this comment, however, he proceeds to give an account of Plato’s “lie” of a necessary 
distribution of parts that justifies domination.  
 
31 Rancière’s rejection of the truth/illusion approach extends even to “postmodern” criticisms of this model, 





can feel it and express their feeling. But, for Rancière, words are still words, 
arguments are still arguments, narratives are still narratives. The main point is not 
what they explain or express, it is the way in which they stage a scene or they 
create a commonsense (FR 117). 
 
Key to Rancière’s work is a decisive movement away from the paternalistic 
truth/illusion/knowledge/ignorance disjuncts that characterized the history of political 
philosophy from Plato to Althusser (and beyond), and toward a figure of thought which 
allows a “people”—who are not a given datum but are created through their enunciation 
as such—to speak for themselves.  
 How, then, are we to situate the rise of extreme Right-wing populist movements? 
This question is all the more pressing when we read passages like this: “For me the point 
is not pathology and how to heal this pathology; the point is that we have conflicting 
ways of describing or constructing a common world” (RD 119-120). As we have seen, 
however, Rancière does not describe the rising tide of racism and xenophobia as just 
another way of “constructing a common world”; he describes it as pathology in need of a 
critical diagnosis. He does write, immediately after the passage just cited, that “of course, 
we can prefer one of those constructions to the other.” But are these preferences in no 
way based on notions of ignorance and knowledge? And if we are content to offer 
pathologizing accounts of certain constructions, then in what sense are we still dealing 
with ‘preferences’? Consider again the example of men’s rights activism. Those involved 
understand themselves to be giving voice to a form of domination made invisible by the 
prevailing “police order,” articulating a partition of the sensible in which feminism is 
oppressive to men.32 We might be inclined to say (I certainly am) that this “contestation” 
does not name a real “wrong” but is only a pathetic and desperate attempt to reassert a 
privilege that has been threatened, or that its basic conceit assumes a completely illusory 
natural hierarchy, or that feminism represents “progress” while MRA represents 
“regression.” But notice what we have done in this case: reinstantiated a gap between 
knowledge and ignorance, between “surface” and “substratum,” as though we could 
“explicate” certain truths (feminism is not actually a form of oppression against men, 
patriarchy is actually a contingent historical violence and is not rooted in a metaphysical 
hierarchy of the sexes, etc.) to those who think otherwise. Is diagnosing this movement 
                                                 





and others like it as ignorance or pathology still “Platonism sociologized” and therefore 
fundamentally anti-democratic? Are words still words, arguments still arguments, 
narratives still narratives? Or do we find ourselves on the “shores” of politics yet again? 
 Rancière has a solution to this problem. In “The Populism That Is Not to Be 
Found” (his contribution to the What is a People? volume), he denies that Right-wing 
extremism is actually supported by the demos:  
Whatever the grievances expressed daily regarding those called immigrants…they 
are not expressed in popular mass demonstrations […] Some good souls on the 
left like to see [racist, xenophobic] measures as an unfortunate concession made 
by those in power to the extreme “populist” right for “electioneering” reasons. 
But none of them were taken under pressure from mass movements […] The so-
called populist extreme right does not express a specific xenophobic passion 
emanating from the depths of the body popular; it is a satellite that profits from 
the strategies of the state and distinguished intellectual campaigns (103-104).33  
 
The “populist right,” he claims, is only a convenient fiction devised by academic and 
governmental elites intent on maintaining their power against true forms of democratic 
contestation. So insofar as Right-wing extremism exists, it is a pathology (as we saw 
above), but it has little to no popular support and so cannot be called a popular 
movement. Besides being patently false, this claim is also manifestly irresponsible. The 
recent histories of Europe and the U.S. make overwhelmingly clear that xenophobic 
Right-wing populism is to be found and that it constitutes a serious political problem. It 
cannot be counted, however, by Rancière’s model without legitimating it as an example 
of democratic dissensus; diagnosing xenophobia, racism, etc. as ignorance or pathology 
means abandoning democracy for the elitist pedagogical disposition of political theory. 
The solution is to pretend as though the rise of extreme Right-wing populism has not 
occurred. 
With this claim, Rancière’s thought reaches its logical conclusion—and its 
antithesis. He abandoned “the science of intellectuals” as pursued by Plato and “The 
Marxist horizon” (PP 127-135) because it assumed the right to speak for the people 
whose positions, conditions, and interests it was meant to represent. It claimed to be the 
arbiter of the divisions between truth and illusion, knowledge and ignorance. What would 
                                                 
33 Cf. “Seven Ways to Spread Racist Ideas in France” (MP 55-58), an ironic Swiftian piece in which 
Rancière suggests that racist ideas are attributable more to intellectuals’ assumption that racism is prevalent 





the people say, Rancière asks, if we let them speak for themselves? “Who were these 
people, what did they do, think, want, say?” (AET 240). Sometimes, as his book 
Proletarian Nights and his numerous examples corroborate, the result is inspiring, 
instructive, and enriching. Sometimes, however, “the people” do, think, want, and say 
xenophobic, racist, misogynist right-wing extremism. Sometimes what they do and say 
reflects ignorance and illusion. In this case, we must either pathologize these positions (in 
direct contradiction with our firm stance against “explication”) or simply pretend, in spite 
of all evidence, that they do not exist, ignoring “the people” for the sake of theoretical 
consistency—precisely the sin of the old master Althusser. In the last instance, then, 
Rancière’s thought reverts to exactly what it began as a reaction against.34 He advocates a 
commitment to “the wisdom of the many,” but not this many. He takes himself to be 
departing from what Arendt characterized as an “island of freedom” (the place of 
political purity insulated from all that which is not true politics); for him, although 
politics is still rare, anyone can be a political subject and anything can become an object 
of political contestation. Ultimately, however, he only manages to expand this island.35 
Despite his intentions, he still protects himself from the sea; it still smells of sailors he 
finds distasteful. The philosopher who devoted a body of work to criticizing the distance 
between philosophy and democracy, who laments that elitist political theory which does 
not listen to the people and presumes to speak for them, closes his ears to their voice at 
this crucial moment.  
   
Mouffe: Agonism without Agony 
Mouffe begins with the premise that the political is inherently antagonistic 
(always involving an inside and an outside, an “us” and a “them”), and argues that the 
attempt to evade this reality—through the prevailing “consensus model” (DP 7)—
threatens the preservation and advancement of democracy. This anti-political “illusion of 
consensus and unanimity” (RP 5) is represented in politics by the heralded “end of 
                                                 
34 Tanke: “One might read many of Rancière’s core convictions…as emerging through a reversal of his 
former teacher’s positions” (10).  
 
35 Samuel Chambers attempts to dissociate Rancière from Arendt insofar as the latter rejects the 
“conception of politics as the production of a pure, protected political sphere” (39-49). While it is true that 
Rancière escapes some of Arendt’s elitist tendencies, I hope to have shown in this section that the distance 





history” following the triumph of global capitalism; it is represented in theory by the 
various avatars of “rationalist,” “deliberative” democracy (among whom she counts 
Rawls and Habermas) and by the Marxist or communitarian critics of this perspective.36 
Against this development, she advocates both a politics and a theory of agonistic, 
pluralistic, liberal, radical democracy that recognizes the nature of the political. 
  Some terminological clarifications. Mouffe distinguishes between “the political” 
and “politics,” the former being “the dimension of antagonism that is inherent in human 
relations” and the latter being “the ensemble of practices, discourses and institutions 
which seek to establish a certain order and organize human coexistence in conditions that 
are always potentially conflictual” (DP 101). The former is “ontological” while the latter 
is merely “ontic” (OP 8). Her “political” is thus not quite the same as Rancière’s la 
politique, though what she terms “politics” is close to his “police.”37 Both, however, are 
concerned with the loss of an ontological, definite-article political rather than particular 
forms of politics/police; in this respect, they are both in close proximity to Arendt.38  
Mouffe also differentiates “antagonism” and “agonism”; the former is 
characterized by relations between “enemies” who do not accept each other’s legitimacy, 
while the latter involves relations between “adversaries” who are in opposition but 
nevertheless “tolerate” one another (RP 4, DP 13-14, 102-103). Mouffe’s theoretical goal 
is to establish a politics of agonism in order to acknowledge the indeclinably antagonistic 
“political” while “sublimating” (AG 8), though never entirely exterminating, some of its 
dangerous tendencies (DP 103). “The task of democracy,” she writes, “is to transform 
antagonism into agonism” (OP 20).  
By “democracy” she does not have in mind the parliamentary procedures of state 
governments, but a “symbolic ordering of social relations” organized around the icon of 
“popular sovereignty” (DP 18). As for “liberalism,” she is perhaps more comfortable with 
                                                 
36 Vasilev notes that Mouffe’s characterization of necessary antagonism, which “upholds conflict as an end 
in itself,” has a disquietingly ahistorical and abstract character.  
 
37 Mouffe draws from Rancière favorably (OP 29).  
 
38 As we will see, Mouffe usually cites Arendt positively. In Agonistics, however, she criticizes Arendt for 
still believing in the possibility of “consensus,” referring to Arendt’s political model as “agonism without 
antagonism” (AG 9-10). For Mouffe, antagonism is never entirely eliminable. Cf. Breckman: “the presiding 





the term than any other radical democratic theorist, and understands its commitments as 
“constituted by the rule of law, the defense of human rights and the respect of individual 
liberty” (DP 2-3). She is aware that liberal values are sometimes in direct contradiction 
with democratic ones, but argues that this “paradox” (of The Democratic Paradox) is 
constitutive, rather than prohibitive, for her project: “democratic politics consists in 
pragmatic, precarious and necessarily unstable forms of negotiating its constitutive 
paradox” (DP 11). In contemporary parliamentary states, there is a tendency to overvalue 
the liberal side of liberal democracy, creating a “democratic deficit” (DP 3-4); the 
adjective “radical” is necessary to make clear that “popular sovereignty” is not achieved 
by periodic elections and a government limited to the protection of individual rights, but 
also involves “a profound transformation of the existing power relations” (OP 52). It is 
important to note, however, that to Mouffe’s mind liberal democracy is “a political form 
of society that is defined exclusively at the level of the political, leaving aside its possible 
articulation with an economic system” (DP 18). So her vision is neither necessarily 
capitalist nor necessarily socialist, not wedded to a particular set of policies, “not…the 
search for an inaccessible consensus to be reached through whatever procedure—but…an 
‘agonistic confrontation’ between conflicting interpretations of the constitutive liberal-
democratic values” (DP 9). This is closely tied to her idea of pluralism, or “the end of a 
substantive idea of the good life…the legitimation of conflict and division, the emergence 
of individual liberty and the assertion of equal liberty for all” (DP 18-19), elsewhere 
defined as “the principle that individuals should have the possibility to organize their 
lives as they wish, to choose their own ends, and to realize them as they think best” (RD 
20, cf. LMD 178). She claims that pluralism is not merely a description of an existing 
fact, but an “axiological principle” (DP 19).  
 Mouffe’s insistence that agonistic pluralism is essential to liberal democracy is 
informed by her ardent “anti-essentialism,” which she develops from readings of 
philosophers like Derrida and Rorty. She rejects the attempt (again, she names Rawls and 
Habermas as culprits) to provide a “foundation” for any form of politics, claiming that 
there is “no longer a role to be played in this [liberal democratic] project by the 
epistemological perspective of the Enlightenment” (RP 10). Such a perspective errors, 





some “truth” from which the “right” form of political life would be derived. “Our 
societies today demand to be approached from a nonessentialist perspective” (RP 11), 
and it is necessary for radical democracy “to renounce any claim to universality” (RP 13), 
“the rationalist belief in the availability of a universal consensus based on reason” (OP 
11).39 This does not mean that rationality as such will be jettisoned entirely, but that “we 
need to broaden the concept of rationality…to recognize the existence of multiple forms 
of rationality” (RP 14). As she understands it, the normative currency of her approach 
does not follow from its universality, rationality, or truth,40 but is part of a project of 
hegemony.41 One more passage is important for us: “Hannah Arendt was absolutely right 
to insist that in the political sphere one finds oneself in the realm of opinion, or ‘doxa’, 
and not in that of truth, and that each sphere has its own criteria of validity and 
legitimacy” (RP 14).42   
 At the same time, however, some forms of rationality and some opinions should 
not be recognized. In several places, Mouffe correlates the neglect of “the political” with 
the rise of extreme right-wing populist movements (RP 5-6, DP 7, 96, OP 66-72, EP, AP 
129), arguing that this troubling and dangerous development is a symptom of the 
“consensus” approach of contemporary mainstream political parties. Because individuals 
are given no real alternatives in the prevailing liberal ‘democracies,’ the antagonism 
constitutive of the political is forced to express itself in harmful, destructive (i.e., right-
wing) ways: “The tendency to privilege exclusively [the liberal component of liberal 
democracy] and to treat the democratic element as obsolete has serious political 
consequences. It is the source of the growing success of right-wing populist parties, 
                                                 
39 “To be capable of thinking politics today, and understanding the nature of these new struggles and the 
diversity of social relations that the democratic revolution has yet to encompass, it is indispensible to 
develop a theory of the subject as a decentered, detotalized agent, a subject constructed at the point of 
intersection of a multiplicity of subject positions between which there exists no a priori or necessary 
relation…” (RP 12).  
 
40 “Taking my bearings from Wittgenstein, I assert that our allegiance to democratic values and institutions 
is not based on their superior rationality and that liberal democratic principles can be defended only as 
being constitutive of our form of life” (OP 121). 
 
41 I will explain this term when I discuss Hegemony and Socialist Strategy below. 
 
42 “Political questions are not mere technical issues to be solves by experts. Properly political questions 






which pretend to re-establish popular sovereignty against elites” (AP 129). Her argument 
here is similar to Rancière’s insofar as both invoke the figure of right-wing extremism as 
a self-evidently undesirable consequence of ignoring their theoretical interventions. For 
Mouffe, however, these populist movements do represent a return of the political (as 
opposed to the anti-political consensus model), but an unwelcome or inadmissible return: 
“The solutions [Jean-Marie Le Pen] proposes are of course unacceptable but one cannot 
deny the political character of his discourse” (OP 68). She also recognizes, unlike 
Rancière, that such movements have commanded broad popular support. 
 Several questions arise here. Why, in this account, did the triumph of the 
consensus model precipitate the rise of right-wing populism rather than a Left return of 
the political? More importantly for our immediate concern: why is this eruption of 
antagonism “of course unacceptable”? Reading Mouffe, one might think that it should be 
celebrated as a resurgence of democracy over and against the anti-political “illusion of 
consensus and unanimity,” as well as a contestation of the universalist pretensions of 
“rationalism.” Despite its formal similarities to her normative categories, Mouffe does 
not take right-wing populism seriously as a democratic demand, even as she recognizes 
that it represents a return of the political. Why? We have already seen that, for her, these 
movements only “pretend” to restore popular sovereignty. There are more problems:    
We should realize that, to a great extent, the success of right-wing populist parties 
comes from the fact that they provide people with some form of hope, with the 
belief that things could be different. Of course this is an illusionary hope, founded 
on false premises and on unacceptable mechanisms of exclusion, where 
xenophobia usually plays a central role. But when they are the only ones to offer 
an outlet for political passions, their pretence of offering an alternative is 
seductive, and their appeal is likely to grow (EP 56 cf. OP 71). 
 
Right-wing nationalism, however “political” it may be, is based on illusions, false 
premises, and unacceptable exclusions. But Mouffe has already denied us the use of these 
discriminating categories when it comes to politics. If the political is the realm of doxa, 
how can we dismiss the political aspirations of the Right as illusory? Once we have 
“renounced any claim to universality,” abandoned our “rationalist” perspective and 





of such movements as “false” or their intentions as “pretend.”43 Mouffe states again and 
again that political divisions are not (and should not be understood as) a matter of 
rationality or truth: “How are we going to enact a ‘politics of truth’ in the terrain of real 
politics? Such an injunction is clearly incompatible not only with…liberal democratic 
pluralism…but also with any project of radical democracy. Thus, it leads us into a 
political dead end” (AG 17). Even supposing the inherent superiority of liberal 
democracy belongs to the obsolete “rationalist” approach (OP 88). When it comes to 
right-wing populism, however, the truth is somehow on our side, and those identifying 
with these movements are under the sway of an illusion.  
 Perhaps, then, the theoretical right to dismiss these political movements as 
“unacceptable” comes from elsewhere, from the “unacceptable mechanisms of exclusion” 
(like xenophobia) on which such movements are based. An immediate problem with this 
approach is the fact that few people self-identify as “xenophobic”—they may identify as 
patriotic, nationalistic, etc., but “xenophobia” is a term that belongs to Left critics of 
Right-wing rhetoric. Marine Le Pen does not say “Je suis xénophobe.” In fact, she says 
the opposite—and often sounds not unlike Mouffe in appealing to a “multi-polar world” 
and accusing her opponents of “stifling democracy.”44 So we are still assuming a divide 
between the professed self-understanding of a certain demos and the “real” conditions 
and effects of their actions, declining to engage them on their own terms, like the old 
fashioned rationalists of an outdated epistemological project.  
Even bracketing this concern, it is unclear how such an account of “pluralism” 
could adjudicate between exclusions which are unacceptable (like the exclusion of 
immigrants) and those that are acceptable (like the exclusion of the populist Right). This 
leads Mouffe to qualify the parameters of the pluralist approach: it must avoid the pitfall 
                                                 
43 In a book championing Laclau and Mouffe’s radical democracy, Smith notes that “reactionary causes” 
often “appropriate key elements from the democratic tradition,” but “in actuality, the religious right, neo-
conservatives and new racists only pretend to champion liberal democratic rights and freedoms in order to 
defend traditional class, race, gender and sexual inequalities” (178). Again, positing a difference between 
“actuality” and certain “articulations” suddenly becomes permissible when we are discussing the Right. In 
this vein, Leggett comments on Mouffe’s equivocal relation to empirical referents, observing that she 
oscillates between “realist” and “anti-realist” positions and arguing that radical democracy should be 
supplemented by a non-discursive account of “society” (310-314).  
 
44 See BBC News. Cf. Mouffe: “it is the idea of equality which provides the backbone of the left vision 





of “total pluralism,” the supposition that any democratic demand is as legitimate as any 
other. “It is important to recognize,” she writes, “the limits to pluralism which are 
required by a democratic politics that aims at challenging a wide range of relations of 
subordination” (DP 20). Put otherwise: 
The pluralism that I advocate requires discriminating between demands which are 
to be accepted as part of the agonistic debate and those which are to be excluded 
[…] But exclusions are envisaged in political and not in moral terms. Some 
demands are excluded, not because they are declared to be ‘evil’, but because they 
challenge the institutions constitutive of the democratic political association (OP 
120-121). 
 
Our rejection of Right-wing populism and its xenophobia is thus not to be cast in moral 
terms. It is to be excluded from consideration and participation on political grounds 
because it challenges the basic institutions of democratic politics. The interventions of 
Jean-Marie and Marine Le Pen are therefore both a return of the political and a violation 
of the values of democratic political association. This is consonant with the way she 
describes the difference between an “adversary” (in her preferred agonism) and an 
“enemy” (in dangerous but ineradicable antagonism): 
[W]ithin the context of the political community, the opponent should be 
considered not as an enemy to be destroyed, but as an adversary whose existence 
is legitimate and must be tolerated […] The category of the ‘enemy’ does not 
disappear but is displaced; it remains pertinent with respect to those who do not 
accept the democratic ‘rules of the game’ and who thereby exclude themselves 
from the political community (RP 4).45 
 
Movements informed by xenophobia, then, are excluded on the basis of their 
“unacceptable exclusions”; they become “enemies” because they refuse to recognize 
certain others (immigrants) as “adversaries” and insist on regarding them as “enemies.”46 
In fact, on this account, any politics which does not aim to “challenge a wide range of 
relations of subordination” would automatically lose its right to participate in the 
                                                 
45 Cf. the way Mouffe describes “communitarian” critics of liberalism such as McIntyre and Sandel: “[they] 
believe that a critique of liberal individualism necessarily implies the rejection of pluralism. So, they end 
up by proposing to return to a politics of the common good based on shared moral values” (LMD 186-187). 
 
46 “[I]t is necessary to reassert the democratic side of liberal democracy, and this implies reactivating the 
notion of popular sovereignty. The problem [with right-wing populism] lies in the way in which this 
‘people’ is constructed. What makes this populist discourse right-wing is its strongly xenophobic 





agonistic political sphere insofar as it does not accept “the democratic rules of the game” 
i.e., insofar as it is based on “unacceptable exclusions.”47  
 We are left with the following conclusion: exclusion is acceptable when we are 
excluding those with unacceptable exclusions. Petito principii. Which exclusions are 
unacceptable will, of course, depend upon one’s “interpretation of the constitutive liberal-
democratic values,” i.e., one’s politics. For anyone reading Mouffe (or anyone reading 
this), the suggestion that France should permanently close its borders to all immigration 
from the Middle East is unacceptable because it is xenophobic. For Le Pen, however, the 
suggestion that anti-immigration and anti-multicultural sentiments should be silenced is 
unacceptable because it is “elitist” or “technocratic.”48 Each side could accuse the other 
of not following “the rules of the game,” of defying “the institutions constitutive of the 
democratic political association.” Each side also understands itself as “challenging a wide 
range of relations of subordination”; for the Front national, patriotic French nationals are 
subordinated by globalization and multiculturalism.49 In order to decide between these 
two interpretations, in order to know when democratic pluralist agonism passes into 
inadmissible exclusion, we need to have in advance a set of political beliefs and 
commitments with certain content. Once we have these beliefs and commitments, we can 
disqualify any opposition as disobeying “the rules of the game” on that basis.50 Mouffe 
                                                 
47 Torfing: “The extension of the Democratic Revolution to still new areas of society provides sufficient 
condition for the creation of democratic antagonism, but it does not predetermine how these democratic 
antagonisms are to be articulated. Democratic antagonisms do not necessarily lead to democratic struggles 
as they can be articulated with different kinds of discourse, even with anti-democratic right-wing discourses 
demanding ‘less state and more market’” (257). What in Mouffe’s (or Laclau’s) theory accounts for a 
distinction between democratic antagonisms and democratic struggles? Why are demands for less state and 
more market automatically anti-democratic?  
 
48 See CNBC.  
 
49 By this I do not merely mean to point out, with Dean (2011), that “the right speaks the language of 
democracy” (73). I mean that the Le Pen’s intervention is democratic as Mouffe understands democracy. 
  
50 Thaler notes the “performative contradiction” (787) involved in Mouffe’s affirmation of “multipolarity” 
over and against cosmopolitan universalism: it still requires universalizing the moral principle of 
multipolarity understood in a specific and precise way. Cf. Jones: “How is it that Mouffe believes that a 
rational consensus is impossible, yet argues that the same parties are able to pledge allegiance to the ethico-
political principles of liberal democracy, namely liberty and equality? In other words, why are the 
participants in any dialogue unable to reach a rational consensus, yet appear to be able to agree on the pre-
set rules of the game itself? More specifically, how is this agreement on the ethico-political principles of 
liberal democracy different than the forms of consensus that drive the work of Rawls and Habermas?” (22). 





writes that “modern democracy’s specificity lies in the recognition and legitimation of 
conflict and the refusal to suppress it by imposing an authoritarian order” (DP 103). But 
if we can refuse to recognize or legitimate a certain “conflict” because we deem its 
content unacceptable on the basis of our political commitments, then this “specificity” 
becomes a tautology: we should accept the political demands we accept, and not accept 
those we do not. It is difficult to see the agony involved in this kind of agonism.   
Mouffe’s theory hinges on the relinquishing of “foundations,” the end of a 
“substantive idea of the good life,” the ontologization of agonistic confrontation, and a 
pluralistic political space where conflict, division, and doxa are taken as ends in 
themselves and different interpretations of liberal-democratic values are tolerated and 
recognized. But the Le Pens and the politics they represent are not to be taken seriously 
because they have an unacceptable interpretation, a doxa we decline to recognize. Like 
both Arendt and Rancière, Mouffe appeals simultaneously to democratic iconography 
and to a demos with specifically demarcated content. All political commitments are to be 
counted as legitimate and given recognition in the agonistic sphere, except those that do 
not share our political commitments. On the same page where she claims that “there is 
only a multiplicity of identities without any common denominator, and it is impossible to 
distinguish between differences that exist but should not exist and differences that do not 
exist but should exist,” she reiterates that her position is not the same as “valorization of 
all differences” (DP 20). So “the people” are to be sovereign, everyone is to be equal, 
different “forms of rationality” are to be tolerated, there is to be no pretension to 
universality or authoritarian suppression of conflict, and dissensus is to be maintained as 
the essence of the political—as long as everyone plays by “the rules of the game.” We 
should pursue a radical democratic agonistic pluralism where “the political” is made up 
of adversaries where none deny the others’ right to exist, but only if none of these others 
challenge “the institutions constitutive of the democratic political association” as we have 
determined them, and only insofar as all of the adversaries are committed to “challenging 
a wide range of relations of subordination” as we understand them. There are no common 
denominators except these common denominators.  
                                                                                                                                                 
‘conflictual consensus’—but this only relocates the problem and does not solve it. As we have said, what 






Laclau, Laclau and Mouffe, and the Undemocratic Demos 
 Many of the theoretical tools Mouffe utilizes were first articulated with Laclau in 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, the text that inaugurated the term “radical 
democracy.”51 Here, Laclau and Mouffe respond to an epistemological “crisis” in Marxist 
theory and socialist politics heralded by an increasing recognition of “the opacity of the 
social” and the “fragmentation of the different positions of social agents” (HSS 12). 
Arguing against what they characterize as the “essentialist” class reductionism of 
Marxism, they advance a theory of “articulation” in which diverse and dispersed actors 
(or “elements”) construct a precarious and contingent identity around rhetorical “nodal 
points,” constituting themselves as parts (or “moments”) of a discursive totality. The 
unity of this totality (or “formation”) is not given—in logic or in experience—prior to its 
articulation, and so the identities of and relations between the various moments are never 
fixed and stable. “If we accept…that a discursive totality never exists in the form of a 
simply given and delimited positivity,” they write, “the relational logic will be incomplete 
and pierced by contingency” (HSS 97).52 While Foucault’s notion of “regularity in 
dispersion” informs this argument (HSS 91), they draw on Derridaen diacritics to develop 
an account of “antagonism” as the discursive manifestation of “the ‘experience’ of the 
limit of all objectivity” (HSS 108). Because of the instability and constitutive 
heterogeneity of all positive signifying terms, the “ambition” of “the social” to 
“constitute a full presence” (HSS 113) always fails. The confrontation of this ambition 
and its inevitable failure constitutes an antagonism: “it is because a peasant cannot be a 
peasant that an antagonism exists with the landowner expelling him from his land” (HSS 
111). 
                                                 
51 Wenman (2003) cautions against conflating Mouffe and Laclau. He argues that after establishing a 
common framework in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, the two authors proceed in markedly different 
directions. While I think the case is overstated, I hope I have avoided the charge of conflation by treating 
Mouffe’s work in a separate section; I introduce Hegemony and Socialist Strategy at this juncture because, 
in my reading, Laclau’s subsequent work is more reliant on the theoretical framework outlined there than is 
Mouffe’s. When I write “Laclau and Mouffe…,” I refer only to what is specified in HSS.   
 
52 “[Our position] accepts the structural diversity of the relations in which social agents are immersed, and 
replaces the principle of representation with that of articulation. Unity between these agents is then not the 





Laclau and Mouffe develop their analyses of “articulation” and “antagonism” into 
a concept of “hegemony.” There is a “hegemonic articulation” when discursive 
formations operate in a field of antagonism, when “phenomena of equivalence” (the 
constitution of moments, or “subject positions”) and “frontier effects” (the recognition of 
the impossibility of a full constitution) develop alongside one another in a shifting and 
ambiguous process that never terminates (HSS 122). They take this term and its basic 
theoretical structure from Gramsci, but understand themselves as departing from his 
account insofar as it still held privileged places for the category of class and the ideal of 
revolution.53 Laclau and Mouffe look away from the articulation of some determinate, 
necessary content (like “class struggle” or “communism”), and toward “a plurality of 
political spaces.” For them, “pluralism” becomes “radical” when “this plurality of 
identities finds within itself the principle of its own validity, without this having to be 
sought in a transcendent or underlying positive ground” (HSS 151). Radical pluralism 
likewise becomes “democratic” when “the autoconstitutivity of each [identity] is the 
result of displacements of the egalitarian imaginary” (ibid). They also distinguish 
pluralistic “democratic struggles” from “popular struggles,” which construe a Manichean 
political space, but still consider the latter to be a variant of the former (HSS 118, 124).  
A radical and plural democratic politics, then, embraces and works to augment an 
indeterminate proliferation of “egalitarian” hegemonic articulations, in which the 
identities of the agents in question are understood as a result of the articulation and not as 
a datum given beforehand. “Radical unfixity,” Laclau and Mouffe write, “makes it 
impossible to consider the political struggle as a game in which the identity of the 
opposing forces is constituted from the start” (HSS 154). They understand this as a 
principle that could revitalize a Left left disoriented by the collapse of its Jacobin 
imaginary; rather than staking its claim on the a priori reality of class struggle, 
emancipatory politics should orient itself around a “proliferation of antagonisms and 
calling into question of relations of subordination,” thus “deepening…the democratic 
revolution” (HSS 147). Radical democracy is presented as a theoretically and 
                                                 
53 Laclau first uses the term “hegemonic articulation” in PI, 100-101. In that early work, he still posits the 
reality, if not the determinacy, of class struggle: “To deny the dialectic between ‘the people’ and classes 





strategically viable alternative to the “vanguardism” (a bugbear throughout the work) that 
would “represent” the “interests” of a pre-existing and selfsame “people.”54  
 Laclau elaborates and refines the terminology of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy 
throughout his subsequent work. In New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time, he 
further clarifies the concept of “antagonism” as “the limit of all objectivity…that which 
prevents the constitution of objectivity itself” (NR 17). For him, this does not mean that 
objectivity is abandoned entirely in a “nihilistic” embrace of unintelligible chaos, but that 
the indispensible task of articulating objectivity will always be restricted by its own 
impossibility. “What we always find is a limited and given situation in which objectivity 
is partially constituted and also partially threatened; and in which the boundaries 
between the contingent and the necessary are constantly displaced” (NR 27). The notion 
of “displacement” developed here clarifies his understanding of hegemonic articulation as 
the constant but constantly unsuccessful attempt to stabilize constitutively unstable 
identity categories and to render clear a necessarily opaque social totality; the boundaries 
are “displaced” because there is a perpetual renegotiation of the line between what is 
included (in a given identity or in the social totality) and what is excluded. Likewise in 
Emancipation(s), Laclau frames the relationship between universality and particularity as 
one of “permanent asymmetry” (EM 35); particular struggles always express themselves 
in terms of a universality with which that can never fully coincide. This insoluble 
paradox—that the articulation of identity/objectivity/fixity/universality is both necessary 
and impossible—is the condition for the possibility of radical democratic politics. “If 
democracy is possible,” he writes, “it is because the universal has no necessary body and 
no necessary content; different groups, instead, compete between themselves to 
temporarily give to their particularisms a function of universal representation” (EM 35).55  
                                                 
54 In this section, I can only scratch the surface of the theoretical issues with the basic argumentative 
structure of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Several detailed dissections of the book (Hunter, Rustin, 
Aronowitz) were published shortly after its appearance. Also worth mentioning in this context is Laclau 
and Mouffe’s colorful exchange (PM) with Geras (1987 and 1988). For an account of the book’s reception, 
see Sim, 34-47. In my estimation, the two strongest overall critiques of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy 
can be found in Wood (1999, 43-89) and Osborne.  
55 “In a society (and this is finally the case of any society) in which its fullness—the moment of its 
universality—is unachievable, the relation between the universal and the particular is a hegemonic relation” 






 These “different groups,” as we recall from Hegemony, are not pre-given and self-
identical subjects either. Laclau takes up this theme again in On Populist Reason, where 
he argues that “a people” is constituted by the articulation of “demands” rather than by 
any unity existing prior to this articulation. This contingent and fragile collective 
construction, which involves a form of “representation” that is both equivalential and 
differential (a people is always both the same as and different from the sum of its parts), 
is “the primary terrain of the constitution of social objectivity” (PR 163).56 Such a “social 
logic,” he claims, is “inscribed in the actual working of any communitarian space” (PR 
x). He goes on to argue that the question of “popular identity” is “practically 
indistinguishable” from the issue of “democratic identity,” and that he and Mouffe’s 
“hegemony” model is “profoundly democratic, because it involves launching new 
collective subjects into the historical arena” (PR 168-169). He stops short of directly 
identifying populism and democracy, however, writing that “the very possibility of 
democracy depends on the constitution of a democratic ‘people’” (PR 171). This would 
suggest that though all democratic subjects are populist, not all peoples are democratic. 
We will return to this point. 
Laclau joins Rancière and Mouffe in understanding ‘the political’ as an 
ontological condition, over and against the merely ontic “sedimented forms of 
‘objectivity’” (NR 35, cf. RF 123) reminiscent of the “police” and its “distribution of 
parts” in Rancière or “politics” in Mouffe. Laclau’s definite-article ‘political’ is “the 
moment of antagonism where the undecidable nature of the alternatives and their 
resolution through power relations becomes fully visible” (NR 35).57 The “alternatives” 
here are competing and incompatible hegemonic articulations within groups and/or 
between groups, a plurality of struggles that attempt, through various “demands” and 
                                                 
56 “[P]opulist discourse does not simply express some kind of original popular identity; it actually 
constitutes the latter. […] relations of representation are not a secondary level reflecting a primary social 
reality constituted elsewhere; they are, on the contrary, the primary terrain within which the social is 
constituted” (PWN 48). 
 
57 Norris (2002 and 2006) offers compelling critiques of Laclau’s formalistic projection of “the political” 
into the ontological realm, arguing that it ultimately comes to contradict his commitments to democracy 
and to the Left. Kingsbury argues along these lines as well, observing that the formalism involved in 







always ultimately in vain, to fill the impossible spaces of group identity and social 
totality. Because we cannot appeal to the “true” nature of things “behind” the hegemonic 
articulations, we have no recourse to choose between them on any basis that transcends 
their strictly political confrontation,58 i.e., their conflict and struggle over power and the 
ineradicable moment of “decision”—without ground—that such a struggle demands; the 
“undecidability” inherent in the political means that “if two different groups have taken 
different decisions, the relationship between them will be one of antagonism and power, 
since no ultimate rational grounds exist for their opting either way” (NR 31). He does not 
flinch from the potential implications of this claim: “From an ultimate ontological and 
epistemological point of view, religious fundamentalism and the most ‘refined’ of 
Western socialisms are on equal footing” (NR 242-243).  
 According to Laclau, the project of “democracy” begins with an affirmation of 
this undecidability, “the recognition of the constitutive nature of [the absence of ground] 
and its political institutionalization” (EM 46). Democracy, he writes, “is the very placing 
in question of the notion of ground” (NR 78). The “vanguardism” that Laclau and 
Mouffe criticized in Hegemony thus comes to include all forms of “rationalism,”59 any 
pretension that political problems can be solved by reason or truth rather than hegemonic 
confrontation. The figure of the political rationalist takes on an increasingly villainous 
role in Laclau’s work, indentified with the “dictatorship of the Enlightenment” (NR 4, cf. 
75) and the philosopher-king; he goes so far as to suggest a kind of elective affinity 
between rationalism and totalitarianism (EM 16-17, NR 77-78, NR 91-92, PM 129). Like 
Rancière, Laclau repeatedly draws an analogy between Platonic elitism and the Marxist 
vision of a universal class—eventually extending the second term of the analogy to 
include “rationalist” politics as such: “In so far as there is true knowledge, only one 
particular form of social organization realizes the universal. And if ruling is a matter of 
knowledge and not of prudence, only the bearer of that knowledge, the philosopher, has 
the right to rule. Ergo: a philosopher-king” (EM 61-62). In On Populist Reason, he 
                                                 
58 “If radical contingency has occupied the terrain of the ground, any social meaning will be a social 
construction and not an intellectual reflection of what things ‘in themselves’ are. The consequence is that in 
this ‘war of interpretations’, power, far from being merely appariential, becomes constitutive of social 
objectivity” (EM 103). 
 





argues that the denigration of “populism” by political theory (which he again associates 
with Plato) is “the dismissal of politics tout court, and the assertion that the management 
of community is the concern of an administrative power who source of legitimacy is a 
proper knowledge of what a ‘good’ community is” (PR x). This “elitist” rejection of 
populism involves the “discursive construction of a certain normality, of an ascetic 
political universe from which [populism’s] dangerous logics had to be excluded”; he 
considers such elitism part of “the history of the constitution and dissolution of a social 
frontier separating the normal from the pathological” (PR 19). In abandoning rationalism, 
radical democracy also leaves behind the elitism that has characterized the history of 
political philosophy (as well as the political projects informed by this history):  
What we are criticizing is an attitude laying down what people should do in 
certain circumstances or what they should prefer on the basis of general, abstract 
reasoning; the kind of attitude that constructs an ‘interest’ and then concludes that 
it is a case of ‘non-rational’ behavior or ‘false conscience’ when people do not fall 
into line (NR 217). 
 
Again in tandem with Rancière, Laclau establishes an opposition between democracy on 
one hand and philosophically elaborated “reason,” “truth,” “knowledge” or “foundation” 
on the other. The category of “misrecognition” is maintained, however, for the lingering 
belief in the “identity and homogeneity of social agents.”60 It is still possible, in other 
words, to misrepresent reality: with the claim that one can represent reality.61 
 Paradoxically, then, radical democracy is supposed to remind us that socialism is 
ultimately on “equal footing” with religious fundamentalism and offer a compelling 
“socialist strategy.” We find in Laclau the same equivocal maneuver we encountered in 
Rancière and Mouffe: determining in advance the proper course of the political belongs 
to anti-democratic elitism, but democracy belongs to the Left. As was the case for our 
previous two theorists, all of Laclau’s positive examples are taken from progressive or 
Left-wing “articulations”—“feminism, anti-racism, the gay movement, etc.” (HSS 118, 
cf. EM 33, EM 57, PM 129). Laclau and Mouffe even write that “every project for radical 
                                                 
60 “We cannot do without the concept of misrecognition, precisely because the very assertion that the 
‘identity and homogeneity of social agents is an illusion’ cannot be formulated without introducing the 
category of misrecognition” (NR 92). Laclau elaborates this argument in RF, 11-36.  
 
61 It would seem, then, that “religious fundamentalism” is not on equal epistemological and ontological 
footing with a (radically democratic) refined socialism, insofar as the former ostensibly claims to have a 





democracy implies a socialist dimension, as it is necessary to put an end to capitalist 
relations of production, which are at the root of numerous relations of subordination” 
(HSS 162).62 But Hegemony and Socialist Strategy gives no justification as to why 
radical democratic projects would correspond to any particular content, i.e., why certain 
hegemonic articulations are radically democratic while others are not, except that the 
former are “the result of displacements of the egalitarian imaginary.” We are not told, 
however, which displacements of the “egalitarian imaginary” constitute radical 
democracy, or why. 
The problem is once again one of form and content. Laclau’s argument is 
predicated on an account of “subject positions” as constituted in and by their 
articulations, over and against an understanding of “peoples” and their struggles as 
“representations” of previously existing ‘actual’ social relations. Inserting a gap between 
real conditions and their various representations, besides leading inevitably to elitist-
rationalist vanguardism, also presupposes an epistemologically untenable division 
between reality and its articulation that radical democracy rejects: “The main 
consequence of a break with the discursive/extra-discursive dichotomy is the 
abandonment of the thought/reality opposition, and hence a major enlargement of the 
field of those categories which can account for social relations” (HSS 96). If we take this 
line of thought seriously, it would seem to collapse a meaningful divide between true or 
false representations; there would be only different articulations of the social totality 
locked in hegemonic struggle, sometimes forming “chains of equivalence” and 
sometimes breaking them. As we have seen, this perspective is consonant with the way 
Laclau describes political confrontation in New Reflections; it is maintained in some of 
his last writings: 
[W]hile the assertion of the primary ontological character of antagonism…gives 
way to a plurality of contingent investments not predetermining the nature of the 
social agents resulting from them…the aprioristic assertion that those agents are, 
                                                 
62 Sim highlights this passage and observes that Laclau and Mouffe seem to be breaking their own rules and 
reverting back to “essentialism” here (29-30). Smith offers a commentary on this passage (19-25), but 
begins with the claim that “Capitalism, by its very nature, systematically denies large sections of the 
population access to the resources necessary for self-determination” (19)—forgetting, first, that for radical 
democratic theory “capitalism” has no “very nature,” and second, that the opposite articulation of the 
relationship between capitalism and subordination (‘capitalism helps to overcome relations of 





necessarily, ‘social classes’ can only be made from a teleological-objectivist 
perspective (RF 124). 
 
 Radical democracy, then, would involve an affirmation of this undetermined plurality of 
investments and their permanent and unpredictable struggle as the essence of the 
political.63 Once we have affirmed this, leaving behind the “teleological-objectivist 
perspective,” on what grounds can we assume that emancipation(s) will have a 
Left/progressive content? 
 Consider our previous examples: men’s rights activism and the Front national. 
They too involve “discursive formations” in a “field of antagonism,” and thus constitute 
hegemonic articulations.64 As we have seen, they also “call into question” what they take 
to be “relations of subordination”; thus, on a formal level, they should count for Laclau 
and Mouffe as a “deepening of the democratic revolution.”65 If this is not the case, if 
democracy is bound to be progressive or Leftist in character, then radical democratic 
theory must tell us why without violating the other strictures of the theoretical landscape. 
How will we describe these “articulations” once we have abandoned “the thought/reality 
opposition”? “There is no radical and plural democracy,” we are told, “without 
renouncing the discourse of the universal and its implicit assumption of a privileged point 
of access to ‘the truth’” (HSS 175). In this case, must the feminist movement renounce its 
“assumption of a privileged point of access to ‘the truth’” when it confronts the MRA 
movement?66 If we want to avoid the “purely pedagogical” attitude of vanguardism (HSS 
49), are we to refrain from appealing to a “reality” the Front national (or for that matter, 
the climate denial movement) might be misrepresenting?   
                                                 
63 “[D]emocratic politics: a succession of finite and particular identities which attempt to assume universal 
tasks surpassing them; but that, as a result, are never able to entirely conceal the distance between task and 
identity, and can always be substituted by alternative groups […] Incompletion and provisionality belong to 
the essence of democracy […] all social agents have to recognize their concrete finitude, nobody can aspire 
to be the true consciousness of the world. This opens the way to an endless interaction between various 
perspectives and makes ever more distant the possibility of any totalitarian dream” (EM 15-17). 
 
64 Torfing: “Neo-liberalism can be seen as a hegemonic discourse to the extent tha tit has managed to 
redefine the terms of the political debate and set a new agenda” (102).  
 
65 Without intending to criticize radical democracy, Lowndes demonstrates this point by giving an account 
of George Wallace’s ultra-Right populism while staying faithful to Laclau’s vocabulary.  
66 Laclau criticizes Žižek for structuring his discourse “around entities—‘class, class struggle, capitalism’—
which are largely fetishes dispossessed of any precise meaning” (CHU 201). One wonders if he would 
likewise criticize a feminist theorist for appealing to the “fetishes” of gender, patriarchy, or women’s 





Laclau and Mouffe admit at one point that “the conservative reaction…has a 
hegemonic character” (HSS 159), but they never explain why this “reaction” is not on 
that basis a democratic struggle, why Left-progressive hegemonic articulations are 
democratic while Right-wing “displacements of the egalitarian imaginary” are consigned 
to “the anti-democratic offensive” (HSS 155-159). In New Reflections, Laclau again 
acknowledges that his formal theoretical tools might fall into the wrong hands: 
The indeterminacy of the relations between the different demands of the social 
actors certainly does open the possibility for their articulation by the right; but 
insofar as such articulations are not necessary, the field of possibilities for 
historical action is also widened, as counter-hegemonic struggles become possible 
in many areas traditionally associated with the sedimented forms of the status quo 
(NR 82-83). 
 
If the field of possibility for struggle is widened, it is also widened indiscriminately. 
Again, we are left wondering why the radical democratic model would lend itself to the 
Left as opposed to the Right with any greater justification or plausibility. If it does not, 
then there is a sleight of hand in Laclau and Mouffe’s identification of radical democracy 
with progressive movements (in HSS 118 and 162 quoted above) and in the suggestion, 
which frames the entire analysis, that this model represents an orientation for a revitalized 
Left. Why not simply say that radical democracy is a political-ontological disposition that 
could be utilized by the Left, the Right, or anything in between as it sees fit? The only 
possible answer is that Laclau and Mouffe happen to be leftists. This is indeed the answer 
Laclau gives, after naming the problem we have articulated: 
In our perspective it is a question of historically constituting the subject to be 
emancipated—indeed, emancipation and constitution are part of the same process. 
But in that case, why prefer one future over another? Why choose between 
different types of society? There can be no reply if the question is asking for a 
kind of Cartesian certainty that pre-exists any belief. But if the agent who must 
choose is someone who already had certain beliefs and values, then criteria for 
choice—with all the intrinsic ambiguities that a choice involves—can be 
formulated (NR 83, cf. CHU 85). 
 
At this juncture, we return to the same tautological formulation offered by Mouffe: 
radical democracy means the affirmation of “the proliferation of new identities and 





“antagonisms” according to our already established beliefs and values.67 So we formulate 
our choice for feminism and against MRA not on the grounds of the former’s “truth” and 
the latter’s “illusion”—that would be a category mistake and place us back in Platonic 
elitism/rationalist vanguardism—but on the basis of our (entirely contingent) existing 
sympathies for the former’s project.68 But if the “plurality” of “democratic struggles,” the 
“proliferation of antagonisms and calling into question of relations of subordination” can 
be limited and arbitrated according to whatever beliefs we happen to have already, then 
radical democracy demands very little of us. It asks only that we cease assuming “a 
privileged point of access to ‘the truth’” for our beliefs and corresponding political 
projects, not that we alter them. The men’s rights activist also chooses his commitments 
on the basis of his already existing beliefs and values. 
 This conclusion, however troubling it may be on its own, is not consistently 
maintained. Laclau elsewhere suggests that certain political commitments will follow 
from the abandonment of the rationalist “dictatorship of the Enlightenment,” i.e., that a 
certain content is inscribed within the formal terms of radical democracy: 
Difference and particularisms are the necessary starting point, but out of it, it is 
possible to open the way to a relative universalization of values which can be the 
basis for a popular hegemony. This universalization and its open character 
certainly condemns all identity to an unavoidable hybridization, but hybridization 
                                                 
67 While trying to save Laclau and Mouffe from this dilemma, Smith effectively demonstrates the petito 
principii involved: “[Laclau and Mouffe] impose strict conditions on the value of difference for radical 
democracy. Difference should be celebrated as a positive good, but only insofar as difference does not 
promote domination and inequality […] For radical democratic pluralism, only those fragments of the 
social movement that uphold democratic principles should be valued as progressive differences” (34).  The 
problem we have been narrating—i.e., that what constitutes “domination” will depend upon what 
“hegemonic articulation” one prefers, and that therefore the former cannot be used as a criterion to 
adjudicate acceptable and unacceptable forms of the latter—is obscured by Smith when she introduces the 
new term “structural position” to the radical democratic vocabulary, distinguishing it from “subject 
position”: “A ‘subject position’ refers to the ensemble of beliefs through which an individual interprets and 
responds to her structural positions within a social formation” (58). But to claim that there are given 
“structural positions” within an intelligible, pre-discursive “social formation” that are then interpreted is to 
have already abandoned radical democracy as Laclau and Mouffe understand it, to revert back to the 
“thought/reality opposition.” She acknowledges later in the book that for Laclau and Mouffe “political 
discourses and identities are wholly constituted through articulation” (87), however inconsistent this is with 
the addition of the “structural position” category. 
 
68 “We are not dealing with a false consciousness opposed to a true one—which would be waiting for us as 
a teleologically programmed destiny—but with the contingent construction of a consciousness tout court 
[…] We identify with some symbols while rejecting others, but that is no reason to assert that the matrix of 
a symbolic structure varies according to the material content of the symbols. That assertion is not possible 
without some notion of reification à la Žižek, which would make it possible to ascribe certain contents to 





does not necessarily mean decline through the loss of identity: it can also mean 
empowering existing identities through the opening of new possibilities. Only a 
conservative identity, closed on itself, could experience hybridization as a loss 
(EM 65, my italics). 
 
Once we have affirmed the constitutive “dislocation” of all identity categories and the 
resulting impossibility of a completely integrated social totality, any hegemonic 
articulation predicated on a pre-established fixity, fullness, or completion—i.e., any 
hegemonic articulation that does not understand itself as such—is proscribed. “There is 
democracy,” Laclau writes, “only if there is the recognition of the positive value of a 
dislocated identity” (EM 100). The “conservative identity” denies this positive value and 
is thus undemocratic. In concert with Rancière and Mouffe, Laclau invokes the loup-
garou of Right-wing nationalist movements to make this point: 
A democratic society is not one in which the ‘best’ content dominates 
unchallenged but, rather, one in which nothing is definitely acquired and there is 
always the possibility of challenge. If we think, for instance, of the resurgence of 
nationalism and all kinds of ethnic identities in present-day Eastern Europe, then 
we can easily see that the danger for democracy lies in the closure of these groups 
around fully-fledged identities that can only reinforce their most reactionary 
tendencies and create the conditions for a permanent confrontation with other 
groups (EM 100). 
 
Democracy requires maintaining the openness, fluidity, and hybridization of identities 
and resting the Manichean tendency to organize social space around a closed circuit of 
stable subject positions. Hegemonic articulations that fail to meet this condition, no 
matter how “populist” they may be, are not democratic.69 This would account for the non-
democratic populisms alluded to in On Populist Reason and, in a different register, for 
the distinction between “popular” and “democratic” struggles mentioned in Hegemony.   
                                                 
69 This is the conclusion of Torfing’s chapter (191-209) on the relation between the discourse theory of 
Laclau and Mouffe and racist nationalism. Much of the chapter is an account of nationalism as a hegemonic 
formation, which would seem to suggest that it represents a “democratic” struggle in Laclau and Mouffe’s 
terms. But racist nationalism breaks the rules in taking itself to have established a permanent fullness in the 
necessarily empty space of the universal: “A myth refers to an absent fullness, but if this universal 
reference to an absent fullness continues to dominate over the particular content of the hegemonic attempts 
to fill the empty place of the universal, the myth is transformed into a social imaginary that provides the 
ultimate horizon of meaning and action. In that case the reading principle provided by racism is no longer 
merely one among many possible reading principles, but the only true reading principle, able to reveal the 






There are several issues with this attempt to disqualify certain popular movements 
from the domain of democracy. Notice first of all that Laclau has surreptitiously imported 
certain normative content even as he distinguishes his vision of a “democratic society” 
from a society with “the best content”: the “reactionary” tendencies of these nationalist 
groups are only reactionary if we assume in advance that certain tendencies are “better” 
than others. Another problem we have encountered already in our discussion of Mouffe: 
it presumes that all Right-wing nationalist movements “articulate” their “demands” in 
terms of permanent closure and the refusal to recognize the value of a “dislocated 
identity.” As we saw when we looked at Marine Le Pen’s Front national, this is not the 
case (nor is it the case for Poland’s Law and Justice party, to take another example70). For 
Le Pen, it is “multiculturalism” and “globalization” which represent “closure” and French 
nationalism that opens up “a multi-polar world.” We might be able to choose which 
articulation to endorse (based only on our existing political commitments), but we cannot 
determine which “closures” are democratic and which are not while maintaining our 
other stated conditions, because this determination will depend upon the “articulation” we 
have chosen.71 If we claim, on the other hand, that despite their professed intentions these 
Right-wing movements are nevertheless operating within a closed discursive space and a 
denial of the pluralistic and incomplete nature of the social, then we have reintroduced 
the thought/reality opposition so antithetical to radical democracy.  
Finally, this requisite “openness” would also disqualify many progressive/Leftist 
movements from the democratic society. As Laclau admits,72 political projects such as 
                                                 
70 See “Debate on Immigration, Refugees in Polish Parliament.” 
 
71 Keenan notes that while plurality and openness are essential features of democratic politics, any form of 
politics requires a degree of closure. “A politics of questioning and openness is burdened by the necessity 
of making contingent, often risky political decisions about its specific form of openness and closure” (107). 
With regard to Laclau and Mouffe, Keenan’s concern is not that they have this ambivalence, but that they 
do not give a full enough account of how it plays out in practice, that they provide no orientation for 
making democratic decisions in the moment. But in this regard they are quite specific: progressive and/or 
leftist movements are included and Right-wing movements are excluded. Cf. Thomassen: “We should not 
proceed too quickly from acknowledging the ineliminability of exclusion to actual exclusions; between 
these two moments, there are several intermediary considerations, such as: What exclusions? How to 
exclude? How can we institute mechanisms for the contestation of exclusion?” (114-115). Thomassen 
poses these questions but does not answer them, and it is not clear how they could be answered given the 
constraints of the radical democratic framework.   
 
72 “Destroying the hierarchies on which sexual or racial discrimination is based will, at some point, always 





feminism and racial justice require the total exclusion of certain other identities (the 
identities of the patriarch and the racialist, for example), the refusal to “hybridize” with 
them. For that matter, any variation of progressive/Left politics that does not understand 
itself as a “hegemonic articulation,” i.e., that understands itself as representing a pre-
existing social totality instead of “constituting it” would also be immediately disqualified 
on that basis.73 A movement which claimed that society was really organized along 
gender and racial hierarchies, even prior to its articulation as such, would be profoundly 
undemocratic.74 In sum: if Laclau and Mouffe are entitled to the distinction between 
“democratic struggles” and “popular struggles” (HSS 118), and if Laclau is entitled to 
posit the possibility of an undemocratic “people” (PR 171), it cannot be on the basis of 
where such struggles or people fall on the spectrum of Left/Right or 
progressive/conservative.75 According to the strictures they have imposed, we do not 
know democracy by its content but only by the extent to which it meets certain formal 
criteria. Nevertheless, they feel at liberty to give examples that lean only in one direction, 
and to assert that “every project for radical democracy implies a socialist dimension.” 
Before concluding, we should make one more note with regard to Laclau. There is 
a curious passage at the end of On Populist Reason when he takes a moment to 
differentiate his position from that of Rancière (after noting their decisive similarities). 
Interestingly, he advances much the same criticism as we did:  
[In Rancière] there is no a priori guarantee that the ‘people’ as a historical actor 
will be constituted around a  progressive identity (from the point of view of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
73 See also CHU 86. Cf.: Critchley: “If all societies are tacitly hegemonic, then the distinguishing feature of 
democratic society is that it is explicitly hegemonic. Democracy is thus the name for that political form of 
society that makes explicit the contingency of its foundations” (115). Breckman: “The constitution of 
‘objectivity’ seems to be a condition of all social movements, thereby rendering all of them instances of 
false consciousness [in Laclau’s terms] […] how many social movements could survive in the full light of 
Laclau and Mouffe’s knowledge?” (206).  
 
74 Cf. Dyrberg (2014): “The radical right threatens political and democratic values by appealing to nation, 
culture and the unity of the people as something given prior to politics and which has priority over 
democracy” (168).  
 
75 Howarth comments on the problem of normativity in Laclau’s theory (269-271). He argues that the 
normative force of Laclau’s analysis lies in the distinction between democratic and anti-democratic 
“articulations.” But in the midst of making this argument he notes that “an anti-foundational [i.e., 
democratic] perspective does not determine a certain set of political and ethical positions, though it does 
rule some positions out—those based on essentialist presuppositions for example.” If an anti-foundational 





Left) […] Rancière identifies the possibility of politics too much, I believe, with 
the possibility of an emancipatory politics, without taking into account other 
alternatives—for example, that the uncounted might construct their uncountability 
in ways that are ideologically incompatible with what either Rancière or I would 
advocate politically […] To explore the system of alternatives, we need a further 
step that Rancière has not taken so far: namely, an examination of the forms of 
representation to which uncountability can give rise (PR 246-247).  
 
If it constitutes a problem that Rancière’s model of “the part of those who have no part” 
does not provide or guarantee any specific political content, we must ask if Laclau’s own 
“articulation of demands” theory fares any better. Does Laclau himself take this further 
step that he chides Rancière for avoiding, or is this an example of the pot calling the 
kettle black? According to what criteria are we to “examine the different forms of 
representation” to which “the articulation of demands” can give rise, once we have left 
behind our “elitist” presumption to “proper knowledge of what a ‘good’ community is,” 
without constructing “a certain normality” from which “dangerous logics” have to be 
excluded? 
 Like Rancière, Laclau and Mouffe categorically reject the ‘vanguardist’ division 
between the ‘real’ interests of ‘the people’ and their prevailing ‘false consciousness.’ 
What is necessary is not the pretension of intellectuals who claim to know the truth when 
it comes to politics, but democracy: an open and shifting terrain of demands and 
articulations in which the demos is not determined in advance but constituted in and 
through its discursive struggle. When confronted with a demos articulating demands they 
find unacceptable, however, their answer is the same as Rancière’s: that’s not true 
democracy. The gap between prevailing articulations of the demos and what would 
constitute its ‘real’ articulations, a division resolutely denied by the radical democratic 
imaginary, is thus reinscribed. However “radical,” this is nevertheless a democracy in 
spite of the demos. 
 
Conclusion 
 Radical democratic theory rehearses the categorical imperative we discussed in 
chapter two with regard to Arendt: ‘the political’—understood through the democratic 





itself.76 It also rehearses, however, the a priori exclusion of certain content from its 
formal categories, thus conditioning the categorical imperative and nullifying its status as 
such. The radical democrats do not share Arendt’s conviction that the private/economic 
should not enter the public/political realm, and they have a decidedly more expansive 
notion of doxa; the realm of “what can really be figured out” is far narrower than it was 
for Arendt, if not eliminated entirely. Nevertheless the elitist/populist ambivalence that 
characterized her work shows up in another way. The object of exclusion is different: for 
Arendt it is the animal laborans and the material concerns associated with it, while for 
radical democracy it is the Right and its “distributions of the sensible,” “interpretations of 
liberal-democratic values,” or “hegemonic articulations.” In both cases the ontological 
and normative priority accorded to democratic iconography is undermined by a 
determination of what does and does not count as an acceptable instantiation of this 
iconography, a determination justified by nothing but an ex cathedra decree inconsistent 
with the theoretical commitments grounding this democratic priority. If certain speech 
should not be heard, if the ‘plurality’ can be limited as deemed necessary, if some doxai 
are fundamentally inadmissible, then speech, plurality, and doxa are not ends in 
themselves. Instead, the critical currency of the figure of democracy depends upon 
something else, something outside of democracy.  
The nature of this “something else” is a different question, but we find a clue 
waiting for us in those moments when the radical democrats deign to comment on the rise 
of Right-wing extremism. Consider again Mouffe’s formulation: “the success of right-
wing populist parties comes from the fact that they provide people with some form of 
hope…Of course this is an illusionary hope, founded on false premises.” Perhaps, in that 
case, critically diagnosing and confronting the rise of the Right should mean giving an 
account of these “false premises” and “illusory hopes,” rather than an affirmation of 
dissensus and contestation as the ontological and normative essence of the political, 
which if consistently maintained would only vindicate the Right and its “illusions.”  
 
                                                 
76 Keenan: “What both Arendt and Laclau and Mouffe highlight is the importance to democratic politics of 





 FROM “FALSE DEMOCRACY” TO FALSE DEMOS 
 
“I consider the survival of National Socialism within democracy to be potentially 
more menacing than the survival of fascist tendencies against democracy.”—
Adorno1 
 
“…it is interesting to think back, and not too long back, when among the 
American Left the slogan was ‘Power to the People.’ The slogan is now used to 
far less a degree because the question ‘Who are the people?’ cannot for any length 
of time be postponed.”—Marcuse2 
 
In spite of its formal constraints, the categorical imperative of democracy 
inevitably disqualifies certain elements of the demos from the status of the political. For 
Arendt, the object of exclusion is the laboring class and its material concerns. For radical 
democracy (and much of the broader democratic turn), it is Right-wing populism, 
especially in its patently ignorant or pathologically prejudicial forms. How might an 
account of “the political” and the place of democratic iconography within it be 
transformed once the radical Right can no longer be dismissed as inconsequential? Once 
circumstances have necessitated a confrontation with these phenomena, how does the 
figure of democracy change in its function and its critical force, if it retains any? Can the 
notion of “false democracy”—an understanding of the contemporary political 
conjuncture as too-little-democratic—remain the pivot point for critique? If not, then how 
could we begin to theorize an alternative informed by the social phenomena rendered 
invisible by the democratic turn? 
 This chapter will sketch such an alternative by engaging the work of Marcuse and 
Adorno, specifically two key essays in which these figures reflect on what I will call 
‘false demos.’3 Provisionally, this is an account of false and pathological political beliefs 
                                                 
1 CM 90. 
 
2 PL 29. 
 
3 In response to the increasing visibility of Right-wing populism, some scholars have called for a return to 
‘first generation’ Frankfurt School critical theory, arguing that the development represented by Habermas 
inhibits our understanding of this phenomenon and therefore possible responses to it. See Abromeit (2016 
and 2017) and O’Kane. I regard this chapter as consonant with these efforts; while they focus more on 
Adorno’s The Authoritarian Personality, I foreground “Opinion Delusion Society” and Marcuse’s 
“Repressive Tolerance” to expand and enrich the analysis.  
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and movements as generated and sustained by the contradictory necessities of an 
antagonistic society, or ‘socially necessary delusion.’ This demos is thus not ‘false’ in the 
sense that it is not the ‘real’ demos, but in the sense that it reflects a false social totality. 
An account of socially necessary delusion allows critical theory to understand and 
confront mass ignorance and irrationality without lapsing into a crude paternalism that 
would posit an essential or ahistorical incongruity between true and false consciousness. 
 The phenomenon of climate denial provides a timely and illustrative model for 
elaborating the concepts of false demos and socially necessary delusion. Skepticism about 
anthropogenic climate change is erroneous to the point of absurdity, and yet necessary if 
society is to function in its current form. I follow Adorno in conceiving a ‘model’ as an 
analysis of a particular phenomenon that represents the whole in and through its 
particularity, rather than as an ‘example’ that instantiates a general concept which is 
indifferent to its instantiations.4 In other words, climate denial is not an incidental case of 
‘social delusion as such,’ an abstract or eternal category. Rather, we form a concept of 
social delusion through an analysis of the phenomenon of climate skepticism as it appears 
in the present political conjuncture. This is only one possible model among many; a 
critical analysis of other forms of social delusion (e.g. Holocaust denial or biological 
racism) would require attention to the specifics of each model. This is likewise not a 
theory of political belief as such or a hypothesis as to how it is formed.  
I foreground climate denial for three principal reasons. First, because it represents 
a stark and unambiguous disparity between prevailing ‘public opinion’ and reality. It is 
also illustrative as a belief that is systematically and heteronomously produced, 
completely unintelligible as a spontaneous eruption of the ‘will of the people.’ Finally, it 
is a useful model because it is so overwhelmingly dangerous; in this ‘difference of 
opinion’ lies the possibility of a sustainable and inhabitable world.5 
 
 
                                                 
4 Adorno elaborates the “model” approach in several places, most helpfully in ID, 169-170. 
 
5 The one source I have found that explores the contradiction between democratic values and the pressing 
urgencies of climate action is Kitcher: “Sustaining democracy seems incompatible with saving our planet.” 
The limitation of Kitcher’s approach is that he does not situate climate denial in terms of its social 




Socially Necessary Delusion and the Logic of Opinion 
 In criticizing the function and effect of “tolerance” as a political and philosophical 
value, Marcuse does not mean to repudiate “the elimination of violence” and “the 
reduction of suppression” as an ideal; to this extent, tolerance remains an “end in itself” 
(RT 82). His key observation, rather, is that under prevailing conditions the exaltation of 
tolerance comes to contravene this ideal and to sustain its opposite. For Marcuse, 
contemporary capitalist society is organized according to an antagonistic class structure, 
stratified by deeply entrenched hierarchies and relations of subordination, and maintained 
by organized campaigns of indoctrination and misinformation. In this situation of “total 
administration,” the value of tolerance serves to safeguard the prerogatives of the 
privileged elite and to legitimate the distortions produced to justify these prerogatives. By 
leveling all political interventions to the common denominator of “opinion” according to 
a standard of neutral “impartiality,” tolerance “actually protects the already established 
machinery of discrimination” (RT 85).  
 At this point, we could mistake Marcuse’s theoretical agenda for a critique based 
on subject positions that has some currency today. The argument goes like this: we 
cannot evaluate the ‘opinions’ of the oppressor and the oppressed according to the same 
criterion, because the opinion of the oppressor will always be informed by privilege, 
and/or because the oppressed have access to an experience unknown by the oppressor and 
therefore a certain epistemic authority.6 We could also mistake “Repressive Tolerance” 
for articulating the “paradox” most famously expressed by Popper, i.e., that it is 
necessary to be intolerant of intolerance to protect tolerance.7 While these lines of 
thought are consonant with Marcuse’s approach up to a point, he has something 
decidedly different in mind. By taking aim at the normative institution of tolerance, he is 
attacking the presumed separation of truth and political dispute, a separation made in the 
name of democracy. “In endlessly dragging debates over the media,” he writes: 
the stupid opinion is treated with the same respect as the intelligent one, the 
misinformed may talk as long as the informed, and propaganda rides along with 
                                                 
6 Cf. the second type of epistemology of ignorance discussed by Alcoff, which she attributes to Harding 
(43-47). 
 
7 See Popper, 546.  
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education, truth with falsehood. This pure toleration of sense and nonsense is 
justified by the democratic argument that nobody, neither group nor individual, is 
in possession of the truth and capable of defining what is right and wrong, good 
and bad. Therefore, all contesting opinions must be submitted to ‘the people’ for 
its deliberation and choice (RT 94). 
 
Political differences, the logic of tolerance tells us, cannot be adjudicated according to 
some “right answer” that everyone would be made to accept, and everyone is entitled to 
their opinion.8 To think otherwise is antidemocratic and perhaps even totalitarian. This 
logic, Marcuse argues, vouchsafes the prevailing system of domination insofar as anyone 
who refers to the system of domination as such can be countered by the retort that this is 
only her opinion (or ‘view’ or ‘perspective’). Likewise, patently misinformed or spurious 
assertions—recall a few from the introduction—are granted a certain legitimacy, if not 
acquiescence, by the warning notice that the speaker is merely offering an alternative 
opinion and must therefore be tolerated. 
 Of course, not every misinformed or spurious assertion is tolerated 
indiscriminately. David Icke’s ‘view’ that most world leaders are reptilian aliens does not 
receive much exposure on the platforms of public discourse, and such ideas are not 
usually taken seriously in private conversation either. So why does climate skepticism—
no less false and no less unfounded—enjoy such permissibility as one ‘stance on the 
issue,’ to the point that many prominent political figures deny the existence of climate 
change and most deny its severity?9 If a major politician endorsed Icke’s theory, it would 
produce a laughing stock at best and a scandal at worst. Why, then, does no scandal 
follow when Senator Inhofe proclaims that climate change is a myth? Climate change is 
an empirical, scientific question, and as an empirical matter there is no “debate” and there 
has not been for decades. That this continues to be regarded as an ‘issue’ having ‘two 
sides’ is something of a scandal in itself.  
                                                 
8 Dunlap and McCright: “By creating the appearance of controversy within the public realm, [climate] 
denialists are able to appeal to values such as freedom of speech, fairness to both sides, and respecting 
minority viewpoints to add legitimacy to their claims” (309).  
 
9 In the U.S., prominent Right-wing politicians often claim, in spite of all evidence, that there is “no 
consensus” among scientists (see Oreskes and Conway, 213). But while one major party outright denies 
climate change (see E. Wong), the other acknowledges nominally it while continuing to act as if nothing 




 The first thing that must be said in the course of answering this question is that, 
unlike Icke-style conspiracy theories, climate denial (in one form or another) commands 
broad public support, at least in the United States. One aspect of its perceived legitimacy 
is its popularity. Here I point to an insight from Adorno, who begins his “Opinion 
Delusion Society” essay by noting how ridiculous and farcical anti-Semitic Nazi 
propaganda appears in retrospect. “Yet precisely this,” he notes, “should make one 
suspicious of an inference habitually drawn from the widely held idea: namely, that in the 
majority the normal opinion necessarily prevails over the delusional one” (CM 105). That 
climate denial is a common belief does not alter its substance and render it deserving of 
deference, any more than the widespread belief in the “Protocols of the Elders of Zion” 
should have been credentialed as one opinion among others in its own context. The 
abstract ideal of tolerance, to return to Marcuse’s framework, dissolves the disquieting 
content of views like climate denial and anti-Semitism in the form of their presentation as 
opinions, buttressed by the (falsely) legitimating feature of their popularity. To do 
otherwise would be to abandon the standard of ‘impartiality’ and the democratic values 
of political discourse, to pretend as though some individual or group is “in possession of 
the truth and capable of defining what is right and wrong, good and bad.”  
 This is exactly what Marcuse recommends: to suspend the principle of tolerance 
and affirm the possession of truth, even if the result would be anti-democratic according 
to the present constitution of democracy. This, not in the name of a scrupulous respect for 
truth as such, but as the necessary movement to attain the ideals signaled by the notion of 
tolerance: 
Withdrawal of tolerance from regressive movements before they can become 
active; intolerance even toward thought, opinion, and word, and finally, 
intolerance in the opposite direction, that is, toward the self-styled conservatives, 
to the political Right—these anti-democratic notions respond to the actual 
development of the democratic society which has destroyed the basis for universal 
tolerance (RT 110-11). 
 
As against the virulent denunciations that such a policy would do away with the 
sacred liberalistic principle of equality for ‘the other side,’ I maintain that there 
are issues where either there is no ‘other side’ in any more than a formalistic 
sense, or where ‘the other side’ is demonstrably ‘regressive’ and impedes possible 




The predictable response to this claim—that what is “demonstrably regressive” or a 
“possible improvement” is a matter of political difference and can therefore only be made 
singular by totalitarian coercion—answers the critique of tolerance with an appeal to 
tolerance.10 At this point, we must ask if the dangers harbored by climate change are 
greater or lesser than those harbored by the withdrawal of tolerance from climate denial.11 
To be sure, there are many cases where the line between legitimate political disagreement 
and “demonstrably regressive” opinion is unclear or difficult. But unless we are prepared 
to grant legitimacy to climate denial and other such views indefinitely, and to accept the 
suffering, violence, and terror on the horizon if climate change is not addressed 
immediately and drastically, we must be prepared to “do away with the sacred liberalistic 
principle of equality for ‘the other side’” in this case.12  
What Marcuse effects here is a reversal of the standard narrative concerning the 
relationship between tolerance and totalitarian domination. To declare that one has the 
‘right answer’ to a political question, and that this answer applies to everyone else 
whether they like it or not, is to forsake the intrinsic value of pluralist democracy and to 
substitute indisputable ‘facts’ for politics; it is the kernel of the totalitarian impulse. We 
heard variations on this theme from Ricœur, Lefort, Connolly, Fraser, Arendt, Rancière, 
Mouffe, and Laclau. For Marcuse (and Adorno), the relationship is exactly the opposite. 
The greatest danger lies in an excess of tolerance rather than a deficit, in a formal 
leveling of opinions removed from the question of their content. This is not without some 
motivation. The ostensibly undemocratic tendencies of the early Frankfurt School must 
be understood with reference to the fact that the Third Reich rose to power 
democratically, something largely ignored by the democratic turn. Marcuse writes: “If 
                                                 
10 Lichtman: “Marcuse’s position becomes identical with the old Scholastic dogma that error has no right. 
[…] Marcuse…opens himself to the charge of despotism or totalitarianism which was so widely and 
passionately brought against him. For he is clearly required to nominate some elite to break the hold of one-
dimensional consciousness and lead the multitude from false-consciousness to emancipation” (201-202). 
Long dismissed on these grounds, Fopp has recently defended the essay as an exercise in social 
epistemology. 
 
11 “I have been fully aware of the danger involved in my position; I believe that it is infinitely smaller than 
the danger we risk if we continue to tolerate the forces which drag this country ever deeper into war, waste, 
and violence” (MRU 221).  
 
12 “We would have to conclude that liberation would mean subversion against the will and against the 




democratic tolerance would have been withdrawn when the future leaders started their 
campaign, mankind would have had a chance of avoiding Auschwitz and a World War” 
(RT 109). 
 The critical inquiry into misinformed and spurious popular opinions cannot rest at 
this level, however, or it would risk settling into a superior complacency. It is not enough 
to point out that patently false or regressive beliefs have such currency and recommend a 
withdrawal of tolerance; we must ask why these beliefs, and particular beliefs like climate 
denial, have such widespread acceptance and such perceived legitimacy. Adorno notes 
that “groundless and absurd [unsinnige] ideas of every stripe are by no means the 
exception and are by no means on the wane” (CM 116), but is not content to simply 
record this as a matter of fact, as if the terminus of critique were to reveal the 
incompetence or incapacity of those who have not yet discovered critical theory. His use 
of the term “delusion” [Wahn] evokes its Freudian inheritance: a delusion is a patently 
false belief that is maintained because it fulfills or satisfies a need. For Adorno, the need 
that demands a delusion is not at its root a matter of individual psychological 
development, but lies in “the real dynamic of society, a dynamic that produces such 
opinions, false consciousness [falsches Bewusstsein], necessarily” (CM 106). “Opinion 
Delusion Society”—rendered without punctuation to suggest the continuity of the three 
terms—is an attempt to understand popular irrationality as a reflection of irrationality at 
the level of social totality.  
By “social totality” and other terms like “whole” or “real dynamic,” Adorno does 
not refer to an ahistorical or immutable essence that might be deduced from first 
principles. He thinks that, as it is presently organized, society is riven by a contradiction, 
a fundamental antagonism, at the level of its material reproduction. He often frames it as 
an opposition between use value and exchange value, a conception which most clearly 
shows through in the lectures: 
…use values are produced not to satisfy human needs but for profit […] The only 
reason why goods are produced is so that the producers, by which I mean those 
who control the means of production, should be able as a class to profit from them 
as much as possible […] given this reality, the needs of human beings, the 
satisfaction of human beings, is never more than a sideshow and in great measure 
no more than ideology. If it is said that everything exists only for human beings, it 
sounds hollow because in reality production is for profit and people are planned in 
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as consumers from the outset. In short, it sounds hollow because of this built-in 
conflict (HF 50-51). 
 
By calling this society irrational I mean that if the purpose of society as a whole is 
taken to be the preservation and the unfettering of the people of which it is 
composed, then the way in which this society continues to be arranged runs 
counter to its own purpose, its raison d’être, its ratio […] While the means used 
by society are rational, this rationality of the means is really...only a means-end 
rationality…one which obtains between the set ends and the means used to 
achieve them without having any relation to the real end of purpose of society, 
which is the preservation of the species as a whole in a way conferring fulfillment 
and happiness (IS 133).13 
 
The end of material production is the satisfaction of the needs of human beings, but under 
the profit principle production is transfigured into an end in itself and needs are regarded 
solely as a means to that end.14 This antagonism, which also creates, sustains, or activates 
various relations of domination and structural inequalities, produces a condition of 
reification, where the process of material reproduction—which is nothing other than a set 
of social relations—comes to appear as an alien force existing outside of human beings 
and their mediate and immediate needs.15 Consequently the subjects of this society, and 
even those with relative material privilege, are caught up in a system they can neither 
understand nor control, which perpetuates itself for its own sake and not for theirs. They 
are therefore not the subjects of this society at all, but its objects.16  
 This antagonism, along with all of its dimensions and ramifications, informs 
Adorno’s conception of “wrong life”; if this life “cannot be rightly lived,” it is because of 
                                                 
13 Adorno articulates this critique in several places (ND 320, LND 8-9); there is an especially lucid 
discussion of the use/exchange contradiction, reification, and the concept of ‘society’ in IS 27-34.   
 
14 Hammer: “It is the commodity form which, in the final instance, explains, in both Lukács, Bejamin, and 
Adorno, the deformations of contemporary social reproduction” (29). The same can be said for Marcuse 
(see esp. RR 280-322 and CR 15-20). 
 
15 For Adorno, the critical capacity of the category of need does not lie in a distinction between “social and 
natural, primary and secondary, correct and false” needs, but in “the question of the suffering of the vast 
majority of all humans on earth. If we produced that which all humans now most urgently need, then we 
would be relieved of inflated social-psychological concerns about the legitimacy of their needs.” See 
“Theses on Need,” 104. Cf. MM 155-157. 
 
16 Stoner and Melathopoulos have insightfully connected the disconcerting political situation of the 
anthropocene—that human beings have created climate change but seem completely unable to stop it—to 
the theory of reification in Lukács, Adorno, and Postone. Sethness-Castro has also applied Adorno’s “new 
categorical imperative” to the present climate crisis (111-135). My argument below complements these 
analyses by situating climate skepticism in terms of Adorno’s account of social delusion.   
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a contingent historical situation and not because of some failure of society ‘as such.’ 
“Opinion Delusion Society” situates the prevailing currency of “groundless and absurd 
ideas” in the context of this antagonistic social totality. Because the maintenance of the 
prevailing order comes into conflict with its nominal purpose, it must divert any 
discontent away from its fundamental structure in order to function. Any tension that 
might expose the contradiction at the heart of the system must be redirected or 
compensated for, even to the point of sustaining belief in outright falsities.17 This does 
not necessarily mean that ten men are sitting in a room conspiring to secure their power; 
it is more akin to an adaptive behavioral technique that operates on both individual and 
systemic levels. The logic of opinion performs this role, insofar as a terminal diagnosis of 
the status quo, however compelling, can be neutralized by dismissing it as only an 
opinion, and insofar as an apology for the status quo, however incoherent or facile, can be 
legitimated by excusing it as only an opinion. In Adorno’s words, it “proffers 
explanations through which contradictory reality can without great exertion be rendered 
free of contradiction” (CM 111). Once this compulsion to explanation is entrenched, 
there is no great leap from “normal opinion” to pathological opinion. Furthermore, there 
is no guarantee that pathology will be confined to splinter groups, and in certain 
conditions delusion may become the rule rather than the exception. “Under the tenacious 
irrationality of the whole, the very irrationality of people is normal” (CM 116). 
 As we have seen, Adorno’s typical model for understanding pathological opinion 
is anti-Semitism, especially in its Fascist expression. It is not adequate, he argues, to 
demonstrate that the dogmas of Nazism are false;18 to comprehend and confront the root 
of the problem, we must ask what social demands this collective derangement satisfied 
for its adherents, and whether or not the conditions that produced these demands have 
been addressed. He writes:   
                                                 
17 In one of the few book length studies of its kind, Apostolidis analyzes the media of the American 
Christian Right using Adorno’s account of social antagonism.  
 
18 “As far as wanting to combat anti-Semitism in individual subjects is concerned, one should not expect 
too much from the recourse to facts, which anti-Semites most often will either not admit or will neutralize 
by treating them as exceptions. Instead one should apply the argumentation directly to the subjects whom 




That fascism lives on…is due to the fact that the objective conditions of society 
that engendered fascism continue to exist. Fascism essentially cannot be derived 
from subjective dispositions. The economic order, and to a great extent also the 
economic organization modeled upon it, now as then renders the majority of 
people dependent upon conditions beyond their control and thus maintains them 
in a state of political immaturity. To see through the nexus of deception, they 
would need to make precisely that painful intellectual effort that the organization 
of everyday life, and not least of all a culture industry inflated to the point of 
totality, prevents (CM 98-99). 
 
This does not absolve any particular individual of responsibility, but it does point to the 
importance of understanding pathological opinion as a social phenomenon. Rather than 
cultural backwardness or lack of information, the persistence of prejudicial or specious 
beliefs reflects the necessity of justifying the status quo or compensating for its torments, 
even at the cost of patent irrationality. In History and Freedom, Adorno addresses the 
“arch-deception” [ur-pseudos, Urtäuschung] of nationalism that culminates in “race 
delusion” [Rassenwahn]: 
The [pseudos] is that a form of association that is essentially dynamic, economic 
and historical misunderstands itself as a natural formation, or misconstrues itself 
ideologically as natural […] It is not sufficient, or rather it is too easy, to talk 
about the delusions of racism and to denounce them. What counts here is the 
ability to explain it and to recognize its place in the dynamics of history. […] It is 
a delusion [Wahn] in the strict sense of the word (HF 106, cf. ID 123). 
 
By the “strict sense” of delusion, as I have already intimated, he has in mind the Freudian 
definition.19 As opposed to an illusion, which could be true or false, a delusion is 
demonstrably false but is still maintained because it satisfies the demands of successful 
adaptation and necessary repression. Adorno often speaks of “socially necessary 
appearance” or “socially necessary false consciousness.” Because he transposes the 
psychoanalytic account of “delusion” from the individual level to the domain of social 
reproduction, we could without too much damage speak of a “socially necessary 
delusion.”20 It bears repeating that, in this theory, delusion is not a permanent feature of 
                                                 
19 Livingstone translates “pseudos,” “täuschung,” and “Wahn” indiscriminately as “delusion.” For the sake 
of precision, I have translated the terms before the indented quote myself, from  Zur Lehre von der 
Geschichte und von der Freiheit, 154-155. I have also altered the translation in the indented quote where 
necessary.   
 
20 The phrase “socially necessary illusion” in the translation of LND (100) is actually “gesellschaftlich 
notwendiger Schein” (147)—better rendered as “socially necessary appearance” or “semblance” to avoid 
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society in abstracto—it is only “necessary” for a society sustained by contingent, 
historically specific contradictions. A rational whole would not require the very 
irrationality of people.21        
 
Climate Skepticism and the False Demos 
Although Adorno was concerned about the ecological repercussions of the present 
system, he could not have foreseen the phenomenon of climate change or its persistent 
denial. Yet this catastrophic development furnishes the best possible model for the theory 
of socially necessary delusion. If we ask why climate denial is so widespread and 
inveterate in spite of overwhelming scientific evidence, we must first acknowledge the 
massive and organized campaign of misinformation spearheaded by giant corporations, 
their public relations firms and think tanks. As chronicled by Michaels in Doubt Is Their 
Product and Oreskes and Conway in Merchants of Doubt, the dissemination of climate 
skepticism is a well-funded and self-aware propaganda project—in this case, it really is 
ten men sitting in a room. But this answer does not strike at the root. Why are these 
business interests so intent on propagating lies about climate change, and why are so 
many so willing to believe the lies? Ostensibly, it is not because of a hostility to truth 
itself, or a misanthropic indifference to the survival of the planet, or even (for most) a 
narrow self-interest.22 It is because, as a growing number of scholars argue, an adequate 
response to the crisis of anthropogenic climate change would require a fundamental 
reconstruction of the economic and political order.23 A system based on the profit motive 
and the principle of unlimited growth cannot reconcile itself with the hard limit of 
ecological sustainability. From the perspective of the sustainable satisfaction of human 
                                                                                                                                                 
confusion with Freud’s “illusion.” The same goes for the translation of “necessary illusion” in ID (3). The 
word “Schein” is also used in ND (196), but translated there as “delusion” (197), which is equally 
misleading in a context where we are also invoking the Freudian terminology.  
 
21 “Regarding the concrete utopian possibility, dialectics is the ontology of the wrong state of things. The 
right state of things would be free of it: neither a system nor a contraction” (ND 11).  
 
22 As Schweickart points out, relatively few of the corporations funding and propagating climate denial are 
directly linked to the fossil fuel industry (16). He also sums up the logic of socially necessary delusion in 
two sentences: “They know, but they don’t know. They can’t afford to know” (17).  
 
23 See Li, Parr, Foster et al., Malm, Hornborg, Klein, Wright and Nyberg, Dunlap and McCright, and Mann 
and Wainwright.  
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needs (or “use value”), climate denial is completely irrational. But from the perspective 
of the realization of ever-increasing profit (“exchange value”), it is perfectly rational. 
Social reproduction thus comes into tension with its own objective; rationality becomes 
irrational and vice versa.24 That the present course of society may soon render the planet 
uninhabitable is obviously an indictment of this course, and so the contradiction must be 
neutralized, smoothed over, denied, if the prevailing order is to be maintained.25 This is 
poignantly revealed in those moments when climate skepticism goes beyond the stage of 
sheer denial. As Klein points out, the skeptics sometimes make an ‘economic’ argument: 
climate change might be happening, but doing anything about it would hinder the 
economy, and so we should not take it seriously. In spite of itself, this argument contains 
some truth—“the Right is right,” as she puts it—inasmuch as it reveals an antagonism 
between the economic system on one hand and the preservation of life on the other.26 It is 
almost as if ‘the economy’—nothing except a set of social relations ostensibly designed 
for the maintenance of our needs—has a will of its own, independent of and now in direct 
conflict with ours.  
From the point of view of the reproduction of society in its current form, climate 
change cannot be true. The people living in this society therefore cannot accept it. The 
iconography of speech, plurality, and dissensus, in which the democratic categorical 
imperative locates an ontology of the autonomous and indeterminate ‘political,’ is thus 
always already mediated by the contradictory demands of material reproduction in an 
                                                 
24 Cf. the discussion of the relationship between rationality and irrationality in SDE, esp. 152-166. On this 
score, Jamieson writes: “We are bringing about a climate change that we do not want but do not know how 
to stop. Human action is the driver, but it seems that things, not people, are in control. […] Instead of 
humanity rationally governing the world and itself, we are at the mercy of monsters that we have created” 
(1). Despite this, Jamieson leaves the economic system (as opposed to the actions of particular 
corporations) entirely to one side in his analysis. His positive project consists of ethical reflections—
“nourishing and cultivating virtues” for the anthropocene (178-200)—and a series of reform-minded policy 
suggestions (227-234). In other words, he is interested in adapting to climate change within the status quo, 
not altering the system that drives it. His account of the “obstacles to action” is also largely psychological 
rather than structural (61-104). The political economy of climate denial (and inaction) is also left out of 
Gardiner’s account, which construes climate failure as an “ethical tragedy” stemming from “moral 
corruption” (see esp. 301-338).  
 
25 From a staunchly empirical social-psychological point of view, Feygina et al. track a negative 
correlation, in individual subjects, between feelings of protectiveness over the status quo and 
acknowledgment of the severity of anthropogenic climate change, concluding that “system justification 
motivation is a significant obstacle to attaining pro-environmental change” (328, my italics).  
 
26 See Klein, 31-63. 
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antagonistic society. The demos, whatever its manifestation, must adapt itself to this 
alienated, heteronomous necessity. Those of us who acknowledge the reality of 
anthropogenic climate change still do not (and cannot) live as if we believe it.27 Even 
self-consciously sustainable ‘lifestyles’ come up against the limits of a social system that 
requires constant consumption and the constant production of waste, and even public 
figures who pay lip-service to the problem do not act differently in any substantial way. 
In this sense, those who explicitly deny the reality or severity of anthropogenic climate 
change are more faithfully reflecting the way all of us, insofar as we use plastic or drive 
cars, carry on the maintenance of this society.28 I do not mean to suggest a moral 
equivalence between the climate activist and the climate skeptic, let alone an 
epistemological one; I only mean to reiterate the point that climate denial is not an error 
but a delusion necessary for the reproduction of the social totality in its current form. “If 
there really is no correct life in the false life,” Adorno writes, “then actually there can be 
no correct consciousness in it either” (CM 120). It would be a mistake to this read this 
remark as defeatist or deterministic, or, again, as leveling all degrees of awareness to a 
common denominator of inadequacy. Rather, the passage suggests that the phenomenon 
of political delusion cannot be understood or challenged on an individual, apolitical level, 
and that it will persist as long as the fundamental antagonisms of society do. The critique 
of idealism in the Marxist tradition was never meant to establish that ideas are 
inconsequential or strictly determined by material conditions. It was meant to establish 
that alienation cannot be overcome simply by arriving at a correct consciousness, that 
alienation exists in reality and not just in ideas.29 
                                                 
27 Wright and Nyberg: “For those aware of the worsening climate crisis there is a sense of unreality about 
the situation as people go on with their busy lives, apparently oblivious to the looming catastrophe […] 
Denial of a very basic kind lies at the heart of our engagement with climate change” (164).  
 
28 Gunderson et al. insightfully point out that even prevailing ‘responses’ to the climate crisis (‘green 
growth’ models and other forms of ‘sustainable capitalism’) have an ideological character insofar as they 
function to obscure the “systemic socio-ecological contradictions” at the root of the problem. There is only 
a difference in degree between outright climate skepticism and optimism about the possibility of ‘market-
based solutions’—they are both “strategies for denial” (134). At the end of the article, Gunderson et al. turn 
to Marcuse’s account of “new technology” as an alternative to the ideological responses.  
 
29 Adorno: “…the condition of pathological opinion can hardly be changed by mere consciousness. […] 
False opinion cannot be transcended through intellectual rectification alone but only concretely [nur real, 
nicht durch inhre intellektuelle Berichtigung allein]” (CM 120) Elsewhere, Adorno explicitly criticizes the 
 
 102 
This brings me to the concept of false demos. Marcuse and Adorno argue that, in 
a fundamentally antagonistic society, popular opinion is not an expression of a 
spontaneous or freely determined ‘will of the people,’ which must be respected because it 
is their will, but a reflection of the alienated state in which people find themselves and to 
which they are compelled to conform. Adorno: “Because the world is not our world, 
because it is heteronomous, it can express itself only distortedly in stubborn and 
inflexible opinions” (CM 110). And Marcuse: “Universal toleration becomes 
questionable when its rationale no longer prevails, when tolerance is administered to 
manipulated and indoctrinated individuals who parrot, as their own, the opinion of their 
masters, for whom heteronomy has become autonomy” (RT 90). The object of critique is 
therefore not the antidemocratic forces that would obstruct the voice of the people, but 
the false content of this voice and the antagonistic conditions that necessitate this content. 
Increasing democratization without a transformation of the alienated social whole will 
only produce more democratic delusions and pathologies, which vary in substance and 
severity according to historical specificities. To assume the a priori critical capacity of  
the figure of ‘the people’—in either a majoritarian or minoritarian sense, either 
epistemologically or morally—is to render invisible the wrong social totality that 
demands acquiescence from each of us (in various ways and with varying degrees of 
success). Adorno: “The progressive democratization of political institutions will do 
nothing to mitigate the loss of a sense of freedom, the growing indifference or the 
enfeeblement of the desire for freedom because the socio-economic reality of even the 
freest political institutions stands in the way of such a sense of freedom” (HF 7). Marcuse 
even suggests that democratic control has already been realized, but with an alienated 
demos: “The people…indeed participate in the rule of the society. The people can indeed 
express their will, which is no longer their will but has been made their will by the ruling 
class and its instrumentalities” (PL 28-29).30 There is no better indication of this than the 
present state of climate change and its systematic denial. Climate skepticism is in fact 
                                                                                                                                                 
‘mechanistic’ model of social criticism that would render “the subjective factor” a matter of complete 
indifference (see IS 151-152). 
 
30 Cf. the famous opening sentence of ODM. Notice that Marcuse identifies a “democratic unfreedom” 
rather than an antidemocratic stifling of freedom. 
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‘the voice of the people,’ however heteronomously produced, and this fact will not be 
altered by amplifying this voice, extending its exposure, or granting it more power.  
In such conditions, a critical political theory must ask how the demos came to 
have such a false tenor before it asks how to attain ‘true’ democratic politics. It must 
criticize a false demos rather than a ‘false democracy.’31 This does not mean that no 
popular movement is worth supporting. On the contrary, it affirms the crucial importance 
of those movements that challenge the conditions that necessitate delusions like climate 
skepticism. It suggests, in other words, that movements must be evaluated according to 
their content, their adequacy to the terminal state of things, and not by the extent to which 
they meet the formal criteria of democracy.  
 Of course, climate denial is a relatively straightforward model and a relatively 
recent development. The mystifications of the Front national or ‘men’s right activism’ 
would require different (and longer) treatments. The theoretical perspective that develops 
concepts like false demos and socially necessary delusion is not meant to excuse us from 
the difficult task of attending to the complexities of each specific phenomenon. It is 
meant, first of all, to situate these phenomena in relation to the objective structural 
conditions which sustain them (and which they sustain). It also allows us to analyze these 
tendencies at a level that goes beyond the necessary but not sufficient stage of moral 
indignation. Most importantly for the present project, however, it enables us to 
acknowledge and critique popular delusion, ignorance, and pathology in a way that is 
foreclosed by the categorical imperative of democracy (as well as the broader democratic 
turn in critical political theory). 
                                                 
31 Despite their abiding suspicion of the demos, Adorno and Marcuse still occasionally make use of the 
‘false democracy’ argument, i.e., that present conditions prevent the establishment of a ‘true democracy’ 
(for example HF 76, EL 13, and Adorno’s essay “Democratic Leadership and Mass Manipulation”). This 
leads some Adorno commentators to characterize his project as essentially democratic (Mariotti, Douglas). 
At the same time, scholars who explore the status of democracy in Adorno consistently express a tension, 
in Heins’s formulation, “between the ideal of moral and aesthetic standards being handed down 
authoritatively and the alternative ideal of norms devised in common by a community of actors and 
perceivers” (79). Though she insists on reading Adorno as a democratic thinker, Mariotti expresses this 
tension also: “Adorno wants to fulfill the promise of democracy by fostering the kind of dispositional and 
intellectual, social and psychic, change on the part of individuals that would allow ‘the people’ to truly 
wield power and rule, for the demos to have kratos” (6). This is the equivocation I have been tracking 
throughout this project: if democracy is only desirable when the demos has a certain “dispositional and 
intellectual, social and psychic” makeup, then democracy is not an end in itself. While I would not describe 
Adorno’s (or Marcuse’s) project as anti-democratic, it seems to me that the figure of democracy does not 
and cannot do the foundational critical work.  
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 As we explored throughout the first three chapters, the democratic categorical 
imperative depends upon two key assertions about the nature of “the political.” First, it is 
“autonomous” with regard to “the economic,” an end in itself that is neither a means to 
material production nor reducible to it. Second, it is “indeterminate,” i.e., not decidable 
by an appeal to truth. These two ontological presuppositions establish the critical force of 
democratic iconography (speech, dissensus, plurality, doxa, etc.), and forms of critique 
which depart from them are guilty of introducing a heteronomy that distorts the nature of 
the political and thus lapse into an anti-democratic disposition. The theorist becomes the 
guardian—Platonic reference intended—of political truth, and if people do not see this 
truth, it is because they are ensnared by some delusion or pathology which is “economic” 
in origin. If critical theory is to be democratic, to be adequate to the nature of the 
political, it must abandon this ambition to speak for the people and let the people speak 
for themselves; its task is to facilitate, elaborate, and theorize the proliferation of the 
multifarious and unpredictable voices of the demos.  
As we have seen, however, the formalism of the democratic categorical 
imperative is never really a formalism. When confronted with Right-wing populist 
movements (or in Arendt’s case, the revolt of the poor), it no longer regards contestation 
and plurality as ends in themselves. It divests itself of the tools with which it could 
disqualify these movements, but disqualifies them anyway, usually with no more than a 
passing reference and sometimes even with outright incredulity. Climate change is by any 
conceivable metric one of the most momentous political issues of our present 
conjuncture, but the prevailing ‘debate’ over its existence or implications is completely 
unintelligible according to the ontological postulates of the democratic imperative. 
Decoupling it from the material reproduction of society (“the economic”) obscures the 
motivations for its persistent denial, while regarding it as a matter of “opinion” betrays a 
callous disregard for the devastation and suffering looming on the horizon if it is not 
addressed.  
One possible response to this is that climate change is simply not a political issue; 
it is an empirical or scientific issue that has been falsely politicized because of the 
antidemocratic forces at work in the prevailing system. Given the prevalence and the 
consequences of climate skepticism and other such views, we would then seem to be 
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living at a time in which politics is not yet The Political, and in which the former 
systematically inhibits the establishment of the latter. In this case, a critical intervention 
based on the ontological features of “the political” becomes an ideal theory removed 
from, and bearing little or no relation to, the realities that urgently confront us at the 
present conjuncture. But the categorical imperative cannot even say this, because to 
separate “properly political questions” from empirical confusions is already to evacuate 
the specificity of democratic logic. If the people—en masse, whether majority or 
minority—affirm some form of climate skepticism, is this not “democratic”? Is it not a 
“demand,” an “articulation,” or a “distribution of the sensible”? By refusing to grant it the 
status of the political, or by explaining it by virtue of a propaganda campaign, we are 
denying the autonomy that the democratic turn was meant to give back to the people who 
had been so dispossessed by “vanguardist” critical theory. As I mentioned in the 
introduction, the categorical imperative wants it both ways: to abdicate its prerogative to 
prescribe the ‘right’ form of politics, diagnosing those who do not conform as deluded, 
and to avoid a critical analysis of phenomena that might force it to reconsider this 
abdication, instead deeming these phenomena ‘not truly political.’ If we take the 
democratic categorical imperative seriously, then climate denial must be granted the 
legitimacy of a political contestation. If we refuse to take climate denial seriously, then 
we must rethink the categorical imperative and give an account of the political—and an 
account of critique—which leaves behind the twin theses of autonomy and 
indeterminacy, and along with them the foundational status accorded to the democratic 
iconography of speech, debate, plurality, public space, and doxa. 
 Another way of stating this difference is that, while the democratic categorical 
imperative begins with a formal and ahistorical political ontology, the concept of socially 
necessary delusion builds a critical theory out of the circumstances that confront us most 
pressingly at the present moment. In other words, the latter is not a principle brought to 
bear on particular events but an attempt to comprehend actually existing society in 
theory.32 The democratic turn is forced to be extremely selective, focusing only on Left-
                                                 
32 Of course, Adorno and Marcuse are dialectical thinkers, and as such do not conceive of theory as a 
simple transcription or interpretation of empirical data. One could sum up the intellectual project of the 
Frankfurt School as a protest against positivist social science. At the same time, they insist that theory 
maintain a close relationship with its object, and that the former must be guided by the latter without 
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progressive movements and either ignoring or summarily dismissing Right populism, 
because a sustained reflection on the latter would trouble the application of its categories. 
As I began to detail in the introduction, climate denial is only the tip of the iceberg. An 
engagement with books like Jacoby’s The Age of American Unreason or Hedges’s 
Empire of Illusion is enough to make one long for the “dictatorship of the Enlightenment” 
that Laclau protested against, erroneously projecting a theoretical ambition onto the 
actual state of affairs. “What for Hegel was self-evident cannot possibly be claimed by 
the regnant philosophies today,” Adorno writes. “No longer are they their own time 
comprehended in thought” (CM 16). Comprehending the “age of unreason” is what the 
categorical imperative of democracy has failed to do—more, what it cannot do given its 
theoretical structure. Likewise, this is what an account of false demos makes possible: a 
confrontation with the prevalence of delusional or pathological “opinions” that goes 
beyond denigration, an approach that does not ignore them as unimportant, 
mischaracterize them as simple mistakes, or (as we will explore more fully in the next 
chapter) reify them as essential characteristics of the backward masses.  
In one of the epigraphs above, Marcuse notes that the slogan “power to the 
people” has fallen out of fashion, replaced by the question “who are the people?” He said 
that in 1974. Today, though not in so many words, critical political theory has given itself 
over to the mantra of “power of the people” again, leaving to one side the decisive 
question of who the people happen to be. If I suggest returning to this question, to an 
account of the actually existing demos and its entanglement with the contradictory 
demands of an antagonistic system of social reproduction, it is not only for the sake of 
theoretical consistency. We must replace the question of “how do we give the people a 
voice?” with the question “why do the people speak so wrongly?”—not because of an 
intellectual commitment to the purity of truth, but because a phenomenon like climate 
denial is too momentous, too grave, to avoid confronting in the name of democracy. The 
consequence of this is that the figure of democracy no longer functions as the fulcrum for 
critique. It is not that there is not enough democracy; it is that, under present conditions, 
the demos is bound up in an alienated social totality that produces delusions and 
                                                                                                                                                 
abandoning its distance from it. Adorno even argues that there is a necessary positivist moment in 
dialectical thinking (ID 116-118, cf. CR 34).   
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pathologies which if maintained will lead to its own destruction. We would therefore not 
wait for a “democracy to come” but for a demos to come.   
 
Back to Ideology? 
The account of false demos and socially necessary delusion that I have sketched 
here points to the resuscitation of the contested and much maligned concept of 
“ideology.”33 As we have seen, Adorno and Marcuse use the word regularly, along with 
the expression “false consciousness.”34 The debate over the term is mired in inconsistent 
usage, with Althusser’s account—which does not coincide with that of the early 
Frankfurt School—casting a long shadow. My description of climate denial as socially 
necessary delusion does not furnish a full-fledged theory of ideology; it only indicates 
some points of orientation.35 Recently, critical theorists such as Maeve Cooke, Rahel 
Jaeggi, and Karen Ng have signaled a possible rehabilitation of ideology critique, and I 
regard this chapter as a contribution to that project.36 Because this approach has become 
so controversial, however, I will anticipate and respond to some common objections, one 
here briefly and one in more detail in the concluding chapter. 
A consistent objection is that ideology critique relies on an untenable or outmoded 
conception of truth as ‘correspondence’ or ‘representation,’ a metaphysical claim about 
                                                 
33 For an account of ideology critique’s fall from grace, see Žižek’s introduction to Mapping Ideology. 
 
34 Adorno discusses ideology and false consciousness in numerous places, most thoroughly in “Beitrag zur 
Ideologienlehre” (translated as “Ideology” in Aspects of Sociology). There are also helpful elaborations in 
ND 66-67, 88-89, 92-93, LND 100-102, HF 78, SDE 155, and P 31. When Adorno is critical of ideology 
critique (for example HF 58), he has in mind the “sociology of knowledge” pioneered by Karl Mannheim, 
which, in his reading, universalizes the concept of ideology and thus deprives it of its critical portent (for an 
extended critique of Mannheim, see P 37-49). Cf. ND 197: “the concept of ideology makes sense only in 
relation to the truth or untruth of what it refers to. There can be no talk of socially necessary delusions 
except in regard to what would not be a delusion—although, of course, delusion is its index.” For accounts 
of Adorno’s use of ideology, see Jarvis (65-67) and Cook. Marcuse uses the terminology in a similar way, 
for example in RT 110, ODM 110-112, PL 19, and N 140. For an account of Marcuse’s use of ideology, 
see Kellner (254-255).  
 
35 Geuss (12-22) and Morris (5-15) distinguish between “epistemic,” “functional,” and “genetic” forms of 
ideology critique. Adorno and Marcuse’s explanation of “socially necessary delusion” contains elements of 
all three forms: such delusions are ideological because they are false, because they function to sustain a bad 
status quo, and because they owe their prevalence (if not necessarily their origin) to the necessity of 
sustaining this status quo. 
 
36 All three focus on Adorno’s account, specifically his formulation (from the “Ideology” essay) that 
ideology is “consciousness which is objectively necessary and yet at the same time false […] the 
intertwining of truth and falsehood” (189).  
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what is Real over and against some deceptive appearance—a “thought/reality 
opposition,” in Laclau and Mouffe’s formulation. This is the argument put forth by 
philosophers such as Richard Rorty, who insists against ideology critique that “there is no 
point in appealing to ‘the way things really are’.”37 A more sophisticated form of this 
criticism suggests that the criterion for what constitutes knowledge is itself produced by 
discourse, and that consequently there is no extra-discursive standard of truth by which to 
measure the epistemic qualities of a given discourse. “Ideology,” Foucault says,  
always stands in virtual opposition to something else which is supposed to count 
as truth. Now I believe that the problem does not consist in drawing the line 
between that in a discourse which falls under the category of scientificity or truth, 
and that which comes under some other category, but in seeing historically how 
effects of truth are produced within discourses which in themselves are neither 
true nor false. 
 
He also objects that “ideology stands in a secondary position relative to something which 
functions as its infrastructure, as its material, economic determinant, etc.”38 It relies, in 
other words, on a shopworn ‘base-superstructure’ model that reduces socio-cultural 
illusions to an economic reality concealed beneath and determining them, again effecting 
a division between the real and the illusory. However different in context and 
formulation, the objections of Rorty and Foucault perform the same basic critical gesture: 
they suggest that it is no longer theoretically or politically viable to appeal to some 
fundamental reality hidden behind a deceptive appearance.  
We may respond to this intervention by considering it in relation to another 
contemporary theoretical movement, the “epistemology of ignorance” as conceived by 
Charles Mills.39 In The Racial Contract, Mills argues that the contemporary world order 
has been shaped by a system of white supremacy, and by a sometimes tacit and 
                                                 
37 Rorty, 229.  
 
38 Foucault (1988), 118. This line of critique is explored in detail in Barret, esp. 123-156 (though, 
interestingly, Barret concludes by endorsing the Frankfurt School model).   
 
39 While it is acknowledged that Mills coined this phrase, it has since developed an expansive theoretical 
life—see for example the collection edited by Sullivan and Tuana, as well as the volume on “Agnotology” 
edited by Proctor and Schiebinger. In her contribution to the former, Alcoff argues that the theory of the 
epistemology of ignorance could be productively complemented with an early Frankfurt School perspective 
(though she focuses on Horkheimer). In her essay on ideology critique, Ng briefly connects Mills and 
Adorno (400). Shelby argues that an account of ideology is necessary for understanding racism, but does 
not draw on the Frankfurt School model.  
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sometimes explicit agreement among whites to establish racist myths that legitimate the 
domination and exploitation of nonwhites. The organization and maintenance of this 
Contract, he claims, “requires a certain schedule of structured blindnesses and 
opacities.”40 The mechanisms of white supremacy must be systematically obscured such 
that relations of domination come to appear as natural, a “cognitive and moral 
economy”41 that obfuscates the conditions for the possibility of the present state of things. 
The result is that it is structurally deincentivized, though not by that token impossible, for 
whites to come to an adequate consciousness of the realities of white supremacy. In 
addition to its directly material consequences, then, the racial contract also produces 
“cognitive dysfunctions”:  
…the Racial Contract prescribes for its signatories an inverted epistemology, an 
epistemology of ignorance, a particular pattern of localized and global cognitive 
dysfunctions (which are psychologically and socially functional), producing the 
ironic outcome that whites will in general be unable to understand the world they 
themselves have made […] To a significant extent…white signatories will live in 
an invented delusional world, a racial fantasyland…42 
 
This delusional world is also reflected in the domain of philosophy, Mills argues, insofar 
as predominant approaches in political theory still rely on variations of “the social 
contract,” a deracialized and therefore idealized model that inhibits social justice rather 
than facilitating it. This is explicable in part because of the overwhelmingly white 
makeup of the academy (especially philosophy), though he also notes that racism “needs 
to be understood as aiming at the minds of nonwhites as well as whites, inculcating 
subjugation.”43 Thus, while nonwhites are certainly more likely than whites to perceive 
the operation of the racial contract, there is not a mechanistic one-to-one determination in 
either direction between racial subject position and adequate consciousness.  
 The parallels between Mills’s account and the discussion of mass delusion in 
Adorno and Marcuse are striking, particularly his characterization of “cognitive 
dysfunction” as a necessary feature of the reproduction of a bad status quo. “In the ideal 
                                                 




42 Ibid, 18. 
 
43 Ibid, 89. 
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polity one seeks to know oneself and to know the world,” Mills writes. But in the real 
polity of the racial contract “such knowledge may be dangerous.”44 This intimate 
connection between falsity and necessity—the “epistemically unreliable but socially 
functional,”45 in Alcoff’s words—forms the basis for ideology critique as the early 
Frankfurt School understands it. In fact, Mills describes his project as “really in the spirit 
of a racially informed Ideologiekritik,” noting that “it lays claims to truth, objectivity, 
realism, the description of the world as it actually is.”46 In order for there to be an 
epistemology of ignorance, there must be something of which to be ignorant.  
 The familiar criticisms of ideology critique must then be applied to the 
epistemology of ignorance. If we dismiss the distinction between representation and 
reality as epistemologically untenable, we must also dismiss Mills’s account of the Racial 
Contract insofar as it posits a distance between the prevailing consciousness of whites 
and the real conditions of white supremacy. In this case, the notion of a “racist myth” 
becomes unintelligible, either because everything is a myth or because nothing is. If we 
take the Foucauldian tack, the consequences for Mill’s account are equally devastating. 
He presents the epistemology of ignorance as an ideological mechanism for legitimating 
and maintaining a system of material expropriation, by that token separating a knowledge 
of things as they are from the mystifying forces which distort this knowledge. In either 
case, the notion of a “racial fantasyland” assumes the existence of a space outside the 
fantasyland, a space of reality and truth against which delusion is measured. If we have 
rejected ideology critique for the stated reasons, we should conclude that the Racial 
                                                 
44 Ibid, 98. 
 
45 Alcoff, 39. 
 
46 Mills (1997), 129. Cf. Mills’s chapter on “Ideal Theory as Ideology” in Black Rights/White Wrongs (72-
90) and his contribution on “Ideology” to the Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice (100-111). Of 
course, one obvious difference between Mills and the early Frankfurt School is that the latter does not offer 
a studied description of global white supremacy, as Mills himself points out in “Criticizing Critical 
Theory.” Any thoroughgoing account of socially necessary delusion would require a settling of accounts 
with “white ignorance” and therefore an engagement with critical theory of race. At the same time, we 
should caution against the tendency to spiral a criticism of the Eurocentric blind spots of the early Frankfurt 
School into a rejection of its categories as ‘economic reductionism.’ Disentangling global white supremacy 
from its mutual implication with the “antagonistic entirety” (the contradiction of the commodity form as 
described by Adorno and Marcuse) has the counteractive effect of isolating racism from its material 
conditions and thus reifying it. Although Mills consistently makes this connection in The Racial Contract 
(24, 32-33), his more recent turn toward reformism is troubling in this regard (see “Criticizing Critical 
Theory,” esp. 246-247).  
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Contract is not a false legitimation of contingent relations of domination, but another 
discourse not epistemologically better or worse than the discourse that names white 
supremacy as a system. We happen to prefer one discourse to another, but we cannot say 
that the organization of the world is really characterized by a system of white supremacist 
domination. 
 I juxtapose this common objection to ideology critique with the epistemology of 
ignorance to illustrate the kind of reductio ad absurdum that results if we apply the 
former consistently. Unless we are prepared to collapse the distinction between real 
racial domination and false racist or deracializing myths, we must reconsider the 
theoretical disposition that would renounce any separation of true and false 
consciousness; unless we refuse to acknowledge any relationship between the material 
exploitation of nonwhites and the discourses which legitimate and perpetuate racial 
ignorance, we must relinquish the idea that any account of this relationship amounts to 
‘reductionism.’ Once we have done this, it becomes difficult to attack ideology critique 
using the same philosophical arsenal.  
In the context of this chapter, I have indeed relied on a “thought/reality 
opposition,” and on an account of truth as concealed behind certain discourses, motivated 
by the necessities of a socioeconomic order, that would distort it. Climate change is real 
and extraordinarily dangerous, and its denial has been a systematic political project—
undertaken because the status quo demands it—successful enough that decisive numbers 
of people are now climate skeptics. I have argued that this situation calls for a theory of 
socially necessary delusion, or ideology. If it is objected that this account is faulty 
because it relies on an account of truth as opposed to delusion, we must be prepared to 
accept all of the consequences of this objection: that there is “no point” in appealing to 
the truth of climate science over and against the delusion of climate skepticism, and that 
“the problem does not consist in drawing a line” between the epistemology of ignorance 
and something that would stand outside of it.   
A more substantial response to the criticism of ideology critique at the 
epistemological level would require another project and take us too far afield from this 
one. For the purposes of our investigation into the critical function of the figure of 
democracy, another objection is more salient: the problem of elitism. There is a danger 
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that the turn to “false demos” and “socially necessary delusion” will inadvertently 
coincide with the pernicious forms of elitism that have prevailed for most of the history 
of political philosophy. In spite of itself, ideology critique may end up reasserting the 
prerogative of the philosopher kings. The categorical imperative of democracy, one could 
argue, functions as a safeguard against this troubling possibility. I will take up and 






 WHAT IS ELITISM? 
 
 The first few chapters of this project argued that the categorical imperative of 
democracy, which regards democratic iconography as an end in itself, is only able to 
maintain its critical credibility if it disqualifies certain elements of the demos in direct 
violation of its central theoretical commitments. As an alternative to this unsustainable 
ambivalence, the previous chapter argued that the present conjuncture is better diagnosed 
and confronted as a problem of false demos, i.e., an understanding of the prevailing 
pathologies of ‘the people’ as inextricable from, which is not to say reducible to or 
strictly determined by, antagonistic objective conditions. Therefore, the categorical 
imperative should be displaced by an account of socially necessary delusion, or ideology, 
which would elaborate the relationship between false and pathological political beliefs 
and the contradictory social relations that create, sustain, or activate them.  
In order to be coherent, then, this theory requires some reference to a belief which 
would not be delusional. It cannot hypostatize social pathology as necessary in isolation 
from specific social relations; if the necessity of delusion were universal, the theoretical 
maneuver would lose its critical force. “Once [the concept of ideology] has ceased to 
differ from any true consciousness,” Adorno writes, “it is no longer fit to criticize a false 
one” (ND 198).1 This is not a theory of political ‘ideologies’ in the colloquial sense that 
applies indiscriminately, but requires demarcating boundary lines between true and false 
political beliefs (which is not to say that the separation will be an absolute one without 
gradient). As Adorno puts it elsewhere (at his most confident): “It is a simple matter of 
distinguishing between truth and ideology…between a consciousness that is appropriate 
to the current state of society and one that conceals it” (HF 140). Simple or not, this 
conception of ideology critique harkens back to an ominous-sounding, all-but-discredited 
project: that of ‘political education.’ This would not be an education in the practice or 
habitus of politics, which theorists of the democratic categorical imperative might affirm, 
                                                 
1 This should distinguish the early Frankfurt School’s account of ideology from the understanding 
developed by, for example, Haslanger, for whom ideology is “not a pejorative term. It is an essential part of 
any form of social life because it functions as the background that we assimilate and enact in order to 
navigate our social world” (18).  
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but an education in the right content of politics, which, according to the understanding we 
have developed here, would be fundamentally antidemocratic.  
 An account of socially necessary delusion, in other words, obliges us to admit of a 
division, in a political register, between the deluded and those who perceive the 
mechanism of delusion. This is a consequence that some critics of ideology critique 
cannot accept. In addition to the epistemological concerns mentioned at the end of the 
last chapter, an account of socially necessary delusion also presents an ethical problem. 
Laclau frequently points to the checkered history of this ambition, warning that the 
impulse to diagnose “false consciousness” has “led to the establishment of an 
‘enlightened’ despotism of intellectuals and bureaucrats who spoke in the name of the 
masses, explained to them their true interests, and imposed upon them increasing 
totalitarian forms of control” (NR 91-92). His later evaluation of this “dinosaur notion” 
(RF 144) is even more severe: “there is no longer any room for that childish talk about 
‘false consciousness,’ which presupposes an enlightened elite whose possession of the 
truth makes it possible to determine what the ‘true interests’ of a class are” (RF 166). 
Rancière also objects to this division on moral grounds, refusing to accept “the 
presupposition of the radical separation between a world doomed to ignorance and the 
very few who know about the way either toward a new society or toward an impending 
disaster” (RD 154). Like Laclau, he justifies this aversion with an appeal to history; “the 
promise of emancipation linked with the endless critique of the illusions produced by the 
system of domination,” he writes, “died in 1989” (RD 153). As we have already seen in 
chapter three, both Rancière and Laclau frequently associate the concept of ideology 
critique with the figure of the Platonic philosopher king, the former going far enough to 
say that Plato’s intellectually stratified republic “made every future theory of ideology an 
academic joke” (RD 135).2 At the core of these morally-infused criticisms, then, is the 
serious allegation that ideology critique, with its implicit notions of political education 
and the unenlightened, is inescapably elitist.    
 This criticism, I will argue in this chapter, relies on an equivocation between the 
markedly elitist notion of political incompetence developed by Plato (which is 
                                                 
2 Ricoeur draws this analogy as well: “Marx and Lenin return to a theme which can be called Platonic, the 
problem of ‘false consciousness’” (272).  
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maintained throughout the subsequent tradition) and the radical departure represented by 
the project of ideology critique. The latter, I claim, retains only a superficial, 
metaphorical resemblance to the former. In fact, an account of socially necessary 
delusion is able to articulate the most compelling critique of Platonic elitism and avoid 
the inconsistencies of the democratic categorical imperative, while the indiscriminate 
repudiation of this account backfires by vindicating the anti-intellectualist tendencies of 
the contemporary Right. Finally, in its concurrent rejection of ideology critique and 
unsubstantiated exclusion of Right-wing populism, the categorical imperative of 
democracy actually coincides with the very elitism that it indicts.    
 In what follows I will use the terms ‘ideology,’ ‘socially necessarily delusion,’ 
‘false consciousness,’ and ‘false demos’ interchangeably. This is in part to avoid 
repetition, but also because the charge of elitism is indifferent to whatever terminological 
refinements might be developed. However we qualify the concept, the notion that there 
are widespread and firmly entrenched political beliefs which are false—and by extension 
that there are those who recognize and diagnose this falsity—is enough to activate the 
criticism. It does not matter how the divide between political truth and the unenlightened, 
or the education which would bridge that divide, are posited; the elitism lies in the fact 
that they are posited. It bears repeating, however, that ‘false consciousness’ is not 
something that one either has or does not have in the way a light-switch is either on or 
off; in this understanding, it is a broadly diffuse constellation of tendencies manifesting to 
various degrees and mobilized in various ways, depending on the contingencies of 
prevailing conditions.  
 
The Incompetence Principle 
Elitism has enjoyed a long and colorful life in political theory. In fact, the 
contention that the vast majority of people are not sufficiently intellectually or morally 
developed to make political decisions has been one of the omnipresent features of 
Western philosophy since Plato. As J.S. McClelland notes, “it could almost be said that 
political theorizing was invented to show that democracy…necessarily turns into rule by 
the mob.”3 Philippe Nemo also remarks on the anti-democratic origins of the tradition: 
                                                 
3 McClelland, 1. 
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“Plato’s political thought is essentially a long argument against the very principle of 
democracy.”4 
At the heart of Plato’s argument against democracy is the claim that some people 
are fit to rule while most, owing to their natural condition, are not. Politics requires an 
understanding of ‘the good,’ and an understanding of the good requires philosophical 
reflection, and philosophical reflection requires that one be capable of doing philosophy, 
which, Socrates says in a key passage in the Republic, the majority are not.5 Most people, 
he goes on to explain, are guided by their irrational desires and by pleasure, rather than 
by reason or truth, and so are susceptible to manipulation by demagogues (the word 
‘demagogue’ meaning ‘leader of the people’). If these people control a city, then this city 
is doomed to descend into disorder and/or tyranny.6 So the demos should not be given 
political power because, by its very nature, it is incapable of wielding it responsibly and 
in accordance with justice. It is this argument that leads Plato to imagine the infamous 
“philosopher kings” (or “guardians”), a class of wise and benevolent rulers who would 
administer a city according to philosophical insight.7 He insists that just as one can be an 
expert in carpentry or cobbling, so one should be able to be an expert in political affairs. 
Democracy, which gives everyone access to political power regardless of political 
understanding, is like allowing anyone to be a carpenter or a cobbler despite a lack of 
training in these trades—but with far graver consequences.8 Leave politics to those who 
are competent in politics, just as we leave carpentry to those who are competent in 
carpentry. The key difference between political expertise and carpentry—and this is the 
locus of Plato’s elitism—is that anyone could be trained as a carpenter, while politics 
                                                 
4 Nemo, 74. Cf. Ober; “classical Greek political thought arose from an extended…battle for discursive 
authority between two powerful and multifaceted communities: the internally diverse Athenian citizenry 
and the internally competitive Athenian educated elite” (12). Ober’s extensive and nuanced account locates 
anti-democratic political thought in ancient Athens even prior to Plato in the work of Aristophanes, 
Thucydides, and the anonymous “Old Oligarch.” 
 
5 “Can the majority in any way tolerate or accept the reality of the beautiful itself? […] Then the majority 
cannot be philosophic” (Republic, 493e-494). 
 
6 Plato articulates this argument in many passages, especially Republic 431c, 561d, and 563d-564b, as well 
as Protagoras 319be. 
 
7 See Republic, 473d.  
 
8 See Republic 434ab, as well as the passage from the Protagoras cited above.  
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requires a philosophical understanding of the good, which by necessity is foreclosed to 
‘the many.’  
This argument for elitism, which we might call the incompetence principle, is 
repeated—albeit with some notable variations—in Aristotle, Cato, Livy, Thomas, 
Hobbes, and Montesquieu, to name only a few.9 With the advent of Edmund Burke and 
other anti-democratic reactionaries of the French Revolution, the concept of ‘the good’ 
drops out, replaced by a notion of political experience. For this kind of elitist, it is not that 
the masses are incapable of insight into the true order of things (there is no such thing), 
but that they have not been maturated in practices of ruling and government; they are 
therefore uncultivated in the foundation of reliable politics, i.e., customs and traditions 
hallowed by usage and consecrated by time.10 Anti-Platonic in its theoretical justification, 
this argument remains Platonic in its conclusion: the demos is politically incompetent. 
Even John Stuart Mill argued for a socially stratified “plural voting” system out of fear 
that the laboring classes, whose mental and moral condition he regards as degraded, 
would fail to respect the liberal values and institutions necessary for civic life.11 Although 
Mill (unlike Plato and Burke) looked forward to a utopia of universal education, his 
estimation of contemporary incompetence was nevertheless demarcated along class (and 
racial) lines, and so still conformed to the basic elitist impulse. In the history of Western 
political philosophy, the incompetence principle runs deeply enough that Platonists, 
conservatives, and classical liberals are united in their fear of the ignorant and unreliable 
demos, however disparate the ultimate stakes of their respective projects.  
                                                 
9 McClelland and Roberts provide indispensible histories of antidemocratic thinking in the Western 
tradition. From their accounts, we see that the perceived negative consequences of democratic power shift 
dramatically—democracy sometimes leads to decadence, sometimes to instability, to sometimes to sin—
but in each case it leads there because of the fundamental incompetence of the common people, interpreted 
as either a natural feature or as the curse of situation (and often, inconsistently, as both). 
 
10 Burke’s Reflections combines an explicit defense of the incompetence principle with an unmistakable 
anti-intellectualism: “When antient opinions and rules of life are taken away, the loss cannot possibly be 
estimated. From that moment we have no compass to govern us; nor can we know distinctly to what port 
we steer. […] Happy if learning, not debauched by ambition, had been satisfied to continue the instructor, 
and not aspired to be the master!” (77-78).  
 
11 He develops this system in Considerations on Representative Govornment (chapter VIII), and in 
Thoughts of Parliamentary Reform (especially 11-12), where he writes: “no lover of improvement can 
desire that the predominant power should be turned over to persons in the mental and moral condition of 
the English working classes” (14).  
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From the late nineteenth century to the early twentieth, there was an explosion of 
literature on the rise of ‘mass society’ and the threat this posed to political stability, 
tradition, morality, and culture. The population boom, the increasing democratization of 
political institutions, and the solidification of organized labor were ominous 
developments for those convinced of the ignorance, irrationality, and lack of cultivation 
of ‘the common man.’ The incompetence principle found its most fervent and explicit 
expressions during this period,12 and it was also during this time that fear of popular 
power attained a veneer of scientific legitimacy as “crowd psychology” or “the sociology 
of mass behavior.”13 Important variations on the incompetence theme were then 
developed by Walter Lippmann (whose argument is essentially logistical) and by Joseph 
Schumpeter (whose account of “elitist democracy” prompted a lively mid-century 
debate).14 As I attempted to show in chapter two, Arendt’s work belongs to this tradition 
as well. 
After being a ubiquitous part of Western political philosophy for millennia, the 
incompetence principle went dormant in the last decades of the twentieth century. Under 
the scrutinizing eyes of what I have called the democratic turn, this way of thinking was 
dismissed as elitist. Recent political events, however, have revitalized the old argument 
from incompetence and sparked a renewed debate about the limits of democracy. Since 
the mid-2000’s, especially in the United States, there has appeared a series of books in a 
genre that we might call ‘the incompetent demos exposé’: an alarming catalog of the 
irrationality, ignorance, and misinformed opinion characteristic of the average American 
citizen. Sometimes this genre takes the form of cultural criticism (Susan Jacoby’s The 
Age of American Unreason, Chris Hedges’s Empire of Illusion) and sometimes of 
ethnographic report (Arlie Russell Hochschild’s Strangers in their Own Land, David 
Niewert’s Alt-America); most important for our purposes, however, is the subsection of 
                                                 
12 Key examples include Le Bon’s The Crowd, Trotter’s Instincts of the Herd, Ortega’s The Revolt of the 
Masses, Martin’s The Behavior of Crowds, and Reisman et al.’s The Lonely Crowd. Also worth mentioning 
in this context are Lippmann’s progenitors in the sociological tradition such as Pareto, Taine, Mosca, and 
Michels.  
 
13 See Jonsson, 78ff.  
 
14 See the edited volume by Bachrach. I am thinking of Lippmann’s The Phantom Public, and 
Schumpeter’s Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (esp. 237-283).  
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this genre which juxtaposes democratic theory with empirically informed pessimism 
about the capacity of people to live up to this theory. What is ‘exposed’ in this case is 
that, contrary to our best ideal theoretical impulses, human psychology is just not 
equipped for the kind of rational and reflective disposition required for democracy to 
work in the way that its advocates think it should. Examples include Arthur Lupia’s 
Uninformed, Bryan Caplan’s The Myth of the Rational Voter, Ilya Somin’s Democracy 
and Political Ignorance, and Achen and Bartels’s Democracy for Realists. These texts 
differ in the way they situate their findings in relation to democracy, but in each case the 
conclusion is that democratic theory needs to be rethought or reconsidered in light of the 
revelation that ‘the people’ have limited competence when it comes to politics.       
 This new tendency is complemented by a series of recent popular periodical 
articles that suggest, contrary to some of our preconceived notions, that people do not 
form beliefs (including political beliefs) on a rational basis. With titles like “The Science 
of Why We Don’t Believe Science,” Why Facts Don’t Change Our Minds,” and “Why 
Facts Don’t Matter to Trump Supporters,” these articles draw on contemporary 
psychological or sociological research to show that human beings are cognitively 
predisposed toward ignorance and irrationality.15 Sometimes the argument is that belief 
systems are based on emotional connection or identification with groups rather than 
‘facts’ or ‘reason’; other times the explanation comes down to a neurological 
‘confirmation bias’ couched in evolutionary terms. In either case, the conclusion is that 
the stubborn persistence of irrational or ignorance beliefs (like climate skepticism) is 
explicable in terms of the frailties of human psychology. Articles of this kind increased in 
frequency during and after the political events of 2016. 
 The notion of incompetence developed by these works is nothing so theoretically 
elaborate as the metaphysics of Plato, and their accounts are much more stolid than the 
paranoid forebodings of Burke. For the exposés, the incompetence principle is based only 
on an assertion about “what people are like.” Looking at the raw data, the story goes, it 
turns out that ‘the people’ are not rational, that they have a predisposition toward 
ignorance, and that they will probably never meet the high standards demanded by any 
theory that presupposes or recommends their competence. “The folk theory of democracy 
                                                 
15 See Kolbert, Ignatius, Mooney, Ehrenfreund, Graham,   
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celebrates the wisdom of popular judgments by informed and engaged citizens,” Achen 
and Bartels write. “The reality is quite different.”16 But the conclusion is not only 
academic; the common thread running throughout this genre—from Jacoby to Somin to 
the mainstream opinion pieces—is a warning about the dangers of popular power when 
this cognitively impaired ‘people’ is angry, overzealous, and under-informed.  
 At the extremity of this tendency is Jason Brennan’s Against Democracy. Because 
of the “ignorant, irrational, impaired, immoral, and corrupt electorate,”17 he argues, we 
should replace democracy with “epistocracy,” or rule by the knowledgeable.18 This 
would work by restricting suffrage, instituting a political competency test as a 
prerequisite for the right to vote. If you can demonstrate that you know enough about 
politics to make a responsible and informed decision, then and only then do you earn 
your place among the electorate. In line with Caplan, Lupia, et al., Brennan frames his 
argument by appealing to “what human beings are like.” The book is littered with phrases 
like this: “It turns out that most people process political information in deeply biased and 
irrational ways.”19 When this sobering empirical albatross is fully understood, the 
idealistic norm of popular sovereignty becomes at best an unreflective dogma and at 
worst a path to political ruin. If this is the case, then political philosophy’s longstanding 
incompetence principle appears to be vindicated. 
 
The Problem with the People 
Contrary to the suggestion of its critics, ideology critique is something 
fundamentally different than the elitism of the incompetence principle and its legacy from 
Plato to Burke to Brennan. The concept of socially necessary delusion does in fact posit a 
distance between prevailing false consciousness and something that would constitute an 
enlightened politics, but it does not attribute this distance to an inherent quality of the 
demos. In other words, it accepts the premise of the incompetence principle (the mere fact 
                                                 
16 Achen and Bartels, 299. 
 
17 Brennan, 158. 
 
18 He adapts the term ‘epistocracy’ from Estlund. As we have seen, Rancière uses the more etymologically 
precise term “epistemocracy.”  
 
19 Brennan, 24. 
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of mass political ignorance and irrationality), but denies its conclusion (that this fact owes 
to an unmediated psychological feature). It places responsibility not on the eternally 
limited vision of the many (Plato), the unrestrained whims of the inexperienced masses 
(Burke), the intellectual and moral deficiencies of the lower classes (Mill), or the 
indeclinable facts of the human psyche (the exposés), but on the antagonistic objective 
social conditions which demand and sustain political incompetence. For Plato and for 
Brennan, the problem is the people. For Adorno and Marcuse, it is the contradictory 
system to which the people must adapt. The former: “The trouble is with the conditions 
that condemn [people] to impotence and apathy and would yet be changeable by human 
action; it is not primarily with people and with the way conditions appear to people” (ND 
190).20 The latter: “I call this society insane—not the people in it” (NL 96).  
What the incompetence principle effects, and what a theory of socially necessary 
delusion avoids, is the reduction a political problem to a psychological invariant. By 
regarding irrationality and ignorance as a structural fixture of human behavior as such, 
the psychologization of incompetence eliminates the need for a political economy of 
delusion and its systematic social production. From this perspective, it is not that 
prevailing forms of social reproduction foster or necessitate delusional beliefs, but that 
we are “hard-wired” to be deluded. Climate denial is so obstinate not because the status 
quo demands it (and has worked so hard to nurture it), but because facts just plain do not 
appeal to people. This inflation of the empirical fact of popular ignorance and 
irrationality into an assertion about ‘what human beings are like’ is at work in both 
Plato’s argument for philosopher kings and Brennan’s turn toward “epistocracy.” A trait 
characteristic of individuals who must adapt to certain historical and socioeconomic 
conditions is inflated into a characteristic of human adaptation in the abstract, thus 
construing these conditions as irrelevant or above criticism. Returning to Mills’s 
framework for a moment, the psychologization model could also tell us that “people tend 
to be racist” and then infer from this that racism is “hard-wired,”21 obscuring the long 
history of the racial contract as a historical production. This is the limitation of the 
approach that only registers mass political incompetence as a simple fact to be reckoned 
                                                 
20 Ashton misleadingly translates “die Menschen” (189) as “Man.”  
 
21 This has in fact been done (see Waugh).  
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with. It is indeed a fact to be reckoned with—and here already there is an advance over 
the categorical imperative of democracy—but if we are not content to resign ourselves to 
this fact and all of its consequences, then critically confronting it means asking after its 
conditions of possibility and the conditions of possibility of its transformation. The 
incompetence principle confirms an ahistorical, apolitical understanding of mass delusion 
and pathology, treating it as a failure of the individual psyche or as the necessary curse of 
particular classes or groups. It regards ignorance not as something to be overcome but as 
something to be recognized and accepted as inevitable. By avoiding this mistake, an 
account of socially necessary delusion circumvents the problem of elitism. 
In an interesting way, the return of the incompetence principle repeats the basic 
error of democratic thinking, i.e., the presumption that political opinion is autonomously, 
rather than heteronomously, produced. The two mistakes mirror one another: democracy 
and anti-democracy are complementary formalisms. The former insists on the value of 
democratic iconography in spite of the prevailing character of the demos, while the latter, 
believing itself (with some justification) to be closer to empirical reality, reifies this 
prevailing character and uses it to justify a rejection of the value of democratic 
iconography. The concept of false demos recognizes popular ignorance and irrationality 
without reifying it, situating it instead in terms of the conditions that engender it and 
placing its critical emphasis there. To make this more concrete, consider again the model 
of climate skepticism. The categorical imperative of democracy would require us to 
either deny its prevalence outright or to legitimate it as a democratic intervention. 
Alternatively, as we have seen, it could decide that this phenomenon is simply not 
political (more on this below). The incompetence principle, on the other hand, would 
regard the popular currency of climate skepticism as confirming its elitist thesis: if the 
people deny climate change, then the people are clearly incompetent by nature. Ideology 
critique goes beyond the categorical imperative by refusing to ignore or minimize the 
significance of climate skepticism, and then goes beyond the incompetence principle by 
asking after the causes and the social function of climate skepticism, explicitly rejecting 
an explanation that would project this pathology into an ahistorical, psychologized, and 
therefore depoliticized realm. The categorical imperative says that the demos is good as 
such, while the incompetence principle says that the demos is bad as such. A theory of 
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socially necessary delusion answers that the demos is bound up with objective social 
conditions, which for the nonce are bad, but which might be made good, and that the 
critical value of democratic iconography will depend on the relationship between the 
demos and these conditions.   
With this response, ideology critique admits the provisional truth of the 
incompetence principle without inferring from this truth an argument for elitism. It can 
therefore formulate a criticism of the incompetence principle that goes beyond sheer 
denial, something the democratic turn is unable to do—either because its doctrinal faith 
blinds it to the realities of the people, or because it has (ostensibly) forfeited its license to 
discriminate between true and false consciousness. By surpassing the incompetence 
principle rather than simply refusing it, ideology critique can criticize elitism at the same 
time that it acknowledges the prevalence of false and pathological political beliefs. To 
quote Adorno again: “If philosophers since Heraclitus have carped at the many for 
remaining captive to mere opinion instead of knowing the true essence of things, then 
their elitist thinking [Elite Denken] only put the blame [Schuld] on the underlying 
population for what properly lies with the institution of society” (CM 109).22 In this 
gesture, elite thinking is rejected as a response to the perceived distance between the 
demos and the truth, but this distance is not thereby annulled.  
Compare this approach to Arendt’s remarks, detailed in chapter two, about the 
“politically immature public.” For her, this immaturity stems from the condition of the 
animal laborans, the political backwardness inherent in those who see things “from the 
viewpoint of the stomach.” Her democratic impulse should lead away from the notion of 
political maturity, insofar as politics is supposed to be autonomous and a matter of doxa 
rather than truth; but the elitist impulse requires that the desired exclusion be cast in 
terms of the inherent capacities or incapacities of certain people. Distressed about the 
intrusion of falsity into the formerly pure political sphere, she does not situate this 
infiltration in terms of the objective social necessities compelling it; instead, she chalks 
up the contemporary politicization of empirical facts to the immaturity of the demos 
itself. The approach I am suggesting would avoid this ambivalence by relinquishing both 
                                                 
22 Cf. Adorno’s discussion of elitism in IS 129-135. 
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the critical primacy of democratic iconography and anti-democratic skepticism, thereby 
functioning as a critique of both. 
 There is a scene in Kazuo Ishiguro’s novel The Remains of the Day that illustrates 
the respective, complementary deficiencies of the incompetence principle and the 
democratic categorical imperative. On a noble estate in 1930’s England, a group of 
aristocrats are debating the value of democracy. One of them insists that “the will of the 
people [is] the wisest arbiter.”23 The others scoff incredulously. As if to test the 
hypothesis, the host calls in his butler, Stevens. One of the aristocrats then asks Stevens a 
series of questions on contemporary political issues, but the bewildered servant is unable 
to say anything in response. The skeptic feels vindicated by this: “You see 
gentlemen…our man here is unable to assist us in these matters. And yet we still go along 
with the notion that this nation’s decisions be left in the hands of our good man here and 
the few million others like him.”24 While the democrat in the room remains stubbornly 
unconvinced, the rest commend the interrogator for proving his point. Incidentally, this is 
the exact justification that Brennan provides for his “epistocracy,” only with a somewhat 
larger sample size.  
 In this scenario, the first aristocrat represents the democratic turn, while the other 
represents the incompetence principle. The former is rendered ridiculous by the fact that 
Stevens is unable to answer, while the latter is rendered facile by his elitist interpretation 
of this fact. Between the democrat’s a priori faith in the opinions of the “ordinary man in 
the street” and the elitist’s positive judgment of incompetence, the circumstances of 
Stevens’s life are rendered invisible. Neither of them is able to perceive the objective 
conditions that mediate his inability to answer—the realities of domestic servitude, the 
blind obedience and deference inculcated in him, and the inferiority complex necessitated 
by the maintenance of a hierarchical social order.25 The democrat insists that, in spite of 
                                                 
23 In Ismail Merchant’s film version, this character says: “You cannot go wrong if you listen to the opinions 
of your ordinary man in the street. They’re perfectly entitled to give opinions on politics.” 
 
24 Ishiguro, 194-199. 
 
25 As Stevens himself puts it: “a butler’s duty is to provide good service. It is not to meddle in the great 
affairs of the nation. The fact is, such great affairs will always be beyond the understanding of those such as 
you and I, and those of us who wish to make our mark must realize that we best do so by concentrating on 
what is within our realm; that is to say, by devoting our attention to providing the best possible service to 
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being a butler, this ordinary man has valid opinions; through this gesture he obscures any 
possible relationship between political opinion and the social necessities of a world 
divided between domestic servants and lords of the manor. For his part, the elitist takes 
the ordinary man’s lack of competence as a justification for the continued existence of 
this world, rather than as a product of it. We should, of course, be outraged at the 
skeptical gentleman’s willingness to humiliate Stevens, to use him as a prop in an 
argument, etc. At the same time, the moral of this story cannot be that the more generous 
aristocrat wins the argument after all, for it is still the case that Stevens is ignorant. The 
elitist infers from the butler’s lack of education a state of permanent incompetence, while 
the democrat simply denies that he needs education. In both cases, they bypass a critique 
of the bad reality of which this ignorance is a reflection.   
 Ishiguro’s scene also provides occasion to clear up a potential category mistake. 
Here, the ignorant one is a servant and the (ostensibly) knowledgeable ones are the 
privileged members of an elite class. We might conclude from this that, whatever its 
merits over and against the incompetence principle, the critique of ideology maps on 
exactly to the economically, racially, and sexually stratified categories of the old model, 
thereby trading elitism for something like ‘paternalism’ while retaining all of the former’s 
problematic aspects. But in the interpretation I am developing here, consciousness is not 
determined by objective social conditions but only mediated by them; likewise, the 
ignorance, irrationality, and pathology generated by these conditions is not strictly bound 
to any particular group. There is no absolute correlation between Stevens’s position as a 
butler and his lack of political perspective, nor is there any guarantee that his aristocratic 
tormenters (or his one patronizing supporter) will be politically enlightened simply by 
virtue of being aristocrats.26 To say that delusion is socially necessary is not to say that 
                                                                                                                                                 
those great gentlemen in whose hands the destiny of civilization truly lies […] it is…simply not possible to 
adopt such a critical attitude towards an employer and at the same time provide good service” (199-200).  
 
26 Ishiguro juxtaposes this scene with another in which an older Stevens is confronted by the devastation of 
the Second World War—and, implicitly, by the fact that his former employer was an advocate of 
appeasement and an occasional Nazi sympathizer. The lesson is clear: the enlightened perspective of the 
aristocrats did not prevent them from casting their lot with political disaster. At the same time, we should 
hesitate before inferring from this that Stevens is the truly enlightened one; at the time, he dutifully 
supported his master and staunchly defended his political choices. In other words, if the course of British 
politics in the interwar years were in Stevens’s hands, we have little reason to believe that the result would 
have been different.  
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people in specific structural positions within the social totality are doomed to delusion. 
Rather, it means that a generally diffused delusion is necessary for the reproduction of 
certain social relations; its relative success or failure among differently situated members 
is contingent rather than necessary. Recognizing and confronting false consciousness is 
not the unique prerogative of any particular class (and certainly not of academics).  
At the same time, we should acknowledge two crucial caveats. The first is that 
those with a vested interest in maintaining the status quo and its systems of domination 
are, of course, less inclined to become aware of or challenge the delusions that reinforce 
this status quo. The second, which stands in a paradoxical relation to the first, is that the 
informed and sophisticated perspective required to approach the question of ideology is 
not equally accessible to everyone. “Criticizing privilege becomes a privilege,” Adorno 
writes. “The world’s course is as dialectical as that” (ND 41).27 So while Stevens’s 
position as a butler does not determine his level of political consciousness, there are 
structural incentives working against it. Likewise, while the aristocrats may have ample 
opportunity to form an enlightened view, they are structurally de-incentivized to question 
the entitlement system or the delusions that underpin it. But accessibility and incentives 
aside, an account of socially necessary delusion does not provide any strict mechanism 
for cutting through messy contingencies and assigning prerogatives based on position.   
The opponents of ideology critique charge that, perhaps in spite of its intentions, 
the diagnosis of false consciousness inevitably reverts to the elitism of Plato. As we have 
seen, Rancière and Laclau liken the critic of socially necessary delusion to the 
philosopher king and ideology to the shadows on the wall of the cave. The crux of Plato’s 
argument, however, is that ‘the many’ are unfit to govern because, according to their 
inherent nature, they are incapable of thinking philosophically; governing should 
therefore be left to that small minority who are able to see what the majority cannot. In 
Plato, and in the reverberations of this argument throughout the tradition, there is a 
                                                 
27 Adorno further articulates this difficult situation, in which the privileged have the most material space to 
elaborate a sophisticated critique of society but the least inclination: “To equate public opinion with the 
very stratum of society that considers itself the elite would be irresponsible, because in such a group the 
actual expertise, and hence the possibility of a judgment that is worth more than mere opinion, is 
indissolubly entangled with particular interests that elite perceives as though they were universal. The 
moment when an elite knows and declares itself as such, it already makes itself into the opposite of what it 
claims to be and draws irrational domination from circumstances that could grant it a good deal of rational 
insight” (CM 117).  
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necessary disparity between the enlightened and the unenlightened. The first major 
difference in ideology critique is that this disparity is understood as contingent. The 
necessity in ‘socially necessary delusion’ means ‘necessary to the reproduction of an 
antagonistic system’ and not ‘necessary as a fixture of human nature’ or ‘necessary for 
social organization as such.’ Likewise, it moves even further away from Plato by 
insisting that the critical aim is not merely a shift in consciousness but a shift in the 
conditions that necessitate this consciousness. The goal is not the successful management 
of the herd by the guardians, as it remains even in Brennan, but the establishment of 
social conditions in which ignorance and irrationality will no longer be necessary. Insofar 
as a theory of social delusion maintains the division between ‘the knowing’ and ‘the 
rest’—and it does so only in a qualified, limited way—its understanding of the nature, 
causes, and consequences of this division are completely transformed. This departure is 
covered over in the criticisms of Rancière and Laclau. Placing emphasis on their 
superficial metaphorical similarities distorts the decisive difference between ideology 
critique and Platonic elitism.   
It should be pointed out that, in their respective critiques of ideology critique, 
Rancière and Laclau (and Rorty and Foucault) probably have in mind the model 
developed by Althusser. Rightly or wrongly, his remarks on the subject could be 
understood as positing a necessary correlation between locations in the mode of 
production and degrees of consciousness, a permanent incongruity between the 
‘ideology’ of those wrapped up in the process and the ‘science’ of intellectuals outside of 
it.28 In this case, a certain vestige of Platonism would remain. As we have seen, the 
account of socially necessary delusion that I have sketched here departs from this 
approach in important ways. But insofar as it vetoes all accounts of false consciousness 
for establishing an intellectual disparity in the political realm, the moral opposition to 
ideology critique is unable to discriminate between these two models. The critics throw 
out the Althusserian baby with the Althusserian bathwater. Rancière in particular allows 
no space between a commitment to necessary intellectual inequality and a commitment to 
                                                 
28 As for the accuracy of this interpretation of Althusser, the most that can be said here is that, despite the 
popularity of the essay on “Ideological State Apparatuses,” his theory of ideology remained incomplete. It 
is most thoroughly elaborated in the recently published manuscript, On the Reproduction of Capitalism 
(esp. 171-209).  
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the “equality of intelligences.” One is either Plato or Jacotot. An account of socially 
necessary delusion shows us a way between these two alternatives.   
 
Elitists and Populists 
Dismissing all diagnoses of ideological delusion as elitist has some further 
implications that we should consider. It is true that since the solidification of the familiar 
Right/Left spectrum, the incompetence principle has been closely associated with the 
Right. It is commonplace to say that modern conservatism began with Burke,29 and the 
‘mass society’ literature that I mentioned above (in particular Ortega and Lippmann) had 
a profound influence on the postwar development of Right-wing philosophy and politics, 
especially in the U.S.30 There is some historical justification, therefore, in the frequent 
assertion that the Left represents the democratic impulse and the critique of elitism while 
the Right represents an anti-democratic fear of the masses.31 This assertion, however, 
overlooks an important sea change that has taken place in the last few decades. Slowly, 
from the 1960’s to the 1980’s, the complexion of Right-wing political thought and 
practice shifted dramatically; it went from a Platonic-Burkean defense of order against 
the unruly masses to an avowed appeal to popular support against “elites” and “experts.” 
No longer relying on notions of political expertise or the incompetence of common 
people, the “majoritarian turn” in (particularly American) conservatism saw the Right 
become “populist” and declare faith in “the silent majority.”32 Massive political 
successes—from Reagan to the 1994 “revolution” to Trump—followed soon after. This 
development has been answered in turn by the exposé genre described above, especially 
the Jacoby and Hochschild variety, which exposes a shockingly misinformed Right-wing 
demos from a progressive perspective. Anti-elitism, once a source of anxiety for the 
                                                 
29 See for example Robin, 42.  
 
30 See Nash (33-80), Critchlow (11), Kirk (197), Lora (202), and Allitt (153).  
 
31 See, for example, the opening paragraph of Robin, Allitt (3), Critchlow (9), or the passage from May 
quoted in the introduction.  
 




Right, has become the torment of the other side. The fear of the masses has switched its 
political allegiance. 
 The shifting political function of the criticism of elitism, besides illustrating this 
project’s larger point about the prevailing character of the demos, also demonstrates the 
dangers of equating ideology critique with Platonism. If we refuse to grant any distinction 
between true and false consciousness in a political register on the grounds that it 
reintroduces a form of the incompetence principle, then patently spurious or pathological 
beliefs—such as climate skepticism or xenophobic nationalism—are accorded the status 
of legitimate political interventions. We may still disagree with these positions, but this 
disagreement would only consist in two opposing conceptions of the world and not in 
more or less clear perceptions of things as they actually are; accordingly, we would not 
criticize the opposing viewpoint on the grounds that it did not adequately reflect reality 
but only on the grounds that it is not our viewpoint. The difference between a climate 
skeptic and one who thinks through the consequences of climate change is therefore not a 
difference between adequate and inadequate pictures of reality. This is consistent with a 
position that rejects the notion of political education tout court. In this case, the measure 
of elitism is not a theory’s understanding of the need for or content of political education, 
but the mere positing of an intellectual disparity as such. When political actors believe 
something delusional, pointing out that this is the case is enough to make one an elitist, 
and suggesting that this wrong belief ought not be tolerated is enough to make one 
totalitarian. That this theoretical disposition is not actually sustainable is revealed by the 
ambivalence I have been tracking throughout this project. In order to preside over the 
marriage of democracy and emancipation, the democratic turn must forbid the Right-
wing demos from attending the ceremony.33 But in discarding political education, we 
cede the ground on which we could establish a critique of Right-wing politics that goes 
beyond random negation.  
 What is more, the indiscriminate rejection of ideology as elitist mirrors the anti-
intellectualism that, as mentioned above, has become an important part of the Right’s 
political identity. A mistrust of “political correctness” and of the “experts” who issue 
                                                 
33 The hypocrisy involved in this has not gone unnoticed by the Right—see Bauer’s “The Left and 
Discriminating Tolerance” or O’Sullivan’s foreword to Ryszard Legutko’s The Demon in Democracy. 
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warnings about climate change would be vindicated by this perspective, if it were 
consistently maintained. Isaac Asimov famously denounced the “cult of ignorance” in the 
United States, i.e., the overriding cultural sentiment that “my ignorance is just as good as 
your knowledge.”34 By dismissing an account of false consciousness because it counts 
some forms of consciousness as false, we give license to this cult of ignorance. This 
criticism, in other words, represents a kind of internalized anti-intellectualism, presented 
as humility and legitimated by the categorical imperative of democracy.  
We can see this mirroring at work in a 1968 episode of Firing Line, where 
National Review founder William F. Buckley cross-examines Black Panther leader 
Eldridge Cleaver: 
Buckley: You don’t seem to be willing to grant precisely that freedom—which 
you theoretically cherish—of people to decide their own political future. When 
Dick Gregory ran for mayor of New York [sic], two percent of the black 
community there voted for him. Ninety-eight percent voted for another candidate. 
Now wouldn’t this suggest a rather overwhelming repudiation of the point of view 
of Dick Gregory by people he nevertheless understands himself to be— 
 
Cleaver: It seems to me that the people who did participate in that election are in 
vast need of political education. 
 
Buckley: In other words, people will be voting correctly when they vote as you 
tell them to, or as you ‘educate’ them to.  
 




Buckley: There is a Marcuse-ian edge to your thought—that people don’t vote for 
their own best interests because they are constantly deceived, and that only 
revolutionary experience will cause them— 
 
Cleaver: I don’t think there’s any doubt that people are deceived. They have the 
pigs of the mass media who manipulate information…essentially they distort 
reality, so that people have their heads filled with lying and vicious propaganda, 
and they’re in no position to really function in a realistic manner. 
 
                                                 




Buckley: Why are you uniquely situated to have penetrated this national 
delusion?35 
 
Notice how closely Buckley’s position aligns with the criticisms put forth by Rancière 
and Laclau. I do not mean to suggest by this comparison that, if the Right articulates an 
idea, then that idea is automatically discredited. Rather, I mean to show that these 
criticisms could be applied by the Right, with total justification, to dissolve any 
emancipatory intervention of the Left insofar as that intervention depends on an account 
of ‘how things are’ over and against ‘how things appear.’ It would be excused from 
having to listen to that philosopher king, Charles Mills, insofar as he posits a division 
between reality (white supremacy) and the delusions which conceal that reality (white 
ignorance), by extension positing a division between those who perceive the truth and 
those who are deluded. Theorizing an epistemology of ignorance presupposes that some 
people are ignorant, and that the epistemologist is qualified to diagnose this ignorance; it 
is therefore inherently elitist. This would not be a case of the Right seizing and 
misappropriating an argument that properly belongs to radical democracy, but, if we take 
Rancière and Laclau at their word, a legitimate application of the latter’s own 
hypothesis.36 There is a serious risk that in rejecting all notions of ideology as elitist, we 
would inadvertently forfeit the legacy of Cleaver and resign ourselves to the legacy of 
Buckley.  
  
 I have argued throughout this project that, in order to make its categories function 
in a critical or emancipatory way, the categorical imperative of democracy needs to 
exclude certain political currents from consideration. Democratic iconography and radical 
politics can be made to coincide if political interventions with undesirable content can be 
nullified, without regard for theoretical consistency, as undemocratic or as outside the 
realm of the political altogether. Reading this ambivalence alongside the reflections 
developed in this chapter allows us to see that the charge of elitism more properly 
belongs to the categorical imperative of democracy than to an account of socially 
                                                 
35 See “Firing Line.” This exchange happens from around 17:30 to around 20:00. Later on (31:45), Buckley 
compares Cleaver to American Nazi Party leader George Lincoln Rockwell.  
 
36 Adorno: “The self-reflection of enlightenment is not its revocation; it is corrupted into revocation only 
for the sake of today’s status quo” (ND 158).  
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necessary delusion. Through its twin elitist-populist impulses, it simultaneously 
establishes an undemocratic ‘other’ and renounces any intention of improving or 
enlightening this other. In dismissing both political education and large parts of the 
demos, the categorical imperative reduces its excluded object to a status beneath the 
political and thus beneath education, in the same way that Plato regarded the non-
philosophical ‘many’ as incorrigible and therefore best managed by the guardians. As we 
have seen, Rancière, Mouffe, and Laclau (along with Fraser, Connolly, and Marchart) 
refuse to count examples of Right-wing political movements as instantiations of their 
normative concepts, but they also explicitly and emphatically forsake the categories—
political education and enlightenment on one hand, delusion and false consciousness on 
the other—through which these movements might be understood or confronted as 
anything other than pure exteriority. If we deny that political education is necessary, we 
are essentially consigning democracy’s political other to a state of permanent 
undesirability and therefore reinstating an elitism of the most extreme form. When it 
comes to the xenophobes that Rancière pathologizes, those who do not play by “the rules 
of the game” according to Mouffe, or the undemocratic “people” in Laclau’s framework, 
there is no room for recovery. They are not to be acknowledged as equals with valid 
political interventions, but neither are they to be shown the error of their ways. 
Ostensibly, then, they are only to be looked down upon, or to serve as a warning notice 
for other true democrats. If instead we grant that, in these truly un-democratic-anti-
political cases, education is permissible, then we have reintroduced the 
enlightened/unenlightened division that prompted this discussion in the first place, only 
with a slightly modified content.  
The categorical imperative of democracy participates in the aversion to the 
masses so common in political philosophy, but under the pretense of a protest against this 
aversion. It thereby bypasses the moment of truth in the incompetence principle and 
simultaneously forsakes its only claim to a cogent criticism of this principle. It does not 
feel a pressing need to engage with the positions of the xenophobe, the men’s rights 
activist, or the climate skeptic, i.e., to engage them as serious phenomena that demand 
theoretical and critical analysis. It is content to invoke these currents as cautionary 
examples, disqualify them without justification, and then proceed with its valorization of 
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democratic iconography as if the Right-wing demos did not exist.  Democracy, we are 
told, means abandoning the idea that there is one correct ‘worldview,’ but at the same 
time aspects of a particular worldview are taken for granted. As if we all acknowledge the 
basic reality of anthropogenic climate change, as if we all understand the history of 
colonialism and racial oppression, as if no one really believes that homosexuality is an 
affront to God. The theorists of democracy operate on the presupposition that all 
members of the political community are reflective, educated, and Left-leaning—i.e., that 
all members of the community are like themselves. The partisans of difference return us 
to identity under another name. While their accounts might be applicable to cases of 
difference, disagreement, and contestation among well-educated progressives, they leave 
us in the dark when confronted with ignorance, anti-intellectualism, and delusion—and it 
is this darkness which desperately needs illumination today.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
We might describe the critical intervention of the democratic categorical 
imperative as a rejection of the theoretical disposition represented by Rousseau, 
specifically his distinction between the “general will” and the collection of individual 
wills. If the political is autonomous and a matter of doxa rather than truth, then the 
conceit of a true politics which is accessible by rational reflection, but which may not 
coincide with the prevailing character of the public or its various contingent eruptions, 
becomes anathema. But however much the categorical imperative of democracy would 
like to reject the idea of the general will, it is constantly reintroducing it. A narrow 
circumscription of proper political content runs alongside its emphatic refusal of the 
prerogative to determine this content. To tweak Foucault’s line about Hegel, we may say 
that at the end of the categorical imperative’s anti-Rousseauian path there stands 
Rousseau, “motionless, waiting for us.”37 This tension, which I have called the elitist-
populist ambivalence, reveals the poverty of democracy as a critical category insofar as 
democratic iconography is always formal and never pledged to any particular content. 
The democratic turn never answers the challenge posed by Schmitt: 
                                                 
37 Foucault (1972), 235. 
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If all political tendencies could make use of democracy, then this proved that it 
had no political content and was only an organizational form; and if one regarded 
it from the perspective of some political program that one hoped to achieve with 
the help of democracy, then one had to ask oneself what value democracy itself 
had merely as a form.38 
 
We have seen throughout this project many attempts to bypass this problem, to suture the 
figure of democracy and the concerns of critical theory without leaving a remainder. I 
have argued that this attempt cannot be successful, and that the critical currency of 
democracy relies on a legerdemain whereby Right-wing populism is excluded without 
adequate justification. The danger in this does not lie in some damage done to the 
blacklisted movements; on the contrary, the categorical imperative of democracy 
deprives us of the tools necessary to understand and confront the false and pathological 
political tendencies that, today, constitute nothing short of an existential threat. This is 
why I claim that an account of ‘false democracy,’ which suggests that things would be 
better if only they were more democratic, should be displaced by an account of ‘false 
demos,’ which asks after the social conditions of prevailing popular delusions without 
lapsing into a Platonic elitism.    
 At the beginning of the last century, G.K. Chesterton defended his conservative 
politics by appealing to a “democracy of the dead.”39 Without exactly intending it, the 
democratic turn appeals to a democracy of those who do not yet (and may never) exist. 
The decisive question then becomes: who can appeal to a democracy of the living? If a 
critical theory of society interested in emancipation cannot do this without embroiling 
itself in the contradictions narrated by this project, then it must look for the terms of its 







                                                 
38 Schmitt, 24. 
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